Craig v. Cartwright

• Decision Date: 05 February 1886
• Docket Number: Case No. 2186
• Citation: 65 Tex. 413
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN C. CRAIG v. AMANDA CARTWRIGHT.

65 Tex. 413

JOHN C. CRAIG

v.AMANDA CARTWRIGHT.

Case No. 2186

Supreme Court of Texas.

Feb. 5, 1886.

APPEAL from Jefferson. Tried below before the Hon. W. H. Ford.

This is a suit, in trespass to try title, by Amanda Cartwright, appellee, against John C. Craig, appellant, filed in the district court of Jefferson county, August 31, 1883, for the recovery of three thousand two hundred and fifty-six acres of land, more or less, a part of the tract known as the league granted to David Brown, a colonist, situate on the west bank of the Neches river, in Jefferson county, and for $10,000 damages for rental value thereof, and for trees and timber cut down, appropriated and destroyed.

The defendant, in his answer, pleaded: First, general demurrer; second, special demurrer, to the effect that the description in the petition of the land and premises claimed therein, is too uncertain and indefinite to inform defendant of what land is thereby sought to be recovered of him; third, disclaimer as to all of the land and premises described in the petition, except so much thereof as he was entitled to under his pleas of limitation, alleged to amount to six hundred and forty-four acres, including the Schusler and Lori lands and improvements; fourth, not guilty; fifth, general denial; sixth, limitation of ten years next before September 1, 1879, and next before the institution of this suit, as to four acres of the “Schusler place” and six hundred and forty acres of the “Lori place,” according to a boundary line agreed to between defendant and one C. C. Caswell, and according to the field notes of a survey made in accordance therewith; seventh, laches, in that the defendant, and those under whom he claimed, had been in actual, peaceable, adverse possession of the six hundred and forty-four acres, cultivating, using and enjoying the same, for more than twenty-five years next before September 1, 1879, and next after plaintiff's cause of action, if any, accrued, and more than thirty years next before the institution of this suit.

The plaintiff replied by supplemental petition, demurring to defendant's answer, and putting in issue the affirmative allegations thereof. The court overruled the defendant's demurrers, and, on December 2, 1885, the cause was tried by jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the land, and $300 damages. The court rendered judgment on the verdict, and the defendant appealed.

O'Brien & John, for appellant, that the description in the petition of the land sued for, was too uncertain and indefinite, cited: Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex. 610;Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 36;Flannagan v. Boggess, 46 Tex. 330;Steinbeck v. Stone, 53 Tex. 382-386.

On the admissibility, in evidence, of the deed from Mrs. Ursaline Lori to Mrs. Catherine Van Wormer, and other documents offered by the appellant, under his plea of limitation of ten years, they cited: R. S., arts. 3194, 3198, 3199; Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex. 110-114;Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 2, 14, 25; Ib., 286; Pearson v. Boyd, 62 Tex. 544; Field on Dam. 2.

On the question of limitation, they cited: Pas. Dig., art. 4624; R. S., arts. 3194, 3195; Melton v. Turner, 38 Tex. 81;Pearson v. Boyd, 62 Tex. 544;Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 269, 286;Gillespie v. Jones, 26 Tex. 343;Wheeler v. Moody, 9 Tex. 372.

F. B. Sexton and Hal. W. Greer, for appellee, that the petition was sufficiently certain in its description of the land sued for, cited: Wilson v. Smith, 50 Tex. 368;Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex. 379;Kingston v. Pickins, 46 Tex. 101;Flannagan v. Boggess, 46 Tex. 335;Croft v. Raines, 10 Tex. 520;Smith v. Chatham, 14 Tex. 322.

On the inadmissibility in evidence of the deed from Ursaline Lori to Katherine Van Wormer, and other documents offered by appellant, they cited: Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex. 609;Mooring v. McBride, 62 Tex. 309.

On the question of limitation, they cited: Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 289;Ward v. Drouthett, 44 Tex. 366;Mitchell v. Burdett, 22 Tex. 633-635;Gillespie v. Jones, 26 Tex. 346;Trueheart v. McMichael, 46 Tex. 228;Mooring v. Campbell, 47 Tex. 38-42;Stegall v. Huff, 54 Tex. 197;Chance v. Branch, 58 Tex. 492-493;Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166;Bracken v. Jones, 63 Tex. 184; 3 Washburn on Real Prop., 3d ed., 124, 127, 130, 133, 135, 141.

STAYTON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.

The petition, in connection with the papers which were referred to and made part of it, gave a sufficient description of the land sued for, and the court did not err in overruling demurrers which raised this question. The deed from David Brown, the original grantee of the land, which conveyed all of the grant unsold at the time he executed it, was admissible, as were the deeds executed by him before the execution of that deed, and, together, showed what passed by it.

The deeds through which appellee claims, show title in her to all of the headright league granted to David Brown, not sold by him prior to the date of the deed made by him to Hanks, less lands which may have been sold under execution against Hanks while title was in him, and less lands sold by M. Cartwright, to whom Hanks conveyed, except as this may be affected by appellant's claim. As the several deeds offered by the appellee, showing conveyances by David Brown prior to his conveyance to Hanks, conveyance by the sheriff under execution against Hanks, and conveyances by M. Cartwright, were offered solely for the purpose of showing what part of the league the appellee still owned and were restrictive of her right, it is unimportant to inquire whether they were operative.

The appellee was not asserting rights through them, but, for the purpose of this action, was admitting their validity, thus limiting her right to recover what, but for the existence of those deeds, she would have the right to recover under the deeds from Brown to Hanks, and from Hanks to Cartwright, if not barred by limitation. The judgment gave to the appellee no lands which these deeds covered, and, if the appellant has any interest in the tracts described by these several deeds, that interest is not affected by the judgment in this case. Those lands were not involved in the suit, for the petition excluded them from the land sought to be recovered, and the deeds were only admitted to show the true boundaries of the land which the appellee sought to recover.

The pleadings of the appellant, asserting title only to so much as he may show himself entitled to under his plea of limitation of ten years, and disclaiming as to the residue of the land, it becomes unnecessary to consider many of the assignments of error. Those only will be considered which relate to the ruling of the court in the rejection of evidence offered by the appellant, under his plea of limitation of ten years, and to the charges of the court.

The evidence tends to show that one Lori made improvements and settled upon the land claimed by appellant, as early as the year 1856, and that he continued to occupy it with his family until his death, after which his widow occupied it until October 30, 1868, at which time she conveyed to Van Wormer, by deed, which described the property conveyed, as follows: “All of my right, interest and claim in and to my homestead place, situated in the county aforesaid, about two miles below the town of Beaumont, on the west side of the Neches river, together with all the improvements thereon. * * * I warrant and defend the title to the same.”

This deed was objected to, on the ground that the description was insufficient and too vague to apprise the plaintiff of the land conveyed. This objection was sustained and the deed excluded. We are of the opinion that this was error. The deed was admissible, if for no other purpose, than to show privity of possession and continuity of claim from the time Lori first entered upon the land until this action was brought--the appellant, and those through whom he claims, holding under that deed. There was no question as to what was claimed to be the homestead of Mrs. Lori at the time she made the deed. The deed from McDaniel to Noltz, the deed from Noltz to Craig, the petition, answer and judgment in the case of Craig v. Noltz, the agreement between Craig and Caswell as to a boundary line, and also the contract between Noltz and Lee & Ingalls, were also admissible, for the reason before stated or for the purpose of showing the continuity of claim and its adverse character.

The Van Wormers conveyed the “Lori place” to John Archer by deed of date April 20, 1871, and, as description of what they conveyed, the deed recited: “All our right, title and interest in and to the place now owned by us, known as the ““Lori place,” situated in the aforesaid county, about two miles below the town of Beaumont, on the west side of the Neches river, and of the headright of David Brown, together with the land thereunto pertaining, and all buildings, fences and other improvements thereon; and we warrant the title to the same.” Eva Schusler conveyed by metes and bounds a part of the land now claimed by appellant, to Sam Robertson, by deed of date June 26, 1870.

This property was contiguous to the “Lori place,” was known as the ““Schusler place,” and had been improved and occupied by Schusler and his family from as early as 1864 until her husband's death, and, by her, from that time until she conveyed to Robertson. Robertson conveyed the same land to John Archer by deed of date March 5, 1872.

On February 6, 1874, John Archer conveyed to Noltz both the “Lori” and Schusler places,” describing them generally and as a part of the David Brown headright; and to this general description he added the following words, “together with the land thereunto pertaining.” Noltz and wife conveyed to the appellant all that Archer had conveyed to Noltz; and in their deed assumed to convey six hundred and forty acres of land, which their deed recited was claimed by them “under the law of limitation of ten years.” This deed bore date February 21, 1883....