Craft v. Homochitto Lumber, Co.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1925
• Docket Number: 25287
• Citation: 141 Miss. 156,106 So. 440
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: CRAFT v. HOMOCHITTO LUMBER, CO. [*]

106 So. 440

141 Miss. 156

CRAFT v. HOMOCHITTO LUMBER, CO. ^[*]

No. 25287

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 14, 1925

Division B

Suggestion Of Error Overruled January 11, 1926.

APPEAL from chancery court of Franklin county, HON. R. W. CUTRER Chancellor.

Suit by the Homochitto Lumber Company against Sidney Craft administrator, to enjoin action at law. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and bill dismissed.

Reversed, and bill dismissed.

Rawls & Hathorn and Price & Price, for appellant.

Where there is an adequate remedy at law, equity will not intervene, nor will injunctive relief be granted. See 14 R. C. L. 407, par. 108; 32 C. J., page 63, par. 41; 32 C. J. 98 et seq., pars. 96, 97, 98, 114. We call attention to the following Mississippi authorities sustaining the rule above announced: Learned v. Holmes, 49 Miss. 300; New Orleans Shell Co. etc. v. Lowenstein et al., 11 So. 187; Saucier et al. v. Rouse, 12 So. 481; Larson v. Larson, 82 Miss. 116; Harvester Co. v. Still, 98 Miss. 127; Adams v. Bank, 103 Miss. 745. The case of Savage v. Edgar, 3 A. L. R. 1025, is very much like the case at bar. See also Burkhart v. Scott, 72 S.E. 784, 3 A. L. R. 1028; Town of Grand Chute v. Winegar et al., 21 L.Ed. (U. S.) 174.

Since the complainant has a complete and adequate remedy at law, and since the law court jurisdiction was first invoked, and the defense, which complainant wants to make us wait for from a court of equity, is available as a complete and adequate defense in the court of law, we submit that the motion to dissolve the injunction must be sustained.

We have been unable to find anywhere a case where an action at law has been enjoined to await the result of an action in chancery, where none of the parties to the action at law are parties to or in any way connected with the action in chancery. We submit that it is manifestly unfair, and anything but equitable, for this administrator to be restrained from prosecuting his action to await the result of an action in chancery over which neither he nor complainant here have any kind of control. Who knows what Martha may decide to do with the case in the chancery court of Franklin county? Neither the administrator nor the complainant can control her action in the case, nor the way she handles it. She may, so far as we know, drag it along for several terms and then dismiss it, and not only the administrator, but the complainant as well, would be powerless to prevent it. If it were an action over which either the complainant or the administrator had control, a different situation might arise, but such is not the case. Therefore, the injunction should be dissolved.

Luther A. Whittington, for appellee.

Upon the allegations in the petition for letters of administration, it might be said that the appointment of the appellant as administrator of the estate of Will Craft, deceased, was in pursuance of the provisions of section 1684, Hemingway's Code, which provides that "if necessary, an administrator may be appointed to institute and conduct suits, etc."

But, another petition had been filed in the chancery court in which said letters of administration had been granted, and when said petition alleged or charged that the petitioner or person claiming to be the sole heir at law, was in truth and fact the sole heir at law of the deceased, and that she had made settlement as such heir at law of the cause of action on account of which the administrator had been appointed for the purpose of bringing suit, it was altogether in the inherent, jurisdiction of the chancery court to order the administrator to stay further proceedings until the determination by that court of the petition filed to declare Martha Stovall Craft, the sole heir at law of said Will Craft, deceased, and that is precisely what the effect of the injunction issued by the chancellor was with reference to the suit which had been instituted by said administrator in the circuit court of Lincoln county against the Homochitto Lumber Co.

The petition of Martha Stovall Craft to have herself decreed to be the sole heir at law of Will Craft, deceased, to our mind is well founded, and is made in pursuance of the provisions of the statute authorizing such proceedings.

The only authority of Sidney Craft to sue in this case proceeded from the action of the court in adjudicating it "necessary" that suit be instituted. Now, when another petition is filed before that same court, and the administrator or servant of the court itself, is made a party to that petition, the chancery court would have the power inherently, all parties being before it, to stay the execution of the authority vested by that same court in the administrator to prosecute said suit, until the court had determined the question of whether said suit was "necessary." We submit, therefore, that the chancery court in granting this injunction was in the exercise of its inherent authority and jurisdiction to direct the administrator to stay proceedings until the question of heirship had been settled in the forum where that question had been definitely raised, in pursuance of the specific statutory remedy.

There can be no questioning of the right of Martha Stovall Craft to invoke the statutory remedy to have herself decreed to be the sole heir at law of Will Craft, deceased. Her rights were entitled to be heard and protected by the specific remedy provided by law, and that remedy she has invoked.

We submit, therefore, that Martha Stovall Craft, having the right to statutory remedy, and having invoked the statutory remedy, the Homochitto Lumber Company, having dealt with said Martha Stovall Craft, as the sole heir at law of said Will Craft, deceased, had the right to enjoy the benefit of any decree that might be rendered by the chancery court on the petition of Martha Stovall Craft, if benefit accused to the Homochitto Lumber Co. by virtue of such decree.

The injunction herein granted should be sustained, at least until the cause is tried on its merits and final decree of the court in the petition filed by Martha Stovall Craft to have herself declared the sole heir at law of Will Craft, deceased, is rendered.

OPINION

ANDERSON, J.

Appellee, Homochitto Lumber Company, a corporation, filed its bill in the chancery court of Franklin county against appellant, Sidney Craft, administrator, to enjoin the latter from prosecuting an action at law brought by him in the circuit court of Lincoln county against appellee. The cause was heard on bill, answer, motion to dissolve temporary injunction theretofore issued, and proofs, and a decree was rendered overruling appellant's motion to dissolve the injunction from which appellant was granted this appeal to settle the principles of the cause.

The controlling facts are as...