Craig v. Craig

• Decision Date: 12 July 1946
• Citation: 157 Fla. 710,26 So.2d 881
• Parties: CRAIG v. CRAIG.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

26 So.2d 881

157 Fla. 710

CRAIG v. CRAIG.

Florida Supreme Court

July 12, 1946

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Stanley Milledge, judge.

L. Earl Curry, of Miami, for appellant.

Morton B Adams, of Miami, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, Chief Justice.

On August 2, 1938 the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, upon the petition of Beatrice Craig, entered a final decree of separation between the petitioner and Charles Leo Craig. The custody of Gordon Craig and Gloria Craig, twins and then ten years of age, children born to the marriage, was awarded to Beatrice Craig, the mother, with visitation privileges to the husband and father, Charles Leo Craig. The husband was ordered to pay the wife the sum of $30 per week for her support and maintenance. Paragraph IV of the decree provided that the plaintiff (Beatrice Craig) 'shall not remove said children beyond the jurisdiction of this Court without special order of the Court.' It further provided 'that the Court retain jurisdiction of the parties hereto and make such further orders as equity may require'.

In the order to show cause dated October 22, 1945, issued on petition of Beatrice Craig and served on the husband, Charles Leo Craig it was made to appear that he was then due Beatrice Craig under the terms of the final decree of separation supra the sum of $8,135 and further commanded that he pay said sum within ten days or appear and show cause before the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on October 31, 1945, why judgment should not be entered against him. The order to show cause restrained and enjoined Charles Leo Craig from disposing of or encumbering described real estate and improvements and equipment located thereon situated in Dade County, Florida, and at the aforesaid time and place show cause why the temporary injunction should not be made permanent.

The respondent Charles Leo Craig, in answer to the rule to show cause represented: (1) that Beatrice Craig 'deliberately, consistently and maliciously' refused and declined to abide with and conform to the terms of the final decree of separation incumbent upon her to perform and at the tiem of signing the final decree so advised the court, that she would not obey the decree; (2) that a term of the final decree provided that Beatrice Craig should not remove the two children beyond the jurisdiction of the Court without special order of the Court; that Beatrice Craig, in total disregard of the aforesaid provision, has spent the greater portion of the time (and the children with her) beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and without obtaining a special order. The respondent saw his children but five times, each of short duration, during the year following the separation. She visited in Maryland, Minnesota and Arizona and upon her return to Miami deliberately withheld the information of her return in order to deprive the respondent of visitation privileges with his children and to alienate the children from the respondent and has been successful in so doing.

(3) The children, now about 18 years of age, to all intents and purposes, are total strangers to respondent--due to the conduct and planned action of Beatrice Craig in disregard of the terms of the final decree. That with but one exception the respondent has not seen his children since the summer of 1940 and the children refused to see and visit with him. He through chance or accident met his son recently on a street in Miami and asked his son where he and his sister were living and the son refused to say. Respondent has reason to believe his children are in the Miami area but he cannot locate them, and the petitioner nor her counsel will advise or inform the respondent where his children may be located or seen.

(4) Respondent states further that the petitioner does not come into this Court of equity with clean hands as she has continuously violated the terms of the final decree in that she has by her planned action and conduct deprived the respondent of the visitation privileges with his children authorized by the final decree. That she at no time or occasion has offered to do equity but comes into court to obtain the enforcement of one term of the court's decree while she has persistently and intentionally violated another term or provision of the same decree, to-wit: the visitation privileges with the children by the respondent. That the paternal affection of the children for the respondent has been forever destroyed because of the petitioner's personal animosity toward him. The respondent has, from time to time, contributed thousands of dollars for the support of the petitioner and children but a continuance thereof in the opinion and judgment of the respondent is inequitable and unjust because of the conduct of the petitioner in a planned violation of the terms of the decree.

(5) With reference to the previous appointment by the court of a receiver for the respondent's property, he respectfully represents that he has not disposed of or encumbered his property and it is not his intention so to do; that the income therefrom constitutes his sole means of livelihood; that he is operating and managing the property in an efficient and businesslike manner and the cost and expense of a receiver therefor is an unnecessary waste; that the showing of the relator in this cause is legally insufficient to justify the court in appointing a receiver for the property or the...