Craig v. Rider

• Decision Date: 27 September 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81SC45,81SC45
• Citation: 651 P.2d 397
• Parties: Linda Lou CRAIG, Petitioner, v. Elbert E. RIDER, Miles Ericson Craig, Devisees in the Estate of Lulu Ann King, Deceased; United States Bank of Grand Junction, Personal Representative of the Estate of Lulu Ann King, Deceased, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 397

651 P.2d 397

Linda Lou CRAIG, Petitioner, v. Elbert E. RIDER, Miles Ericson Craig, Devisees in the Estate of Lulu Ann King, Deceased; United States Bank of Grand Junction, Personal Representative of the Estate of Lulu Ann King, Deceased, Respondents.

No. 81SC45.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Sept. 27, 1982.

Nelson, Hoskin, Groves & Prinster, John W. Groves, Gregg K. Kampf, Grand Junction, for petitioner.

Harshman & Deister, Thomas J. Harshman, Thomas M. Deister, Grand Junction, for respondent Elbert E. Rider.

Dufford, Waldeck & Williams, Robert I. Williams, Grand Junction, for respondent Miles Ericson Craig.

Williams, Turner & Holmes, Anthony W. Williams, Grand Junction, for respondent U. S. Bank of Grand Junction.

LOHR, Justice.

The central issue in this case is the standard to be applied to determine whether an interested party has shown "good cause" under section 15-12-413, C.R.S.1973, to support a motion to vacate an order admitting a will to probate in a formal testacy proceeding. The trial court denied the motion of Linda Lou Craig, the decedent's granddaughter and sole heir, to set aside the court's order admitting the will of Lulu Ann King to probate. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in Craig v. Rider, 628 P.2d 623 (Colo.App.1980), and we granted certiorari. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Linda Lou Craig did not establish that her delay in objecting to the probate of the will was excusable and in holding that, as a result, good cause to vacate the probate order was not shown. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and direct that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and that the objections to probate be considered on their merits.

Lulu Ann King died on May 20, 1978, at the age of 94, leaving an estate worth approximately one million dollars. A purported will dated August 20, 1975, was filed in Mesa County District Court, and the court set a hearing for June 19, 1978, to determine whether the will should be admitted to probate. ¹

Lulu Ann King had been twice widowed. One child, Harry Ericson, was born of her first marriage, and he in turn had a single child, Linda Lou Craig. No children were born of the decedent's second marriage. Ericson predeceased Lulu Ann King, making Linda Lou Craig the decedent's sole heir. The filed will left half of the decedent's estate in trust to her great grandchild Miles Craig, a son of Linda Lou Craig. ² The other half of the estate was willed to Bert Rider, a friend who had lived at the decedent's farm in her latter years.

The attorney for United States Bank of Grand Junction, the personal representative named in the will, sent notices of the probate hearing to Linda Lou Craig and requested that she sign forms waiving service and consenting that the hearing be held on the date set. She did so, on her own behalf and as representative of her minor son Miles. Linda Lou Craig filed no objection to the probate of the will and did not attend the hearing. On June 21, 1978, after the hearing, the court ordered the will admitted to probate.

On July 19, within 30 days after admission of the will, Linda Lou Craig filed a motion to vacate the order of probate pursuant to section 15-12-413, C.R.S.1973, alleging that Lulu Ann King lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence when she executed the will. The motion also claimed that the factual grounds for these contentions were not discovered until after the probate hearing, diligence was used in learning the new facts, and any delay in obtaining such knowledge was excusable. Additional facts relating to the bases for the movant's challenge to the probate of the will are set forth later in this opinion.

The trial court decided that the hearing on the motion should be bifurcated. The court elected to consider first the legal sufficiency of the reasons for delay in asserting the claim, ruling that if adequate cause for the late filing of the objection was established it would then go on to consider whether Linda Lou Craig could make a prima facie showing that her objections to the probate of the will were meritorious. At the hearing on delay the court permitted the presentation of evidence about Linda Lou Craig's acquisition of information concerning the decedent's mental condition up to the time when the motion to vacate the probate order was filed. The court received the evidence for the limited purpose of evaluating whether the movant's delay in objecting to probate of the will was excusable. After the hearing the court found "that there is neither good cause shown nor due diligence exemplified by [Linda Lou Craig] of the dignity and kind required to vacate the order of Court admitting the will of Lulu Ann King to probate," and denied the motion to vacate the order. In further support of its ruling, the district court held that Linda Lou Craig was estopped to challenge the probate order, apparently based on her execution of the waiver of service and consent to the hearing on admission of the will to probate.

On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. Analogizing to the standards applicable to determine whether a default judgment should be set aside for excusable neglect, the court of appeals held that in order to establish good cause to set aside an order of probate pursuant to section 15-12-413, C.R.S.1973, the moving party must show both excusable neglect and a meritorious defense. It further held that the trial court's decision to bifurcate the hearing and try the excusable neglect issue first was proper. Although the trial court couched its findings in terms of both excusable neglect and due diligence, the court of appeals determined that adequate evidence supported the finding that Linda Lou Craig had not established excusable neglect, so the finding was binding on appeal.

On certiorari, Linda Lou Craig agrees that the standard for setting aside a default judgment should apply to good cause determinations under section 15-12-413, C.R.S.1973, but contends that the court of appeals neither correctly stated the test nor properly applied it in this case. Linda Lou Craig asserts that "substantial justice" is the correct formulation of the standard and contends that three factors must be weighed in the balance to determine whether substantial justice will be achieved by vacating a probate order: (1) excusable neglect, (2) existence of a meritorious defense, and (3) convenience and reliance of the court and other parties. Furthermore, Linda Lou Craig contends that each individual factor cannot be tested in isolation but must be considered together with the others to determine whether substantial justice will be served by setting aside an order of probate. As a result, her argument continues, the trial court erred in basing its ruling solely on the absence of a showing of an adequate reason for delay in asserting the objection. Linda Lou Craig also asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that she had not established excusable neglect for her delay in objecting to the probate of the will.

Although we do not agree entirely with the movant's analysis, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in holding that excusable neglect was not established for the late filing of the challenge to the validity of the will. We also hold that the movant adequately met the other criteria for setting aside an order admitting a will to probate, with the result that Linda Lou Craig's motion to vacate should have been granted.

I.

The General Assembly has prescribed the time within which an order in a formal testacy proceeding may be challenged and the grounds for such a challenge in section 15-12-413, C.R.S.1973, which provides:

For good cause shown, an order in a formal testacy proceeding may be modified or vacated within the time allowed for appeal.

In the present case, a motion to vacate was filed 28 days after issuance of the order admitting the will to probate, and all parties acknowledge that it was filed within the time prescribed by the statute. See section 15-10-304, C.R.S.1973; C.A.R. 4. The issues before us are whether the trial court utilized the correct criteria in determining "good cause shown" or erred in applying those standards.

The court of appeals held that motions to vacate formal testacy orders are analogous to motions to vacate default judgments under C.R.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b). It therefore found it appropriate to look to cases decided under those rules for guidance in reviewing the trial court's ruling on the "good cause shown" issue. This holding is consistent with section 15-10-304, C.R.S.1973, which states that, absent contrary or inconsistent provisions in the Colorado Probate Code, "the Colorado rules of civil procedure including the rules concerning vacation of orders and appellate review govern formal proceedings under [the Colorado Probate Code]." ³ C.R.C.P. 55(c) specifies the standards for setting aside a default judgment. It provides:

For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). (Emphasis added.)

In turn, C.R.C.P. 60(b) states, in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; .... (Emphasis added.)

The underlying goal in ruling on motions to set aside default judgments is to promote substantial justice. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Robb, 188 Colo. 155, 533 P.2d 491 (1975); F & S Construction Co. v. Christlieb, 166 Colo. 67, 441 P.2d 656 (1968); Walker v. Associates Loan Co., 153 Colo 261, 385 P.2d 421 (1963); Burlington Ditch, Reservoir & Land Co. v. Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 59 Colo. 571, 151 P. 432 (1915). Whether substantial justice will be...