Crain v. Peterman
| Decision Date | 22 December 1906 |
| Citation | 98 S.W. 600,200 Mo. 295 |
| Parties | CRAIN et al., Appellants, v. PETERMAN |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Dent Circuit Court. -- Hon. L. B. Woodside, Judge.
Affirmed.
John W McClellan and Ed. J. Shuck for appellants.
(1) Plaintiffs insist that the law presumes that every possession is rightful and consistent with and not in opposition or adverse to title and ownership. Hunnewell v Burchett, 152 Mo. 611. Therefore, it devolves on defendant to show that the possession of Shuck was not the possession of Aaron G. Crain. (2) Again, it is the contention of defendant that the acts of ownership exercised by Shuck were not such acts as would prevent the running of the Statutes of Limitation; that the acts were not open notorious and continuous and were not such acts as a passer-by would be presumed to see. Now, this would be a correct proposition of law when applied to the disseizor, to the wrongdoer, and to the person claiming title in disregard of the rights of others; however, the acts as above stated need not be so strong if the party claiming by the Statutes of Limitation can show by evidence that the party being ousted knew of the claims of the disseizor or ouster, (Nye v. Alfter, 127 Mo. 529), but is the true owner of the land required to be in possession as long as an ouster to break the possession of a wrongdoer? Is it not a fact that a single week or even a day would be time sufficient to break the Statutes of Limitation and defeat the acquiring of title by a wrongdoer? There is great difference between the possession required to acquire title by the Statutes of Limitations and the possession required or necessary on the part of the party who has the superior title to break the continuity of possession so as to defeat the acquiring of title by the Statutes of Limitations whether it be the ten or thirty-year Statuts of Limitations, because the one "adverse possession" designates a possession in opposition to the true title and real owner, and it implies that it commenced in wrong by ouster and disseizure and is maintained against right (Hunnewell v. Burchett, 152 Mo. 611), while the other is only the ordinary acts of ownership incident to the use and enjoyment of property by the party holding under the superior title.
D. W. Clements for respondent.
(1) No reversible error is assigned or shown. Hamilton v. Boggess, 63 Mo. 243; Weller v. Wagner, 181 Mo. 151. (2) Plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the general ten-year Statute of Limitations. Draper v. Shoot, 25 Mo. 197; Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 237. (3) Plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the thirty-year Statute of Limitations. Pharis v. Bayless, 122 Mo. 116; Shumate v. Snyder, 140 Mo. 77; Collins v. Pease, 146 Mo. 135. (4) Respondent's is the better title. Hunnewell v. Burchett, 152 Mo. 611.
Plaintiffs sue in ejectment for the possession of 320 acres of land in Dent county.
Plaintiffs introduced in evidence the Government plat-book showing that the land in question was entered by Aaron G. Crain in 1857. They also introduced evidence tending to show that Crain died in 1879 and that the plaintiffs are his heirs at law. Also that from 1870 to 1875 a man named Shuck, who is now dead, lived near the land and used to cut grass on it and he was heard to say that he had a lease from Crain under which he cut the grass.
The testimony on the part of the defendant tended to show as follows:
Aaron G. Crain never lived in Missouri; neither he nor anyone claiming or who might claim under him had for thirty consecutive years been in possession; and neither he nor anyone claiming or who might claim under him had for that period of time paid any taxes on the land.
A sheriff's deed on a judgment against one S. M. Alward for the taxes of 1875 and 1876, conveying the land to A. H. Love, dated October 11, 1879, duly recorded.
A sheriff's deed to said land on judgment against N. I. Kenyon, A. H. Love, L. Judson and Aaron G. Crain, for the taxes of 1896, to A. H. Love, dated April 6, 1899, and warranty deed from Love to defendant Peterman, December 11, 1902, both duly recorded.
There was evidence for defendant tending to show that immediately after Love received the first sheriff's deed in 1879 he...
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