Craigmile v. Sorenson, 36853
| Decision Date | 30 November 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 36853,36853 |
| Citation | 80 N.W.2d 45,248 Minn. 286 |
| Parties | Milton D. CRAIGMILE et al., Respondents, v. Adolf O. W. SORENSON et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where vendors in a contract for the sale of land reserve the right to approve insurance to be placed on buildings on the premises, they must exercise such right in good faith in such a manner as to permit the vendees to comply with the contract. Where they act in such a manner as to prevent performance, they cannot claim a default in performance until they have afforded the vendees a reasonable opportunity to perform.
2. Where the vendees in a contract for deed for the sale of land obtain an enforcible policy of insurance on the buildings on the premises, they cannot be held in default of performance for failure to name one of the joint vendees as coinsured in the policy.
3. In an action for a declaratory judgment brought to determine the status of the parties under a contract for deed, the court could permit the vendees to meet the objections of the vendors to policies of insurance on the buildings on the premises when such objection is ascertained.
4. Where plaintiffs' prayer for relief in an action for a declaratory judgment asks that the court determine the status of the parties under a contract for deed and for such other and further relief as the plaintiffs might be entitled to in the premises, the court did not lack authority to grant relief by permitting the vendees in such contract to meet the objections of vendors to policies of insurance procured and tendered by the vendees.
5. Where a case is submitted to the trial court on a stipulation that decision may be based upon the files, records, and proceedings therein and upon the facts stipulated, the court's findings need not be based only on the stipulated facts.
Affirmed.
A. D. Bornemann, Hallock, Harry H. Peterson, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Lyman A. Brink, Hallock, Philip E. Thorson, Crookston, for respondents.
This case arises out of an attempt by defendants as vendors to cancel a contract for deed to sell certain real estate to plaintiffs as vendees. It has been here on two prior occasions. Craigmile v. Sorenson, 239 Minn. 383, 58 N.W.2d 865, and Craigmile v. Sorenson, 241 Minn. 222, 62 N.W.2d 846. The facts stated in our prior decisions will not be repeated except insofar as it seems necessary to a determination of the issues now before us.
Briefly, the facts are that on April 16, 1951, defendants, husband and wife, as vendors, contracted to sell a tract of farmland in Kittson County, in this state, to plaintiffs as joint tenants. Thereafter a dispute arose as to the validity of the contract. On May 29, 1953, our opinion in the first case was filed upholding the validity of the contract, 239 Minn. 383, 58 N.W.2d 865. On July 11, 1953, defendants served a notice of cancellation of the contract under M.S.A. §§ 559.21 to 559.214, claiming a default in the following particulars: (1) Failure to make the downpayment and to pay installments on the principal and failure to pay the interest in compliance with the terms of the contract; (2) failure to keep the buildings on said premises at all times insured against loss by fire and against loss by windstorm in accordance with the terms of the contract; and (3) failure to pay, before penalty attached thereto, taxes due and payable in the year 1952. On July 23, plaintiffs tendered to defendants the amount which they computed to be due, including principal and interest on the contract; taxes paid and interest thereon at six percent; and fire and windstorm insurance policies as set forth in our second opinion. Craigmile v. Sorenson, 241 Minn. 222, 62 N.W.2d 846. Defendants refused the tender without giving any specific reason therefor. On July 28, 1953, plaintiffs commenced an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the amounts due and the status of the parties with respect to the contract and what was required in order to comply therewith. In conjunction with this action they sought an injunction restraining defendants from proceeding with the cancellation of the contract until the amount due on the contract and other alleged defaults could be determined. Defendants applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial court from enforcing such injunction. That matter was disposed of in our second opinion filed February 11, 1954, 241 Minn. 222, 62 N.W.2d 846. The case then came on for trial, and the parties stipulated that the case would be submitted to the trial court 'upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, and upon the following facts which are stipulated as the evidence.' The facts thereafter were stipulated. Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment thereafter were made pursuant to this stipulation, and judgment was entered pursuant thereto declaring the contract to be in full force and effect. This appeal is from the judgment so entered.
It is the contention of defendants that (1) plaintiffs, as vendees, were in default under the contract for deed for the reason that they failed to name defendant Ruby C. Sorenson in the policies of insurance covering the buildings on the premises as a person entitled to receive the proceeds of the insurance in case of loss; (2) they are in default in failing to name Mary Joan Craigmile as joint owner of the property in such insurance policies; (3) the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudge that the insurance policies be amended to make them comply with the contract; and (4) the stipulation of facts is conclusive and that the court was bound thereby and could not go beyond the stipulation of facts.
1. The contract for deed contains the following provision, among others:
'Said parties of the second part further covenant and agree as follows: * * * at their own expense, to keep the buildings on said premises at all times insured in some reliable insurance company or companies, to be approved by the parties of the first part, against loss by fire for at least the sum of insurable value and against loss by windstorm for at least the sum of insurable value payable to said parties of the first part, their heirs or assigns, and, in case of loss, should there be any surplus over and above the amount then owing said parties of the first part, their heirs, or assigns, the balance shall be paid over to the said parties of the second part as their interest shall appear, and to deposit with the parties of the first part policies of said insurance.'
In the execution of the contract for deed defendants are designated as husband and wife. The record fails to disclose who was the record owner or whether one of the vendors signed only as the spouse of the record owner. There is no indication, nor does the contract so state, that they were joint owners. Plaintiffs' attempt to comply with this contract with respect to the insurance requirement discloses a determined attempt on the part of defendants, as vendors, to do all that they could to prevent performance. As part of the tender made after service of the notice of cancellation of the contract, plaintiffs included fire insurance written by Hallock Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Company and windstorm insurance written by Minnesota Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. 1 These were the same companies with which defendants had carried insurance on the buildings on this very farm prior to the execution of this contract and the same companies with which they carried insurance on their own property. In spite of this, they refused to approve the insurance policies without giving any specific reason therefor.
In a hearing before the trial court, defendants were directed to disclose what insurance company would be acceptable to them, as well as the amount which they claimed to be due on the contract, in order to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to comply with their demands. Adolf Sorenson wrote the court a letter on August 7, 1953, in which he stated the amount which he claimed to be due and also stated:
'* * * I want this farm covered by one of the following company.
'Boston Insurance Co.
Hallock, Minnesota.
'That company will be acceptable for both fire and tornado, the Ins. value is $14,000.'
Ruby Sorenson, as of the same date, wrote the court stating the amount which she claimed to be due but said nothing at all about insurance.
Plaintiffs thereupon procured insurance from the company and agency named in Adolf Sorenson's letter. They then attempted in various ways to make a tender upon defendants of these policies and the money which was claimed to be due. On August 8, 1953, Milton D. Craigmile, his attorney, and two other individuals went to Sorenson's home and had with them cash money in the amount stated in the Sorenson letters and the insurance policies written by the Boston Insurance Company for the purpose of making a tender thereof. The Sorensons were not at home. Craigmile and the others were informed that they were in North Dakota and would not return until the following week. On the same day, plaintiffs obtained an ex parte order from the trial court authorizing them to deposit the money and insurance policies with the clerk of the district court if they were unable to make a tender on the Sorensons within the time limited by the notice of cancellation. 2 On August 10, after three visits to the Sorenson home, they deposited the money and insurance policies with the clerk of the district court pursuant to the court's order. Defendants and their attorney were notified promptly of such deposit by the clerk by mail. The statutory period for reinstatement of the contract for deed expired. Defendants at no time during that period, as far as appears from the record, stated the reason for their refusal to accept this tender. They now claim that there was a default for failure to include the name of Ruby...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Independent School Dist. No. 197 v. Accident and Cas. Ins. of Winterthur, s. C3-94-827
...misrepresentation increases an insurer's risk of loss is a question to be decided by the trier of fact. Craigmile v. Sorenson, 248 Minn. 286, 295, 80 N.W.2d 45, 51 (1956); Transamerican Ins. Co. v. Austin Farm Ctr., Inc., 354 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn.App.1984), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb.......
-
Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., No. A04-2338.
...that Motorwerks' continuing oppression should transform the book-value buyout into a fair-value buyout. See Craigmile v. Sorenson, 248 Minn. 286, 292, 80 N.W.2d 45, 49 (1956) ("It is a principle of fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of the failure of performance . .......
-
Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hospitals, Inc.
...with the order, there is immunity from responsibility for the ensuing confinement. 4. It was held by this court in Craigmile v. Sorenson, 248 Minn. 286, 80 N.W.2d 45, that where a case is submitted to the trial court upon a stipulation that the decision may be based upon the files, records,......
-
Space Center, Inc. v. 451 CORP.
...set up the other party's subsequent nonperformance or a breach to avoid liability for its own prior total breach. Craigmile v. Sorenson, 248 Minn. 286, 80 N.W.2d 45 (1956). Defendants cannot rely on plaintiff's breach of the lease to terminate the purchase agreement and avoid liability for ......