Craig v. Burris
| Decision Date | 10 December 1902 |
| Citation | 20 Del. 156,55 A. 353 |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
| Parties | WILLIAM CRAIG v. MARTIN B. BURRIS |
Superior Court, New Castle County, November Term, 1902.
SUMMONS CASE IN SLANDER (No. 23, May Term, 1901).
The defendant was a practicing attorney, being a member of the New Castle County Bar. At the trial it was proved that the alleged slanderous words were uttered after the plaintiff was arrested and brought to the office of John W. Naudain, a Justice of the Peace at Townsend, Delaware, upon a warrant issued by said Justice, upon the complaint of one Benjamin F Ginn, charging the plaintiff with obtaining money by false pretence; but outside of the office of the Justice near the front thereof, and before he had been before said Justice to answer said charge, the defendant Burris and the plaintiff Craig and others being present.
It was also proved that the defendant was present upon the occasion in question representing one Benjamin F. Ginn, the prosecuting witness in the prosecution based upon the said warrant. Ginn claimed that Craig owed him a certain amount of money. The plaintiff, who was then without counsel, admitted that he owed Ginn, but denied that he obtained the money by false pretense from George M. D. Hart, as stated in the warrant, claiming that the only money he obtained from Hart was for his one-third share of the grain as tenant of Ginn's farm. The plaintiff's evidence on the last named point was corroborated by the statement of James A Hart.
The statements made by the defendant Burris, to the plaintiff upon that occasion as detailed by the different witnesses in the slander case, were as follows:
"You collected this money," or "got this money by false pretense."
The plaintiff was asked by his counsel what the people in and about Townsend understood the phrase "go up the road" to mean when used in connection with a person brought before a Justice of the Peace.
(Objected to by counsel for defendant on the ground that it is not sufficient to prove a local meaning attached to words, but it must be a meaning generally accepted.)
Verdict for defendant.
Franklin Brockson for plaintiff.
Robert M. Richards and William S. Hilles for defendant.
We think this question inadmissible.
(Plaintiff's counsel offered in evidence a copy of all the defendant's pleas in the case, alleging the truth of the matter charged to have been spoken, as an admission that they were spoken).
(Objected to by counsel for defendant on the ground that it had been decided by the Court frequently that pleadings in a case are not evidence therein and are not proper to go before the jury.)
The pleadings are not evidence.
(The defendant asked the Court to grant a nonsuit, on the ground that upon the evidence in the case the alleged slanderous words were proved to have been spoken under such circumstances as to make them privileged, and therefore they could not be the basis for an action for slander, and argued as follows):
Although the law is general that where words implying a crime are spoken they imply malice and are malicious per se, yet it is also the law that if they are spoken under such circumstances as to repel the implication of malice, then they are privileged. (2 Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 418); and that is a question of law for the Court.
Summerville vs. Hawkins, 70, E. C. L., 583; Taylor vs. Hawkins, 71, E. C. L., 308; 18 A. & E. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.), 1050; Cameron vs. Corkran, 16 Del. 166, 2 Marvel 166, 42 A. 454.
Where there is no dispute as to the circumstances surrounding the occasion whatever, the Court may decide whether that was a privileged occasion.
Monster vs. Lamb, 11 Q. B. Div. 588.
Where the evidence shows that the occasion was such as has been recognized as a privileged occasion, then the Court should grant a nonsuit. Judicial proceedings are privileged.
Goslin vs. Cannon, 1 Harr. 1; Eccels vs. Shannon, 4 Del. 193, 4 Harr. 193; Hoar vs. Wood, 3 Metcalf 193.
The plaintiff has failed to prove that Martin B. Burris had no authority from the Attorney-General to represent the State on this occasion; if Burris had such authority and could have done anything that the Attorney-General could have done, then his statement was a privileged statement, made in a judicial proceeding. The Court should hold in this case, as a matter of law, on the evidence, that the occasion in question was a privileged occasion; that the words spoken were no more than this defendant, as counsel for Benjamin F. Ginn, the complainant, or as representing the prosecuting officer of this State, should have spoken or could have spoken in connection with the discharge of his duty. If that be true then certainly these words cannot form the basis for such an action as this.
If it is to be presumed, as the authorities hold, that he appeared there by the authority of the Attorney-General, and if under a statute of the State, appearing there by such authority, his acts were as valid as the acts of the Attorney-General; it necessarily follows that he appeared there clothed with the powers and burdened with the duties of the Attorney-General, so far as that particular proceeding was concerned, and he could do anything that it was the Attorney-General's duty to do, and it was his duty to do anything that the Attorney-General had authority to do.
18 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 1039; Mayo vs. Sample, 18 Iowa 306.
Any words spokeu by a public officer in the performance of his duty, or in the course of his duty, are priviledged, and, therefore, cannot form the basis of an action for slander.
Brockson, for plaintiff, replied:
Whether or not the occasion was a privileged occasion in this case is a question of fact for the jury under the evidence.
First. It...
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