Crabell v. The Wapello Coal Co.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: SEEVERS, J.
• Citation: 28 N.W. 56,68 Iowa 751
• Parties: CRABELL, ADM'R, v. THE WAPELLO COAL CO
• Decision Date: 23 April 1886

28 N.W. 56

68 Iowa 751

CRABELL, ADM'R,
v.
THE WAPELLO COAL CO

Supreme Court of Iowa, Dubuque

April 23, 1886

Appeal from Wapello District Court.

ACTION to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's son, who was killed in the coal mine of the defendant because of the alleged negligence of the defendant. Trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

AFFIRMED.

McNett & Tisdale, for appellant.

Stiles & Beaman, for appellee.

OPINION

SEEVERS, J.

There was an entry or slope into the mine which was several hundred feet in length. When cars were loaded in the rooms, they were drawn by mules to the slope, and from six to ten cars were then hitched together, and drawn out of the mine to the dump by an engine located outside [68 Iowa 752] of the mine. The train, when so made up and hauled out, was known as the "trip," and the person in charge was called the conductor of the trip. At the time the plaintiff's son was killed he was acting as such conductor, and was riding on the front car, which was loaded with coal.

I. It is insisted that the plaintiff cannot recover because there was, at the time of the accident, a statute in force which prohibited all persons from riding on such cars, and making it a misdemeanor to do so. The statute in question is chapter 202 of the Acts of the Eighteenth General Assembly, entitled "An act to regulate mines and mining." It provides for the appointment of a state mine inspector, and defines his duties. The act also provides the manner of opening new mines and operating those in existence, and its primary object is the protection of mines, miners and operators. Section 15 of the act is as follows: "Any miner, workmen, or any other person, who shall knowingly injure or interfere with any air-course or brattice, or obstruct or throw open doors, or disturb any part of the machinery, or disobey any order given in carrying out the provisions of this act, or ride upon a loaded car or wagon in a shaft or slope, or do any act whereby the lives and health of the persons, or the security of the mines and machinery, is endangered; or if any miner or person employed in any mine governed by the provisions of this act shall neglect or refuse to securely prop or support the roof and entries under his control, or neglect or refuse to obey any order given by the superintendent in relation to the security of the mine under his charge or control, --every such person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," and punished as prescribed in the statute.

Counsel for the appellant contend that there is no ambiguity in the statute, and that the deceased clearly comes within the language of it. They further contend that, while in construing a statute the intention of the legislature should be sought, yet that no construction can be adopted which conflicts with, [68 Iowa 753] or renders nugatory, the language, or a material portion of it, used to express the legislative thought. On the other hand, the counsel for the appellee contend that the statute should not be so construed as to apply to a person [28 N.W. 57] who is engaged in the performance of a necessary duty, and that the context and the whole statute should be considered for the purpose of determining its meaning.

It appears from the evidence that some person always accompanied the cars when trips were made. This was not only proper, but essential. The cars frequently got off the track, and other accidents were liable to occur, and it was the duty of the person in charge to prevent such accidents if he could, and promptly give notice to the engineer in charge of the engine, and other employes, when one occurred. At the time he was killed, the deceased was employed in the discharge of such duty, as directed by defendant's superintendent. The language of the statute is broad and comprehensive, and the deceased was clearly within the letter, but this does not conclusively establish that he was within the intent, of the statute. One of the cardinal rules for the...