Crabtree By and Through Crabtree v. Muchmore

• Decision Date: 04 June 1990
• Docket Number: 89-6074 and 89-6170,Nos. 89-6073,s. 89-6073
• Citation: 904 F.2d 1475
• Parties: Catherine Dianne CRABTREE, a minor, By and Through her next friend, F. Dale CRABTREE; David Lynn Crabtree, a minor, by and through his next friend, F. Dale Crabtree; Avondale, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clyde D. MUCHMORE; Brooke S. Murphy; Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., Defendants-Appellees, and David M. Cook, Judge of the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Defendant. Catherine Dianne CRABTREE, a minor, By and Through her next friend, F. Dale CRABTREE; David Lynn Crabtree, a minor, by and through his next friend, F. Dale Crabtree; Avondale, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clyde D. MUCHMORE; Brooke S. Murphy; Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., Defendants, and David M. Cook, Judge of the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Defendant/Appellee. Catherine Dianne CRABTREE, a minor, By and Through her next friend, F. Dale CRABTREE; David Lynn Crabtree, a minor, by and through his next friend, F. Dale Crabtree; Avondale, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clyde D. MUCHMORE; Brooke S. Murphy; Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1475

904 F.2d 1475

16 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1216

Catherine Dianne CRABTREE, a minor, By and Through her next

friend, F. Dale CRABTREE; David Lynn Crabtree, a minor, by and through his next friend, F. Dale Crabtree; Avondale, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clyde D. MUCHMORE; Brooke S. Murphy; Harvey D. Ellis, Jr.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

David M. Cook, Judge of the District Court of Oklahoma

County, Oklahoma, Defendant.

Catherine Dianne CRABTREE, a minor, By and Through her next

friend, F. Dale CRABTREE; David Lynn Crabtree, a minor, by and through his next friend, F. Dale Crabtree; Avondale, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clyde D. MUCHMORE; Brooke S. Murphy; Harvey D. Ellis, Jr.,

Defendants,

and

David M. Cook, Judge of the District Court of Oklahoma

County, Oklahoma, Defendant/Appellee.

Catherine Dianne CRABTREE, a minor, By and Through her next

friend, F. Dale CRABTREE; David Lynn Crabtree, a minor, by and through his next friend, F. Dale Crabtree; Avondale, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clyde D. MUCHMORE; Brooke S. Murphy; Harvey D. Ellis, Jr.,

Defendants/Appellants.

Nos. 89-6073, 89-6074 and 89-6170.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

June 4, 1990.

Charles E. Geister III and Patrick M. Ryan of Ryan, Corbyn & Geister, Oklahoma City, Okl., for Clyde D. Muchmore, Brooke S. Murphy and Harvey D. Ellis, Jr.

Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen. of Oklahoma, and Robert A. Nance, Asst. Atty. Gen., Deputy Chief, Federal Div., Oklahoma City, Okl., for David M. Cook.

William B. Rogers of William B. Rogers & Associates, Oklahoma City, Okl., for Catherine Dianne Crabtree, a minor, by and through her next friend, F. Dale Crabtree, David Lynn Crabtree, and Avondale, Inc.

Before LOGAN, BARRETT and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

These companion appeals arise out of a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 suit filed by Catherine Dianne Crabtree, David Lynn Crabtree and Avondale, Inc., against Oklahoma State District Judge David M. Cook and attorneys Clyde A. Muchmore, Brooke S. Murphy, and Harvey D. Ellis, Jr. (attorney defendants). The district court dismissed the actions against the attorney defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Judge Cook also filed a motion to dismiss, which the court considered as a motion for summary judgment and granted on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. The court awarded attorney's fees under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 against plaintiffs and their counsel in favor of Judge Cook but refused to enter such sanctions in favor of the attorney defendants. In No. 89-6073, the Crabtrees appeal the dismissal in favor of the defendant attorneys, and in No. 89-6074 they challenge the dismissal and grant of attorney's fees in favor of the defendant judge. ¹ The attorney defendants appeal the district court's denial of sanctions and attorney's fees in No. 89-6170. ²

No. 89-6073

In No. 89-6073, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for substantially the reasons stated in the district court's order of January 30, 1989, which we attach hereto. We hold that the district court correctly construed the complaint as stating insufficient facts tending to show that the attorneys had an understanding or agreed plan with Judge Cook sufficient to state a cause of action for conspiracy. We also hold that the district court properly analyzed the requirements under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), for alleging a cause of action under a "joint participation" theory. Because the complaint does not state a cause of action, we do not analyze the attorney defendants' alternate argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the action was an attempt to gain review of state court decisions.

No. 89-6074

In No. 89-6074, we affirm the district court's grant of judgment in favor of the defendant judge on grounds of absolute judicial immunity and its award of attorney's fees as sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The Crabtrees concede that the judge acted only in a judicial capacity. Their complaint is based upon a theory that somehow he acted absent jurisdiction because, they allege, he had no personal jurisdiction over the Crabtree children. At the same time they acknowledge that the judge did have before him the Crabtree children's trust and he found that the trust owned the property that forms the basis of the children's claim of an unconstitutional deprivation. ³ They also acknowledge that the Crabtree children filed a motion in state court to vacate the court's judgment, that they appealed the denial of their motion to vacate and brought several original actions before the Oklahoma Supreme Court with respect to the property, that their attorney made the statement in court that the Crabtree "family" claimed the property as exempt, and that Avondale was served with a notice of the motion for a temporary restraining order. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 3-4. If we accepted the Crabtrees' theory, no judge could claim judicial immunity for his actions if he incorrectly determined that his court had personal jurisdiction over parties to a suit, or over persons who held an interest in property in which the court was adjudicating ownership at the behest of another. We hold that no attorney, charged with the responsibility of reading the Supreme Court's decision in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), and our opinion in Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431 (10th Cir.1986), could believe that absolute judicial immunity would not bar the action against Judge Cook. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the action against the state court judge and did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions and assessing attorney's fees.

No. 89-6170

In No. 89-6170, the defendant attorneys appeal from the district court's denial of their motions for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 and sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. In its order denying these defendants attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 the court relied upon Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), and its rule that a prevailing defendant recovers fees only when the suit "was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Id. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. The district court stated that it had reviewed the complaint's allegations "under the complex and evolving case law regarding the pleading of conspiracy and joint participation in 1983 actions," I R. (No. 89-6074) tab 68 at 2, and reasoned that it had evaluated the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), but "did not delve into, or address, the merits of such claims; it merely found that pleading requirements had not been satisfied. Based upon the same, the court finds in its discretion that an award of attorney's fees is not warranted under section 1988." I R. (No. 89-6074) tab 68 at 2.

By referencing the "complex and evolving case law" on pleading conspiracy and joint participation, we assume that the district court was referring to the difficulties lower courts have had in determining the exact parameters of the Lugar requirements for joint participation. The court may have been giving plaintiffs and their counsel the benefit of the doubt, apparently both as to the form of pleading a cause of action and the possibility of stating a valid claim. We have some sympathy for the difficulties of pleading a Sec. 1983 conspiracy between private actors and state officials who have immunity, but it is not enough for the district court to base a denial of Sec. 1988 fees on its own failure to "delve into, or address, the merits" of the claims pleaded. It must look to the merits to the extent of determining whether the action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. ⁴ In the instant context, we think that is the same inquiry that it should make with respect to imposing upon counsel Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 sanctions. So we turn now to the district court's consideration of Rule 11.

The court gave the following reasoning for denying Rule 11 sanctions:

"In determining whether monetary sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate in this instance, the Court has focused on that language in the Rule that requires the pleadings to be well grounded in fact and not interposed for any improper purpose. In so doing, the Court finds that while it determined that the plaintiffs had failed to allege to this Court's satisfaction under extant case law sufficient facts to support claims of conspiracy and/or joint participation, such failure does not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct. The plaintiffs' claims were arguable; as stated, the Court merely determined under the stringent requirements for pleading conspiracy and joint participation for purposes of section 1983 that the plaintiffs had failed under Rule 12(b)(6).

The inquiry into 'improper purpose' appears to require the Court to fathom the motives of counsel and parties despite the appellate court's statements regarding objective reasonableness. In reviewing the record to determine the existence of this factor, the Court finds despite the defendants' strenuous and repeated contentions that the actions of Messrs. Crabtree and Rogers and Avondale are 'vexatious and contumacious,' that monetary sanctions will not be imposed under Rule 11."

I R. (No. 89-6074) tab 68 at 4-5.

The key statements here were the court's conclusions that plaintiffs' claims were "arguable," that the court had "merely determined under the stringent requirement for pleading conspiracy and joint participation" that plaintiffs had failed, and that inquiry into " 'improper purpose' appears to require the Court to fathom the motives of ...