Christiansburg Garment Co v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Decision Date | 23 January 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 76-1383,76-1383 |
Citation | 434 U.S. 412,98 S.Ct. 694,54 L.Ed.2d 648 |
Parties | CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT CO., Petitioner, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Two years after a racial discrimination charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been filed against petitioner company, respondent, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), notified the complainant that its conciliation efforts had failed and that she had the right to sue the company, which she did not do. Almost two years later, § 14 of the 1972 amendments to Title VII authorized the EEOC to sue in its own name on charges "pending" with the EEOC on the effective date of the amendments. The EEOC then sued petitioner on complainant's charge and the District Court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the charge had not been "pending" at the time of the 1972 amendments. The company then petitioned for the allowance of attorney's fees against the EEOC pursuant to § 706(k) of Title VII, which authorizes a district court in its discretion to allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee. Finding that the EEOC's action in bringing the suit was not "unreasonable or meritless" and that its statutory interpretation of § 14 was not "frivolous," the District Court ruled that an award to petitioner of attorney's fees was not justified. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held :
1. Although a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII proceeding is ordinarily to be awarded attorney's fees by the district court in all but special circumstances, a prevailing defendant is to be awarded such fees only when the court in the exercise of its discretion has found that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Pp. 415-422.
(a) There are at least two strong equitable considerations favoring an attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff that are wholly absent in the case of a Title VII defendant, viz. the plaintiff is Congress' chosen instrument to vindicate "a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority," Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263, and when a district court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law. Pp. 418-419.
(b) No statutory provision would have been necessary had an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant been based only on the plaintiff's bad faith in bringing the action, for even under the American common-law rule (which ordinarily does not allow attorney's fees to the prevailing party) such fees can be awarded against a party who has proceeded in bad faith. P. 419.
2. The District Court properly applied the foregoing standards and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that an award to petitioner of attorney's fees was not justified. Pp. 423-424.
550 F.2d 949, affirmed.
Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
"In any action or proceeding under this title the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee . . . ." 1
The question in this case is under what circumstances an attorney's fee should be allowed when the defendant is the prevailing party in a Title VII action—a question about which the federal courts have expressed divergent views.
Two years after Rosa Helm had filed a Title VII charge of racial discrimination against the petitioner Christiansburg Garment Co. (company), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notified her that its conciliation efforts had failed and that she had the right to sue the company in federal court. She did not do so. Almost two years later, in 1972, Congress enacted amendments to Title VII.2 Section 14 of these amendments authorized the Commission to sue in its own name to prosecute "charges pending with the Commission" on the effective date of the amendments. Proceeding under this section, the Commission sued the company, alleging that it had engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the amended Act. The company moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the Rosa Helm charge had not been "pending" before the Commission when the 1972 amendments took effect. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the company. 376 F.Supp. 1067 (W.D.Va.).3
The company then petitioned for the allowance of attorney's fees against the Commission pursuant to § 706(k) of Title VII. Finding that "the Commission's action in bringing the suit cannot be characterized as unreasonable or meritless," the District Court concluded that "an award of attorney's fees to petitioner is not justified in this case." 4 A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, 550 F.2d 949 (CA4), and we granted certiorari to consider an important question of federal law, 432 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2948, 53 L.Ed.2d 1077.
It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants must pay their own attorney's fees. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141. Congress has provided only limited exceptions to this rule "under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights." Id., at 260, 95 S.Ct. at 1623. Some of these statutes make fee awards mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs; 5 others make awards permissive but limit them to certain parties usually prevailing plaintiffs.6 But many of the statutes are more flexible, authorizing the award of attorney's fees to either plaintiffs or defendants, and entrusting the effectuation of the statutory policy to the discretion of the district courts.7 Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 falls into this last category, providing as it does that a district court may in its discretion allow an attorney's fee to the prevailing party.
In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263, the Court considered a substantially identical statute authorizing the award of attorney's fees under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 In that case the plaintiffs had prevailed, and the Court of Appeals had held that they should be awarded their attorney's fees "only to the extent that the respondents' defenses had been advanced 'for purposes of delay and not in good faith.' " Id., at 401, 88 S.Ct. at 966. We ruled that this "subjective standard" did not properly effectuate the purposes of the counsel-fee provision of Title II. Relying primarily on the intent of Congress to cast a Title II plaintiff in the role of "a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority," we held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id., at 402, 88 S.Ct. at 966. We noted in passing that if the objective of Congress had been to permit the award of attorney's fees only against defendants who had acted in bad faith, "no new statutory provision would have been necessary," since even the American common-law rule allows the award of attorney's fees in those exce tional circumstances. Id., at 402, 88 S.Ct. at 966 n. 4.9
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280, the Court made clear that the Piggie Park standard of awarding attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff is equally applicable in an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 422 U.S., at 415, 95 S.Ct., at 2370. See also Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 428, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48. It can thus be taken as established, as the parties in this case both acknowledge, that under § 706(k) of Title VII a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances.10
The question in the case before us is what standard should inform a district court's discretion in deciding whether to award attorney's fees to a successful defendant in a Title VII action. Not surprisingly, the parties in addressing the question in their briefs and oral arguments have taken almost diametrically opposite positions.11
The company contends that the Piggie Park criterion for a successful plaintiff should apply equally as a guide to the award of attorney's fees to a successful defendant. Its submission, in short, is that every prevailing defendant in a Title VII action should receive an allowance of attorney's fees "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." 12 The respondent Commission, by contrast, argues that the prevailing defendant should receive an award of attorney's fees only when it is found that the plaintiff's action was brought in bad faith. We have concluded that neither of these positions is correct.
Relying on what it terms "the plain meaning of the statute," the company argues that the language of § 706(k) admits of only one interpretation: "A prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff." But the permissive and discretionary language of the statute does not even invite, let alone require, such a mechanical construction. The terms of § 706(k) provide no indication whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a defendant should be entitled to attorney's fees. And a moment's reflection reveals that there are at least two strong equitable considerations counseling an attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff that are wholly absent in the case of a prevailing Title VII defendant.
First, as emphasized so forcefully in Piggie Park, the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate "a policy that Con...
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