Craig v. Clearwater Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1938
• Docket Number: 14794.
• Parties: CRAIG v. CLEARWATER MFG. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

200 S.E. 765

189 S.C. 176

CRAIG v. CLEARWATER MFG. CO.

No. 14794.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 28, 1938

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Aiken County; A. L Gaston, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Minnie T. Craig, administratrix of Theodore G. Craig deceased, against the Clearwater Manufacturing Company, for the death of Theodore G. Craig. From a judgment on a verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Bussey & Fulcher, of Augusta, Ga., and Hendersons & Salley, of Aiken, for appellant.

Williams & Busbee, of Aiken, for respondent.

BONHAM Justice.

On the night of October 2nd, 1936, Theodore G. Craig, an estimable young man, lost his life in a collision between the automobile in which he was driving and three trucks, on State Highway No. 1 in Aiken County. This action is brought under Lord Campbell's Act by his widow for the benefit of herself and children.

The circumstances attending the tragedy depict a most deplorable state of negligence on the part of some person or persons and the pertinent question is, who is liable?

The complaint alleges that the trucks which collided with the car which Theodore G. Craig was driving, and which trucks were driven negligently and recklessly, were the property of Clearwater Manufacturing Company and the drivers of the trucks at the time of the collision were the agents or employees of the said Clearwater Manufacturing Company, and "were then acting in the scope of their duties as such."

The principal line of defense was a denial that the trucks involved in the unfortunate occurrence were the property of the defendant, and the further denial that the drivers of the trucks were the agents or employees of the defendant.

Under the pleadings, the plaintiff, in order to recover, was bound to show that the trucks alleged to have caused the accident were the property of the defendant; were driven by the agents or employees of the defendant, who were then engaged within the scope of their duties as such.

The plaintiff offered testimony to show that the trucks bore the plates of the State Highway Department, issued in the name of the Clearwater Manufacturing Company, which licensed the trucks to operate in this State. The defendant offered testimony to show that the trucks involved in this accident were the property of Max Efron, who procured them to be licensed by the State Highway Department in the name of Clearwater Manufacturing Company without the knowledge, consent or authority of said Manufacturing Company. It was testified for plaintiff that Efron did not pay the City taxes on the trucks and when called upon by the City Tax Collector, he said the trucks were the property of the Clearwater Manufacturing Company. An officer of the Company in the City of Aiken sent the Tax Collector to the Mill of the Company at Clearwater, fifteen miles away from Aiken; here he showed the execution to an unidentified person, who said he would enquire into it and send the matter to the New York Office; thereafter, the taxes were paid by Efron. It appears that the Clearwater Manufacturing Company owned no property subject to taxation in the City of Aiken. The officers of the Clearwater Manufacturing Company all testify that they knew nothing of the action of Efron in having his trucks licensed in the name of the Clearwater Manufacturing Company, until after this action was begun. There is evidence that Efron is an independent contractor as a hauler of freight on the highways; that he has a written contract with Cohn, Hall & Marx of New York, who purchase the unfinished cotton cloth of various mills and send it to finishing mills, of the character of this defendant, to be finished; that on the day in question Cohn, Hall & Marx had directed Efron to go to mills in Easley and Spartanburg and get cloth and take it to Clearwater Manufacturing Company. This he did and the trucks were returning to Aiken when the collision occurred.

Much stress has been laid upon the plea of the defendant that these trucks were the property of Max Efron; that he had a written contract with Cohn, Hall & Marx to haul the cloth which they purchased from the places of manufacture to the finishing mills. There is evidence that the trucks are the property of Max Efron and that the drivers are in the regular employ of Efron and paid weekly by him.

Was there sufficient testimony to require the Court to submit to the jury the question, viz: was the Clearwater Manufacturing Company the owner of the trucks involved; were the drivers of the trucks the agents or employees of the said Manufacturing Company; were they engaged about the business of the said Company within the scope of their employment?

Certainly no one has testified for the plaintiff that these trucks were the property of the defendant; a number have testified to the contrary. It is true that Mr. Busbee, the Aiken Tax Collector, said that when he called upon Efron for payment of the taxes on the trucks, Efron said they were the property of the defendant, but Efron was not an officer of the Company and had no authority to speak for it.

This is a brief synopsis of the testimony relating to the question of the title to the trucks, and the employment of the drivers.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to show that the trucks were owned by the defendant, or to show that the trucks were operated by the defendant or its agents or servants, acting as such; that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony is that the trucks were owned and operated by Efron Trucking Company, an independent contractor, and were not acting as agents or employees of the Clearwater Manufacturing Company, but for another Company.

In denying the motion, the trial Judge said: "* * * I am going to let this case go to the jury. On the question of independent contractor this witness, Efron, was not a contract hauler under the law. He had no right under the law to engage in hauling by motor vehicle for anybody. He had not complied with Section 8505 [8525] of the Code, and beginning with Section 8507, or any of the provisions of that Chapter. There is certainly no evidence by the defendant that he was a contractor and authorized by law to engage in hauling by motor vehicle on the public highways of the State."

His Honor laid undue stress on the question whether Efron was an independent contractor. In our judgment, that was, at that point of the case, an immaterial issue, if, indeed, it ever became a major issue. The matter then before the Court was whether the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question whether the trucks involved in the collision were the property of the defendant, and were then operated by its agents or servants and engaged in its business within the scope of their duties.

In our opinion, it is wholly immaterial whether Efron had complied with the Statutes of the State regulating the conduct of those desiring to become haulers of freight by truck on the public highways of the State. He may have been in open violation of the law. The question is: Did the trucks belong to the Clearwater Manufacturing Company? Were the drivers of the trucks then employed by the defendant Company, and were they then engaged in its business? If they were employed by Efron and were then engaged in his business, certainly the derelictions of Efron and his agents and servants cannot be charged to defendant.

We can find in the record no direct evidence that these trucks were the property of the Clearwater Manufacturing Company, nor can we find such evidence that they were engaged then in the service of the said Company, or that the drivers thereof were the servants or employees of the said Company.

We have given painstaking study to and consideration of this evidence. The record is unusually long, but we have read it more than once with solicitous care. Our confirmed opinion is that the only reasonable deduction to be made from all the evidence is that the trucks were the property of Max Efron; that they were, on the night of this collision, returning from the Clearwater Mill where they had been to deliver cloth which they had brought from mills at Easley and Spartanburg; that this had been done by the direction of Cohn, Hall & Marx given to Max Efron, and under contract with said Cohn, Hall & Marx.

Our analysis of the testimony of plaintiff, in support of its allegations that the trucks were the property of the Clearwater Manufacturing Company; that at the time of the collision they were engaged in its business, and operated by its agents or servants, is:

That the trucks bore the license plates of the State Highway Department issued in the name of Clearwater Manufacturing Company, and the testimony of Mr. Busbee as to what Efron said thereabout in connection with the Aiken City taxes and the examination and cross-examination. As we understand, the...