Craig v. Barnes, Docket No. C

• Citation: 710 A.2d 258
• Decision Date: 14 May 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. C
• Parties: Thomas R. CRAIG v. Estate of Thomas W. BARNES. um-97-814.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 258

710 A.2d 258

1998 ME 110

Thomas R. CRAIG v. Estate of Thomas W. BARNES.

Docket No. Cum-97-814.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 14, 1997.

Decided May 14, 1998.

Michael R. Bosse (orally), James M. Bowie, Thompson & Bowie, Portland, for Canal Ins. Co.

Anne H. Cressey (orally), John S. Whitmam, Richardson, Whitman, Large & Badger, P.C., Portland, for Green Mountain Ins. Co.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.

LIPEZ, Justice.

¶1 Canal Insurance Company appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Saufley, J.) in favor of Green Mountain Insurance Company on the basis of Green Mountain's contention that Thomas Barnes was not an insured within the meaning of the automobile insurance policy issued to Barnes's fiancee, Mildred Solak. Canal contends that the Superior Court erred in finding that Barnes did not possess a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use the motor vehicle being operated by him at the time of his accident with Thomas Craig. We disagree and affirm the summary judgment.

I.

¶2 The material facts of this case are undisputed. Barnes was the purchaser of a 1986 Pontiac GrandAm and was the only "owner" listed on its certificate of title. Barnes financed the purchase of the GrandAm with a secured loan and made the payments on that loan. However, Mildred Solak, Barnes's fiancee, testified in a deposition that Barnes had purchased the GrandAm as a gift for her. Solak kept the GrandAm at her home, registered it in her name, contracted with Green Mountain to insure it, and was the only person to drive it. The Green Mountain insurance policy named Solak as the only insured. Solak drove Barnes to and from his employment. Barnes had not possessed a valid driver's license for ten years because his license had been revoked due to his conviction of operating under the influence of intoxicants (OUI), and Solak had never known Barnes to drive either the GrandAm or anyone else's car. Solak testified that she would have refused to allow Barnes to drive the car had he sought permission to do so.

¶3 On the night of the accident, Solak went to bed early. Barnes, who had been drinking, removed the car keys from Solak's pocketbook and took the car without her knowledge. While operated by Barnes, the GrandAm collided with the rear of a taxicab driven by Craig and insured by Canal. Barnes fled the scene of the accident and subsequently was arrested and charged with OUI. Barnes has since died from causes unrelated to the accident.

¶4 Craig initiated this action against three defendants--Barnes's estate, Green Mountain, and Canal. Craig sought uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to Canal's policy. Craig also alleged that, at the time of the accident, Barnes was insured pursuant to Solak's policy issued by Green Mountain, and he sought benefits pursuant to that policy as well. Canal filed a cross-claim against Green Mountain, alleging that Barnes was insured by Green Mountain and seeking recoupment, indemnification, and contribution for any judgment that Craig should secure against Canal. Green Mountain moved for a summary judgment on Canal's cross-claim, arguing that Solak's policy did not extend coverage to Barnes. Canal also moved for a summary judgment, arguing that Barnes was an insured pursuant to Green Mountain's policy. The court granted a summary judgment in favor of Green Mountain, concluding that the exclusion in Green Mountain's policy denying coverage to any person "[u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so" applied to Barnes. This appeal followed.

II.

¶5 A party is entitled to a summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists and if the party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the undisputed facts. See Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp., 1997 ME 220, p 5, 704 A.2d 866, 868. "We review the grant of a summary judgment for an error of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been granted." Id. Our review of the trial court's decisions on questions of law is de novo. See Seashore Performing Arts Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 676 A.2d 482, 484 (Me.1996).

¶6 Solak's insurance policy issued by Green Mountain provided that Green Mountain "will pay damages for 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' for which any 'insured' becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident." The policy defines "[i]nsured" to include "[a]ny person using 'your covered auto.' " The policy then excludes from this general coverage any person "[u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so."

¶7 A person lacks a reasonable belief that he or she is entitled to use a vehicle if that person: (i) knows that he or she is not entitled to use the vehicle; or (ii) lacks objectively reasonable grounds for believing that he or she is entitled to use the vehicle. See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Perry, 75 Md.App. 503, 541 A.2d 1340, 1349 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1988) (evaluating an exclusion stating, "[w]e do not provide Liability Coverage for any person ... [u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so"), cert. denied, 313 Md. 612, 547 A.2d 189 (1988). In this case, the court concluded that Green Mountain did not establish that Barnes subjectively knew that he was not entitled to use the vehicle. The court determined, however, that Barnes lacked an objectively reasonable belief that he was entitled to use the GrandAm at the time of the accident.

¶8 This determination was correct. Pursuant to the plain language of the "reasonable belief" clause, the court determines if "[a]ny person" is an additional insured by examining whether that person had a reasonable belief that he or she was entitled to use the vehicle. The court must consider any fact relevant to the objective reasonableness of that person's belief. Relevant facts may include his or her ownership of the vehicle, receipt of permission for use from the named insured, relationship to the named insured, prior usage of the vehicle, and legal entitlement to drive. No one fact is dispositive.

¶9 In this case, the "[a]ny person" whose status as an insured is in dispute is the vehicle's operator. An operator of a vehicle uses that vehicle by operating it. As the court noted, the only facts that support an argument that Barnes could have reasonably believed that he was entitled to operate the GrandAm are his record ownership of the vehicle and his financing of it. By contrast, there are many facts that undermine the argument that Barnes possessed a reasonable belief that he was entitled to drive the car: Solak's testimony that Barnes presented the car to her as a gift; her sole possession of the car; her registration and insuring of the car in her name only; her testimony that only she drove the GrandAm and that she had never seen Barnes drive that or any other vehicle; her testimony that she would not have permitted Barnes to drive the car had he asked; Barnes's act of taking the car keys from Solak's purse while she was asleep without informing Solak that he was going to drive the car; and Barnes's failure...