Craig v. Leiper

• Decision Date: 31 January 1828
• Citation: 10 Tenn. 193
• Parties: CRAIG v. LEIPER and others.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

10 Tenn. 193

CRAIG

v.LEIPER and others.

Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee.

January Term, 1828.

Opinion of the court delivered by Judge CATRON.

The first question in this cause is, can a specific performance be decreed against Leiper, after the lapse of more than thirty years, from the execution of the title bond from Hugh Leiper to James Craig, which occurred in 1785, and the bill was filed in 1820.

From 1785 to 1794 forbearance was mutual between Craig and Leiper, because of the embarrassment of the title to the 640 acre entry, which was contested by Murfree. To this point the proof is very satisfactory. Indeed, Leiper refused to convey until he got a title for the Kentucky lands given in exchange for the 640 acre entry.

In or about 1790, Craig became insane, and so continued until his death in 1817. This the court thinks very fully proven by the inquisition of lunacy, in connection with the evidence of witnesses.

In April, 1796, Leiper conveyed to Feland the 640 acre entry, which he claimed to be a discharge of his obligation to Craig. During the mutual forbearance, time did not form any objection to the assertion of his equity by Craig; after his insanity and during its continuance, Craig could not be charged with laches, nor could his heir, the complainant, be so charged, because he filed his bill as soon as he could discover in whose possession the warrant was, without which being had in possession and adjudicated, pursuant to the laws of Tennessee, no grant could issue. But what is conclusive upon this point, grows out of the fact that Leiper himself had acquired no legal title to the land, which rested in entry, and therefore he was not in a situation to comply with his contract of 1785, at any time from the execution thereof, to the filing of this bill.

It has been contended with great ingenuity that in no case after the lapse of twenty years, and where the estate in the meantime has changed hands, will a court of equity give specific relief; and that the insanity of the complainant forms no exception to this general rule. The existence of the rule, its propriety and policy, this court has often recognized, and has no idea of departing therefrom; but to the exception, broad as contended for in the present instance, we cannot consent. Twenty years acquiescence by Craig, or even a much shorter time, had he been sane, would have estopped him from contesting the validity of the conveyance from Leiper to Feland, supposing it to have been made with his knowledge; but from the time of the execution of the deed in 1796 to the time of Craig's death in 1817, he was clearly insane, incapable of assent or dissent, and not liable to the charge of laches, or sleeping upon his rights; and he is therefore not affected by the lapse of time in respect to Feland, or the conveyance of those claiming under him. So far this court agrees with the chancellor, who ordered the decree below.

The main point in this cause, and which the chancellor apprehended to be for the defendants, Leiper and Feland, and upon which he dismissed the bill as to them, is, does the plea of an innocent purchaser without notice apply to the mesne grantees under Feland? The land was entered by Leiper by special entry in January, 1784. In March, 1785, Leiper, by a title bond covenanted to convey this entry to Craig. As between Leiper and Craig, this title bond, in the estimation of a court of equity, transferred the right of Leiper to the land described in the bond, to Craig, and which right thus vested was of a character to descend to the heir of Craig upon his death. 3 Hay. 115; 1 Term Rep. 247, 284; New. 45. After James Craig's death, Wm. Craig, the complainant, had the right to enforce the execution of the bond. 3 Hay. 116. Was the conveyance from Leiper to Feland in 1796, a discharge of the bond of Leiper to James Craig, of 1785? That this cannot be pretended upon the part of Leiper, will appear from the facts. Craig, though physically present when the deed was executed, was clearly insane, and incapable of assent, and this perfectly within the knowledge of Leiper, who was aiding Feland to commit upon Craig one of the grossest frauds furnished by the judicial history of any country. If the transaction stood as in 1796, after the conveyance from Leiper to Feland, there could be no doubt of the complainant's right to enforce the bond in some shape. Do the mesne purchasers, after and through Feland, stand in any better situation, than those under and through whom they claim title?

It is a rule in equity that where A contracts to convey to B, then conveys to C for consideration without notice, the latter takes the estates discharged of the trust. 9 John. 463; Sugd. 520. This rule applies to the case where a vendor has vested in him the legal title, and transmits the same to the second purchaser. No principle governing a court of equity is better settled than this. But there is another rule equally well settled. That a purchaser of an equitable title must always abide by the case of the person from whom he buys, and will be entitled to all the remedies of the seller. Sugd. 524; 2 P. Wms. 495; 2 Ves. sr. 486.

Therefore the plea of an innocent purchaser must aver that the vendor was seized in fee, or pretended to be seized in fee, and without such an averment the plea is clearly bad. 1 Vern. 246; 3 P. Wms. 281; 3 Ves. 285; Beames' Pl. 243; 9 Ves. 32; 16 Ves. 252; 4 Dess. 287.

There is no instance, says Lord Eldon, of the plea being allowed without the averment that the party purchased from was seized, or pretended to be seized, in fee. 17 Ves. 290. There is some confusion in the application of this doctrine in Tennessee, growing out of the difference in the state of titles here, and in England. There all lands are granted from the government and passed through many hands; the titles generally are not registered; every man keeps his own title deeds, which he does not expose. In most instances none but the experienced conveyancers can ascertain whether the vendor has the legal title, of which actual possession is generally the best evidence; hence mistakes are common and impositions are easily practised. The vendor must be in actual possession, and the vendee believe he is acquiring the fee, otherwise he cannot be a bona fide purchaser within the meaning of the plea. 3 Ves. 226; 9 Ves. 32; 16 Ves. 262; 17 Ves. 290; 4 Dess. 287; Beames' Pl. 243.

But suppose the purchaser knows the vendor is not seized in fee, that he claims only an equity, the legal estate outstanding, and with full knowledge deals for the equity. In such case, no one will pretend that the vendee can rely upon the plea that he is an innocent purchaser...