Craig v. State

• Decision Date: 10 May 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 1120,49 Ohio St. 415
• Parties: CRAIG v. STATE.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

30 N.E. 1120

49 Ohio St. 415

CRAIG v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 10, 1892

Error to circuit court, Hamilton county.

The facts fully appear in the following statement by BRADBURY J.:

At the October term, 1890, of the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, an indictment was found by the grand jury charging the plaintiff in error with the crime of murder in the first degree. He was afterwards arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. A jury was drawn, summoned, and in attendance for his trial on November 17, 1890, when in open court, by leave thereof and by the advice of counsel, he withdrew his plea of not guilty, in the following words: ‘ And thereupon the defendant, Charles Craig, after being fully advised in the premises by his counsel, and being cautioned by the court pleaded guilty as charged in the indictment herein. * * *’ The court thereupon proceeded, under section 7316 Rev. St., to hear evidence ‘ and determine the degree of the crime, and pronounce sentence accordingly.’ After hearing the evidence, the court found the grade of the homicide to be murder in the first degree, and sentenced the prisoner to suffer death. The proceedings and evidence were embodied in a bill of exceptions, and the cause taken to the circuit court on error, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. Thereupon proceedings were begun in this court to obtain a reversal of both of said judgments. Affirmed.

Rev.St § 7316 (repealed 1929. See Gen.Code, § 13448-2), which provides that " if the offense charged is murder, and the accused be convicted by confession in open court, the court shall examine the witnesses, and determine the degree of the crime, and pronounce sentence accordingly," is constitutional and valid.

Syllabus by the Court

The provisions of section 7316, Rev. St., which provide that ‘ if the offense charged is murder, and the accused be convicted by confession in open court, the court shall examine the witnesses, and determine the degree of the crime, and pronounce sentence accordingly,’ are constitutional and valid.

Wade Cushing , for plaintiff in error.

D. Thew Wright , for defendant in error.

BRADBURY, J., (after stating the facts as above .)

The only question arising on the record is the constitutionality of that provision of section 7316, Rev. St., which requires the court, where, upon a charge of murder, the accused confesses his guilt in open court, to ‘ examine witnesses, and determine the degree of the crime, and pronounce sentence accordingly.’ The record discloses that the plaintiff in error, voluntarily, by the advice of counsel, and after being cautioned by the court, entered a plea of guilty; and then, without objection or protest, permitted the court of common pleas to hear evidence offered by the state, and submitted evidence himself, tending to show the degree of the crime he had committed. That this action of the court was warranted, by the statute above quoted, is clear. Counsel for plaintiff in error contends, however, that the general assembly transcended its constitutional powers in enacting that statute; that the right, upon an indictment for a felony, especially if capital, to be tried by a jury, is so sacred that the accused could not waive it, even when authorized by a statute enacted by the legislature for that purpose. The denial, in criminal cases, of the power of waiver, has, in many instances, been carried to an extreme, if not absurd, length. The doctrine had its origin at a period in the history of the law of England when offenses that would now be regarded as comparatively trivial were, upon conviction, visited with death, and when the criminal procedure was as crude and imperfect as the Criminal Code was harsh; the accused being allowed, upon the trial of an issue of not guilty, neither counsel nor witnesses to aid him in his defense. The judges, frequently more humane than the law, were reluctant in many instances to pronounce the sentence of death prescribed by the statute, and were ready to seize upon any irregularity occurring in the course of the procedure to save the life of the prisoner, when neither the nature of the offense of which he had been convicted, nor the circumstances of its commission, indicated any considerable depravity or viciousness of character. In addition to this the judge was, in theory at least, the counsel for the accused, and if, through the act, advice, or omission of the judge, the accused was induced to omit making an available objection, or consented to relinquish a right, this was deemed not an act of the accused, but of the court, and the law would not permit the party to suffer for it. Bish. Crim. Pr. 20. In this state, however, the court is no longer, in fact, the adviser or counsel of the accused. Instead, other counsel is guarantied to him, and, if he is indigent, provided at the public expense. He is entitled to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and may, under the sanction of a judicial oath, if he so chooses, detail to the court and jury every fact or circumstance known to him that may bear on the question of his guilt or innocence. Every reasonable facility is thus provided for a complete and thorough in vestigation of the charge against him, which is the surest shield of innocence. Also the penalties prescribed for violations of our criminal laws are more humanely and reasonably apportioned according to the character and magnitude of the crime to which they are respectively attached. Under this state of the law there can be but little sound reason for maintaining a doctrine, defensible mainly, if not solely, by the circumstances under which it originated, and which have long since ceased to exist; and therefore, as might be expected, courts and legislatures view with diminishing respect that strict ancient doctrine on the subject of waiver in proceedings and trials of even the higher grades of crimes.

A plea of guilty is not an unusual proceeding in criminal prosecutions. The accused is arraigned to afford him an opportunity either to admit or deny the truth of the accusation. The subsequent proceedings are within his control, and depend upon his plea. By a plea of not guilty he denies and puts in issue every material fact alleged in the indictment, thus imposing upon the prosecutor the burden of proving them. Bish. Crim. Pr. 799; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 471; Whart. Crim. Pl. 408; People v. Aleck, 61 Cal. 137. On the other hand, a plea of guilty, from an early period in the history of criminal procedure, both in England and in the several states of the Union, has been regarded as an admission of every material fact well pleaded in the indictment, dispensing with the necessity of proving them, and authorizing the court to proceed to judgment. 4 Bl. Comm. 329; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 429; Crow v. State, 6...