Craddock v. Bickelhaupt

• Decision Date: 24 October 1939
• Docket Number: 44888.
• Parties: CRADDOCK v. BICKELHAUPT.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

288 N.W. 109

227 Iowa 202

CRADDOCK v. BICKELHAUPT.

No. 44888.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 24, 1939

Appeal from District Court, Clinton County; W. R. Maines, Judge.

Suit for damages growing out of an automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

Reversed.

John T. McCarthy, of Clinton, Kenline, Roedell & Hoffman, of Dubuque, and W. E. Purcell, of Clinton, for appellant.

Miller & Claussen, of Clinton, for appellee.

STIGER, Justice.

I.

On May 24, 1935, there was a collision between the car in which plaintiff's intestate was riding and an Oldsmobile automobile driven by Ben Unruh, who, on May 4 1935, had purchased the car from defendant, G. E Bickelhaupt, under a conditional sales contract. Plaintiff seeks to recover against defendant as owner of the car which he alleges Unruh was driving with his consent. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict. One of the grounds of the motion was that plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant was the owner of the Oldsmobile at the time of the accident; that the evidence affirmatively showed that defendant Bickelhaupt was not the owner of the automobile at the time of the accident and disclosed that Unruh was the owner of the car at said time. This motion, which was renewed at the close of all the evidence, was overruled, and defendant's first assignment of error is based on the overruling of the motion.

The following code sections are material to this issue:

" 4863. Definitions . In all laws of this state regulating motor vehicles, except where otherwise expressly provided:

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8. ‘ Owner’ shall include any person having the lawful ownership, use or control, or the right to the use or control, of a motor vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for a period of ten or more successive days."

" 5026. Liability for damages . In all cases where damage is done by any car driven by any person under fifteen years of age and in all cases where damage is done by the car, driven by consent of the owner, by reason of negligence of the driver, the owner of the car shall be liable for such damage."

" 9947. (§ 18.) Property in specific goods passes when parties so intend .

1. Where there is a contract to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.

2. For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, usages of trade, and the circumstances of the case."

Plaintiff's evidence establishes the following facts: On May 4, 1935, Unruh paid $20 to defendant on the purchase price of the Oldsmobile and executed a promissory note to the defendant for $70 for the balance of the purchase price payable at the office of Sherlock Finance Corporation, Savanna, Illinois. The note was immediately endorsed by defendant to the finance corporation without recourse.

We quote some of the provisions of the conditional sales contract executed by Unruh and defendant:

" Sold to the undersigned Purchaser by the undersigned Dealer, the following described property including standard equipment: one Used 1927 Olds 2 door upon which the purchaser owes and agrees to pay a balance of Seventy Dollars ...... Dollars ($70.00) at the office of the Sherlock Finance Corporation, in Savanna. Illinois, in accordance with a certain negotiable note of even date.

1. The purchaser represents and agrees that he has inspected, accepted and received said property and that no warranty other than title to said property has been made to him, by the seller.

3. Title to said property shall remain in the dealer until the entire purchase price is fully paid in cash and until this contract is fully performed. Any equipment, tires or accessories now or hereafter placed upon said vehicle shall be covered by this contract.

8. As an inducement for the Sherlock Finance Corporation to purchase the seller's interest under this conditional sales contract, all parties to this contract, and all assignors and guarantors and indorsers, hereby agree to perform this contract at the office of the Sherlock Finance Corporation, Savanna, Illinois, and each waive the right to a change of venue from any court in Carroll County, Illinois.

9. The Purchaser acknowledges receipt from the Dealer of a true and complete copy of this contract, and takes notice that the Dealer for value received hereby sells and transfers this contract and said note and all the right, title and interest of the Dealer in and to said property to the Sherlock Finance Corporation of Savanna, Illinois."

The contract also provides for repossession and sale by defendant on default by the purchaser.

Unruh testified that he talked with defendant about buying a car and then " made a deal" with him for the Oldsmobile. He refers to himself as " purchaser" . Unruh stated in the contract that " he has inspected, accepted and received said property."

Unruh promised to pay for the automobile, he took possession and control of it immediately on the execution of the contract and it is clear that the delivery of possession to Unruh was with the mutual intention of passing the immediate ownership of the automobile to him subject only to reservation of title in defendant as security for the balance of the purchase money. The relationship between the parties was that of seller and buyer. This transaction was undoubtedly a conditional sale.

In the recent case of Hansen v. Kuhn, Iowa, 285 N.W. 249, 252, our principal cases defining conditional sale contracts are cited. In this case we held that under a conditional sale contract in substantially the same terms as the contract in the instant case the buyer was the substantial owner, and the vendor, who retained the legal title only as security for payment of the residue of the purchase price, was not an " owner" within the purview of Sections 5026 and 4863, subd. 8.

Justice Bliss, speaking for the court, states: " Kuhn bought the truck. The only matter held in abeyance was the completed payment. He became the beneficial owner, the equitable owner, the substantial owner, immediately upon the execution of the contract. Only the naked title remained in the seller, subject to being completely divested, upon the receipt of the final deferred installment of the purchase price. Other than the matter of payment, such a sale transaction is in nowise different from an absolute sale."

The decision in this case is controlled by the decision in the Kuhn case.

Plaintiff, appellee, in argument states: " No single sentence in the contract gives to Unruh any present or certain right in the car. There is no provision in the contract which gives or recognizes a right in Unruh to do more than to acquire title to and ownership of the car upon the completion of the contract payments. Under the terms of the contract, as between appellant and Unruh, both ‘ title’ and ‘ ownership’ remained in appellant." Instruction No. 17, after calling the jury's attention to the fact that the contract recited the car was sold to the purchaser and contained the provision that title remained in defendant until the entire purchase price was paid, stated: " Contracts of this character are known to the law as conditional sales contracts and such contracts do not pass title to the property to the purchaser at the time of their execution, but on the contrary, in the absence of other circumstances, reserve the ownership and title to the property in the seller. So it is the law in the case before you that the contract between defendant and Unruh left the defendant with ownership of the car, unless you find other facts and circumstances which establish an intention on their part that title to and ownership of the car should pass to Unruh." (Italics supplied.)

We are not in accord with the argument or the instruction. Unruh, the purchaser, became the substantial, beneficial owner under the contract.

II.

Code Sections 4961-4964, inclusive, relating to transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle, read:

" 4961. Notice . Upon the transfer of ownership of any registered motor vehicle, the owner shall immediately give notice to the county treasurer, upon the form on the reverse side of the certificate of registration, stating the date of such transfer, the name and post-office address, with street number if in a city, of the person to whom transferred, the license number, and such other information as the department may require.

4962. Duty of purchaser. The purchaser of the motor vehicle shall join in the notice of transfer to the county treasurer and shall at the same time make application for the transfer of the motor vehicle and for a new certificate of registration.

4963. Registration and fee . Upon filing the application for transfer, the applicant shall pay a fee of fifty cents for the transfer, thereupon the county treasurer, if satisfied of the genuineness and regularity of such transfer, shall register said motor vehicle in the name of the transferee and issue a new certificate of registration as provided in this chapter.

4964. When title passes . Until said transferee has received said certificate of registration and has written his name upon the face thereof for the purpose of this chapter, delivery and title to said motor vehicle shall be deemed not to have been made and passed."

Appellee states in argument that " the statute (4964) takes out of the case before the court the only thing on which appellant may rest his case, the delivery of possession. Under the statute delivery is deemed not to have been made. The statute, as well as the contract, provides that title to the car did...