Crail v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 October 1924
• Parties: CRAIL v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

2 F.2d 287 (1924)

CRAIL v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

October 18, 1924.

Stanley B. Houck, of Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

Brown & Guesmer and Edwin C. Brown, all of Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.

George A. Kingsley, of Minneapolis, Minn., and William G. Graves, of St. Paul, Minn., amici curiæ.

CANT, District Judge.

The amount immediately involved in this action is small. The action itself is said to be important, because the claim of plaintiff is one of a very numerous class.

In September, 1922, defendant engaged to transport a certain carload of coal, weighing 88,700 pounds, from a point in the state of Illinois to Minneapolis, Minn. Before its arrival at Minneapolis, plaintiff became the owner and consignee of the coal. On arrival in plaintiff's yard at Minneapolis, the place of delivery, it was found that 5,500 pounds of the coal had been lost in transit. At that time the value of the coal in question in carload lots at Minneapolis was $5.75 per ton, plus freight. The retail price of the same coal at Minneapolis was $9.70 per ton, plus freight. It was not possible to go into the market at Minneapolis and purchase 5,500 pounds, and no more, of the same grade of coal, with which to replace that which had been lost, at less than $9.70 per ton, plus freight. Plaintiff was under no necessity of making such replacement, and he made no such purchase. Plaintiff was a coal dealer, making purchases in carload lots from time to time as his necessity required. Those purchases included coal of the kind and quality here in question, of which, on the arrival of this carload, he had sufficient for his needs until the arrival of the next carload of the same kind which should be purchased. In carload lots the coal was worth more at Minneapolis than at the point of shipment. Plaintiff paid no freight on the coal which was lost. Under the facts above stated, what amount is he entitled to recover from the defendant on account of the failure of the defendant to deliver the 5,500 pounds of coal which was lost?

The underlying general rule applicable in such cases is not in dispute. The measure of damages is the value of the commodity which has been lost at the time and place at which it should have been delivered, with interest, less the transportation charges, if they have not been paid. The basic thought in such cases is that the plaintiff shall be made whole. If he has sustained loss or damage, he should be compensated by receipt of the proper equivalent in money.

The dispute arises over the application of the rule, and more specifically the problem is whether the plaintiff should be entitled to recover from defendant the value of the lost coal, as that value would have been in the car, if the contract of carriage had been properly performed, or whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff should recover such an amount as he would be obliged to pay in the market at Minneapolis for coal of a like kind and grade sufficient to replace that which had been lost. Defendant admits a right of recovery in accordance with the first of the two statements last above set forth, and claims that this is the true application of the general rule. Plaintiff claims a right of recovery under the second of said statements, and claims that this is a proper interpretation and application of the rule. A recovery as claimed by plaintiff would be substantially greater in amount than as admitted by defendant.

On delivery of the car to plaintiff, he was entitled to find therein the full 88,700 pounds of coal, or, if some part or all of the coal was not there, he was entitled to an amount in money equivalent to the value of that which was lost. If in some way, on discovery of the loss, defendant had replaced the missing coal in the car, or had placed therein other coal of the same grade and in like amount, plaintiff could no longer complain. Restoration would then have been complete. Each ton of coal so replaced in the car would be worth $5.75, and no more. If the coal was not replaced in the car, payment therefor to plaintiff at the rate of $5.75 per ton would be the money equivalent of the coal, and he would be as well off as if he had that which was lost.

These are the general rules applicable under ordinary circumstances. If, in any case, under peculiar conditions, special damages are sustained, the same must be specially pleaded and proved. This case has no such feature.

The foregoing considerations should dispose of the case in accordance with the claims of the defendant. The many authorities, however, are in much confusion. This is not with respect to the rule as to the measure of damages, but with respect to the application thereof. Cases have arisen under all sorts of conditions, and with respect to all classes of property. Under proper conditions, the claim of special damages has sometimes been pleaded and proved, and sometimes where there has been no such pleading or proof, so far as the opinion discloses, the cases have been treated as if there were, and finally, in specific c...