Craigie v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 87-5328 to 87-5332 and 87-5354. |
| Citation | 740 F. Supp. 353 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | Pamela CRAIGIE, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of M. Brian Ball, Deceased v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. Lynne PANCOAST, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Christopher P. Avram, Deceased v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. Paul T. GEE v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. Frances M. SCHWEISS, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert A. Schweiss, Deceased v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. Robert FREEDENBERG, Sr. and Elizabeth Freedenberg, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Morris R. Freedenberg, Deceased v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. Michael SERRATORE v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. |
Stephen R. Bolden, Philadelphia, Pa., Henry Koltys, Lyme, N.H., Richard J. Lyons, Connolly, Chandor & McAndrews, Warminster, Pa., for Pamela Craigie.
Bruce D. Hess, Howland Hess Guinan & Gorpey, Huntingdon Valley, Pa., for Robert Freedenberg, Sr. and Elizabeth K. Freedenberg.
John J. Connors, Jr., Southampton, Pa., for Michael Serratore.
Lawrence R. Scheetz, Richboro, Pa., for Frances M. Schweiss.
Edwin F. McCoy, LaBrum and Doak, Philadelphia, Pa., for Lynne Pancoast.
Thomas C. Branca, Stewart, Wood & Branca, Norristown, Pa., Richard S. March, Galfand Berger Senesky Lurie and March, Philadelphia, Pa., for Brassell's Red Stallion, Inc.
George J. Lavin, Jr., Francis P. Burns, III, George J. Lavin, Jr. Assoc., Thomas J. Bradley, Philadelphia, Pa., for General Motors Corp.
William B. Koch, Koch, Phelps and Cunningham, Norristown, Pa., David M. Kozloff, Kozloff, Diener, Payne & Fegley, Wyomissing, Pa., for Robert W. Baxter and Tyson Baxter.
This diversity case concerns multiple motor vehicle fatalities and injuries which occurred in Pennsylvania on Friday, September 13, 1985. We have before us a number of motions, many of which were resolved in a pre-trial conference of all counsel held on Friday, June 1, 1990. Some of the motions were deferred until time of trial. In this opinion, we treat two remaining motions: Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Third-Party Complaint and Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Have the Defendants Treated as Joint Tortfeasors. Although we would prefer to wait for trial, we must decide these motions now in fairness to the parties, so they may know how to prepare for trial.
On the Friday in question at approximately 11:35 P.M., seven young men were passengers in a 1973 Chevrolet Blazer motor vehicle being driven by one Tyson Baxter. He was driving in an easterly direction on State Route 132, known as Street Road, in Upper Southampton Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. On that unfortunate night, the vehicle collided with another vehicle, a utility pole, and a light standard, injuring the driver and killing four of his passengers: M. Brian Ball, Christopher P. Avram, Robert A. Schweiss and Morris R. Freedenberg. All four were ejected from the vehicle during impact. Two passengers, Michael Serratore and Paul T. Gee, received serious injuries, and one passenger, John Gahan, received only minor injuries and is not a party to this or any other lawsuit. Chemical tests showed that the blood alcohol level of the driver, Tyson Baxter, was .14, which is above the .10 required to trigger a presumption of driving under the influence of alcohol as set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1547 (Purdon 1983 & Supp.1989). Tyson Baxter was only 17 at the time and the blood alcohol level of the four young men who were killed was also above the .10 level. Representatives of the estates of these young men who were killed, along with those who were injured, have brought suits1 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania,2 and have filed separate suits in this Court which have been consolidated for trial.3
Plaintiffs originally brought suit in this Court against General Motors Corporation ("General Motors") as the manufacturer of the 1973 Chevrolet motor vehicle, claiming that the design of this product was defective and also that General Motors was negligent in designing the vehicle. More specifically, plaintiffs claim that the 1973 Chevrolet vehicle should have been capable of retaining its occupants inside during a collision. Plaintiffs allege that had the occupants remained inside the vehicle, they would have received only minor injuries. General Motors has, in turn, filed a third-party complaint impleading the driver of the 1973 Chevrolet motor vehicle, Tyson Baxter, and his father, Robert Baxter.4 General Motors has filed a third-party complaint alleging negligence5 on the part of of Tyson Baxter and asserting liability for contribution or indemnity as to General Motors, as well as sole liability as to each plaintiff. General Motors has also asserted conduct which would amount to contributory negligence on the part of the decedents and plaintiffs in its answer. Tyson Baxter has filed a third-party complaint joining a local tavern, Brassell's Red Stallion, Inc., pursuant to 47 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 4-493(1) (Purdon Supp.1989).
Plaintiffs' claims against General Motors are all based upon what has come to be called the "crashworthiness", "enhanced injury", or "second collision" theory. We shall refer to these terms collectively as "crashworthiness". In their motion to strike the third-party complaint, plaintiffs maintain that the third-party joinder is improper because General Motors and the driver are not true joint tortfeasors. They point out that General Motors' liability would be based upon products liability and the crashworthiness doctrine, whereas the liability of the driver, Tyson Baxter, would be based upon traditional negligence concepts. Plaintiffs maintain in their motion in limine that, if joinder is permitted, the Court should then treat General Motors and all other defendants as joint tortfeasors and place on them the burden of proving that portion of the total harm each was responsible for. Before we discuss all these motions in detail, we shall review the evolution of the crashworthiness doctrine.
The crashworthiness doctrine was first articulated in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968). The court in Larsen stated: "The manufacturer's duty to use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of a product to minimize injuries to its users and not to subject its users to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision or impact should be recognized by the courts." Id. at 504. The court based its holding upon negligence concepts6 "with each state free to supplement common law liability for negligence with a doctrine of strict liability for tort...."7 Id. at 503 n. 5. The duty established under Larsen is for a designer to eliminate "any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury", id. at 503, and "the duty of reasonable care in design should be viewed in light of the risk." Id. At the same time, motor vehicle designers are not under any duty to "design an accident proof or fool-proof vehicle." Id. at 502.
Larsen's statement that the courts should recognize a duty proved to be prophetic and, in the twenty-two years since the Larsen decision, many courts have recognized the crashworthiness doctrine. In this District, we turn for fundamental guidance to the opinion of the Third Circuit in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). In Huddell, a motorist was killed in New Jersey after being struck in the rear of his stopped automobile. A diversity suit was brought against General Motors claiming that the motorist's automobile seat headrest was improperly designed, causing a serious skull fracture and extensive brain damage. The claims against General Motors were for breach of warranty. Claims in negligence were also brought in the same suit against the driver who struck the vehicle from behind. After relating the problems inherent in forecasting how state law will evolve and also noting that in New Jersey the warranty doctrine had developed into the doctrine of strict liability, the Court of Appeals stated, at page 735:
We take it as beyond peradventure that an automobile manufacturer today has some legal obligation to design and produce a reasonably crashworthy vehicle. The manufacturer is not required to design against bizarre accidents; the manufacturer is not required to produce an accident-proof vehicle. But the manufacturer is required to take reasonable steps — within the limitations of cost, technology, and marketability — to design and produce a vehicle that will minimize the unavoidable danger.... The manufacturer must consider accidents among the "intended" uses of its product.
The court, in Huddell, went on to note, at pages 738-739:
On the issue of apportionment of damages, the court in Huddell, at page 742, noted the possible application of a rule like that announced in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972). The court in Huddell, at page 742, quoted the court in Dole thus:
where a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but...
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