Craig v. State

• Decision Date: 03 February 1892
• Parties: CRAIG v. STATE
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 297

18 S.W. 297

CRAIG v. STATE

Court of Appeals of Texas.

February 3, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Hood county; C. K. BELL, Judge.

Jim Craig was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Reversed.

Russell, Cooper & Lemmon, for appellant. Richard H. Harrison, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HURT, J.

This is a conviction for manslaughter, with the penalty fixed at three years in the penitentiary. Over objection, the state introduced in evidence the confessions of defendant made to Sue, Sawyer, and Page. The statement or confession was made to these parties next morning after the cutting which resulted in the death of Manuel Cavasas. The objection urged was that defendant was in arrest, and had not been cautioned as the law requires. The appellant was not cautioned. Was he in arrest, within the meaning of the statute? The facts are as follows: Sue states that Sawyer and Jim Page left home early that morning to hunt defendant. They went to another neighborhood, where another party, in charge of a constable, were also to go in search of defendant. Arriving at said place, they learned that the posse had gone on a similar mission to theirs. They went towards defendant's father's house for the purpose of finding defendant. They were on horse-back, and had one gun with them. In about 200 yards of defendant's house they saw him going along the cross-road leading to Smith's place. They rode up to him, and spoke to him. The defendant stopped. They did not make any arrest or tell defendant that he was under arrest, but their purpose was to take him to Ft. Spunky to the justice. If the defendant had attempted to leave them, they would not have permitted him to do so. Do these facts show that defendant believed himself in arrest? Were they calculated to induce such belief? If defendant had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, himself in arrest, then his confession was inadmissible. On the other hand, if he did not so believe, his confession was admissible, though Sue, Sawyer, and Page intended an arrest, and would not have permitted him to escape. Did he believe himself in arrest? He certainly did not, because there was nothing said or done which was at all calculated to produce such belief. We must infer, he being a man of ordinary intelligence, that he had no such belief. In support of the proposition that the facts show an arrest, counsel cites Nolen v. State, 8 Tex. App. 595, 9 Tex. App. 425, and Grosse's Case, 11 Tex. App. 364. When the facts in these cases are examined they will be found quite different to the facts in this case. There was no error in admitting the statements.

The cutting occurred about 11 o'clock at night. Appellant mounted a horse immediately, and rode rapidly to his father's house, about a mile away. He arrived there "about 11 o'clock, or between 11 and 12." He came into his mother's room all covered with blood which came from a severe wound on the left side of his head. It was still bleeding profusely. His face and front were bloody, and he was weak, sick, and nauseous, and complained of his head. His mother commenced dressing the wound. These facts being shown, the defendant then proposed to show by his mother his version of the difficulty. The state objected, because, we presume, that appellant's statements to his mother constituted no part of the res gestæ. The ground is not stated in the bill. The objection was sustained. Was the statement made to his mother, under the above circumstances, admissible as original evidence? If not, was it admissible to explain the statement made by defendant to Sue, Sawyer, and Page? Was it admissible, under the facts of this case, for the purpose of corroborating defendant's evidence on the trial? Was the statement original evidence? Just when a fact or statement is or is not a part of the res gestæ is one of the most difficult questions to solve known to the writer. The old rule was that, to be part of the res gestæ, the fact or statement should be contemporaneous with the transaction, and this rule is approved by many courts of the first ability. On the other hand, the rule has been construed so as to admit acts and declarations occurring, not contemporaneously with the transaction, but which precede or follow it. "And when they are to be admitted or rejected, if not coincident with the act or transaction in question, is a question of judicial discretion of embarrassing nicety. If the declarations appear to spring out of the transaction; if they elucidate; if they are voluntary and spontaneous, and made at a time so near to it as reasonably to preclude the idea of design, — then they are to be regarded as contemporaneous. Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615. This rule is supported by the following authorities: State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 173; Comfort v. People, 54 Ill. 404; Denton v. State, 1 Swan, 279; Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 513; Handy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 450; Goodwin v. Harrison, 1 Root. 80.

The rule we may understand, but in its application the difficulties arise. If appellant continued the gait in which he started from the place of the cutting, he must have reached home within 10 minutes. When he reached home he was covered with blood from a wound on the left side of his head, still bleeding profusely. He was weak, sick, and complained of his head. These are the surrounding facts when he made a statement regarding the transaction to his mother. We are of opinion that the declarations to his mother spring out of the transaction. They certainly were calculated to...