Craig v. Pattison

• Decision Date: 12 April 1897
• Citation: 74 Miss. 881,21 So. 756
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAM CRAIG v. A. H. PATTISON

21 So. 756

74 Miss. 881

WILLIAM CRAIG v. A. H. PATTISON

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 12, 1897

March 1897

FROM the circuit court of Tallahatchie county HON. F. A MOSTGOMERY, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Eskridge & Dinkins, for appellant.

We think the proof abundantly shows that the defendant was a storekeeper in the ordinary sense of that term, and certainly as contemplated by the revenue act of 1896 and the decisions of this court. The evidence shows that the defendant kept her groceries, snuff, tobacco, soap, etc., in her "smokehouse, " and her dry goods in the west room of her dwelling house, and some of them arranged on shelves as in regular stores.

The plaintiff shows that all the articles charged against him in her account were bought from the defendant. An examination of the account will disclose that twenty-four different varieties of articles are enumerated in it. A pretty large variety for one who claims to have no store. It does not matter that defendant kept her goods for sale in her smokehouse and in the west room of her dwelling; the revenue law will as effectually reach and operate on her as it would in open market. The word "store, " as used in the act, is intended to designate any place where goods are deposited and sold by one engaged in buying and selling goods. Folkes v. State, 63 Miss. 81. "The word, 'store, ' means a place where goods are kept on deposit, especially in large quantities; a warehouse, and also a place where goods are kept for sale in large or small quantities. Until the legislature undertakes the work of classification of stores generally, we must hold the general term used in the code to embrace every species of store not otherwise particularly named and taxed." Pitts v. Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 181.

Again, the defendant is not exempt from the revenue tax because she kept goods for sale at a profit, to be sold only to the laborers on her plantation, and only kept on hand such goods as were necessary for her tenants. Alcorn v. State, 71 Miss. 464. In this case the court uses this language in explanation of the revenue law: "The privilege tax imposed by our law in cases of this character, is not upon mercantile firms or upon individuals engaged in the selling of merchandise, but upon stores."

The law reaches and subjects to the payment of a privilege tax, any person, whether lawyer, merchant, farmer, doctor, mechanic or what not, who keeps on deposit goods for sale at a profit. The only difference made by the law is in the amount of the tax imposed, according to the value of the stock on hand at any time, ranging from $ 300 to $ 50, 000 or more. If we are right in our position that defendant was subject to pay a privilege tax, she clearly had no legal status in court, in demanding a recovery of the account of $ 67.50 against the defendant.

C. H. Brown, for appellee.

The business engaged in by the appellee in supplying her tenants has not a single attribute of a store, nor does it, in a single phase, merit the adjudication in the cases of Folkes v. State, 63 Miss. 81; Alcorn v. State, 71 Miss. 464; Pitts v. Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 181. The court, in the case of Folkes v. State, supra, says: "The purpose of the statute is to impose a tax on every place where goods are deposited and sold by a dealer engaged in buying and selling goods, and not (as virtually contended for by appellant), to impose a tax on every landlord who supplies his tenants. Such a construction would, in effect, annul the law as now in force relative to landlord and tenant, " and, I will add, disconcert the supply system, and contravene public policy.

Granting that appellee was conducting the business of a store without paying the tax as provided for, yet, the appellant must fail in this action, for two reasons, to wit: (1) The proof does not show, as disclosed by the record, that the appellee's "stock of goods" were of any value; (2) the appellee is not seeking through the courts an enforcement of a contract, but stands in the attitude of one who has collected his debt, and the debtor is suing to recover back what he has freely and voluntarily paid.

OPINION

STOCKDALE, J.

Appellant sued in a magistrate's court to recover his share of the crop made by him on appellee's plantation during the year 1896, valued by him at $ 100. Appellee filed, as offset, an account for supplies furnished appellant during the year 1896, amounting to $ 67.70. Judgment being rendered for appellant, appellee appealed to the circuit court, and having given bond for the forthcoming of four bales of cotton and two tons of cotton seed claimed by appellant, she retained the same in her possession. It was conceded that appellant made the four bales of cotton and two tons of seed, and admitted by the parties on the trial in the circuit court that Mrs. A. H. Pattison had furnished the supplies charged in the account filed as offset to plaintiff's demand, and that she had not paid any privilege tax nor...