Cradle Ip, LLC v. Tex. Instruments, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 November 2013
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 11–1254–SLR
• Parties: Cradle IP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Texas Instruments, Inc., Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

5 F.Supp.3d 626

Cradle IP, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.Texas Instruments, Inc., Defendant

Civ. No. 11–1254–SLR

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

November 20, 2013

Paul E. Crawford, Esquire and Thatcher A. Rahmeier, Esquire of Novak Druce Connolly Bove + Quigg LLP, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Plaintiff. Of Counsel: Jeffrey K. Sherwood, Esquire, Frank C. Cimino, Jr., Esquire, Charles W. Saber, Esquire, Robert G. Gingher, Esquire, and Steven T. Skelley, Esquire of Dickstein Shapiro LLP.

Jeffrey L. Moyer, Esquire, Kelly E. Farnan, Esquire, and Jason J. Rawnsley, Esquire of Richards, Layton, & Finger, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant. Of Counsel: Robert T. Haslam, Esquire, Anupam Sharma, Esquire, Thomas E. Garten, Esquire, Charlin C. Lu, Esquire, Hyun Byun, Esquire, Patrick N. Flynn, Esquire, Jessica R. Baldwin, Esquire, and Eric A. Caligiuri, Esquire of Covington & Burling LLP.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sue L. Robinson, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 16, 2011, plaintiff Cradle IP, LLC (“Cradle”) filed suit in this district against defendant Texas Instruments, Inc. (“Tl”) alleging infringement of three of its patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,874,049 (“the '049 patent”), 6,708,259 (the “259 patent”), and 6,647,450 (the “450 patent”). (D.I.1) Tl answered the complaint and asserted a counterclaim for declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the '049, '259, and '450 patents on February 6, 2012. (D.I.10) Cradle answered Tl's counterclaims on March 1, 2012. (D.I.15)

Presently before the court are Tl's motions for summary judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the patents-in-suit. (D.I. 217; D.I. 218) Tl also filed motions to exclude testimony by Cradle's experts, Dr. James Olivier and Dr. David Albonesi. (D.I. 224; D.I. 227) Additionally, Cradle filed motions to strike the declaration and testimony of Michael Shay, as well as new expert opinions. (D.I. 271; D.I. 309) Tl also filed motions to strike inadmissible evidence and untimely expert opinions. (D.I. 295; D.I. 315) The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).

Cradle is a limited liability corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 6) Cradle is a privately-held, majority-owned subsidiary of Cradle Technologies. ( Id. at ¶ 8) Cradle Technologies recently assigned the patents-in-suit to Cradle. ( Id.) Tl is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. ( Id. at ¶ 7) It makes, manufactures, and sells the accused products. ( Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16, 19)

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEWA. Summary Judgment

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A party asserting that a fact cannot be—or, alternatively, is—genuinely disputed must support the assertion either by citing to “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the purposes of the motions only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see alsoPodob nik v. U.S. Postal Service, 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir.2005) (stating party opposing summary judgment “must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment,” a factual dispute is genuine where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted); see alsoCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”).

B. Claim Construction

Claim construction is a matter of law. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc). Claim construction focuses on intrinsic evidence—the claims, specification and prosecution history—because intrinsic evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd,517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Claims must be interpreted from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.

Claim construction starts with the claims, id. at 1312, and remains centered on the words of the claims throughout. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001). In the absence of an express intent to impart different meaning to claim terms, the terms are presumed to have their ordinary meaning. Id. Claims, however, must be read in view of the specification and prosecution history. Indeed, the specification is often “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.

C. Infringement

A patent is infringed when a person “without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States ... during the term of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A two-step analysis is employed in making an infringement determination. SeeMarkman, 52 F.3d at 976. First, the court must construe the asserted claims to ascertain their meaning and scope. See id.Construction of the claims is a question of law subject to de novo review. SeeCybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998). The trier of fact must then compare the properly construed claims with the accused infringing product. SeeMarkman, 52 F.3d at 976. This second step is a question of fact. SeeBai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.Cir.1998).

“Direct infringement requires a party to perform each and every step or element of a claimed method or product.” BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2007), overruled on other grounds by692 F.3d 1301 (Fed.Cir.2012). “If any claim limitation is absent from the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter of law.” Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 (Fed.Cir.2000). If an accused product does not infringe an independent claim, it also does not infringe any claim depending thereon. SeeWahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed.Cir.1989). However, “[o]ne may infringe an independent claim and not infringe a claim dependent on that claim.” Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2007) (quoting Wahpeton Canvas, 870 F.2d at 1552) (internal quotations omitted). A product that does not literally infringe a patent claim may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if the differences between an individual limitation of the claimed invention and an element of the accused product are insubstantial. SeeWarner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). The patent owner has the burden of proving infringement and must meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. SeeSmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citations omitted).

When an accused infringer moves for summary judgment of non-infringement, such relief may be granted only if one or more limitations of the claim in question does not read on an element of the accused product, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. SeeChimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2005); see alsoTechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment of noninfringement is ... appropriate where the patent owner's proof is deficient in meeting an essential part of the legal standard for infringement, because such failure will render all other facts immaterial.”). Thus, summary judgment of non-infringement can only be granted if, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue as to whether the accused product is...