Cramer v. American Merchants Union Express Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1874
• Citation: 56 Mo. 524
• Parties: JOHN V. R. CRAMER, et al., Appellants, v. THE AMERICAN MERCHANTS UNION EXPRESS COMPANY, AND THE MERCHANTS DISPATCH COMPANY, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

56 Mo. 524

JOHN V. R. CRAMER, et al., Appellants,

v.THE AMERICAN MERCHANTS UNION EXPRESS COMPANY, AND THE MERCHANTS DISPATCH COMPANY, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1874.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Marshall & Barclay, for Appellants.

I. No common carrier is bound to do more than he contracted to do. In this instance there was no contract that placed this defendant in the position of a forwarder of goods, nor was there any authority in the contract to warrant the defendants' assuming the duties of a forwarder.

II. The defendant had no authority to deliver the goods in question to any consignee save the St. Louis and Vicksburg Packet Company at St. Louis, or to Cramer, Hume & McCown, if they had demanded them at St. Louis.

If the St. Louis and Vicksburg Packet Company were the consignees whom the defendant contracted with reference to, then, upon a failure to find these consignees, it became the duty of the common carrier to store the goods in a safe warehouse, and notify the consignor, who then became the owner of the goods, or else to hold them and notify the consignor. (Ang. on Cor., 326; Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. vs. Scott, 42 Ill., 132; Norway Planes Co. vs. Boston & Maine Railway, 1 Gray, 263; Fox vs. Holt, 36 Conn., 550; Linn vs. N. I. S. Co., 49 N. Y., 442; Par. Con. B. 186, 210; 3 Bro. & Bing., 177; see also Stephenson vs. Hart, 4 Bing., 476; Duff vs. Budd, 3 Br. & B., 177; Hudson vs. Baxendale, 2 Hurl. & N., 575; Ostrander vs. Brown, 15 Johns., 39; Fisk vs. Newton, 1 Denio, 45; Stone vs. Watt, 31 Maine, 409; Hemphill vs. Cheene, 6 W. & S., 62; Redfield on Contracts, 241 and 256; Redfield on Railways, p. 76, cl. 18 ch. 26 S. 175, 4th Ed.; Halford vs. Adams, 2 Duer., 471; Lithtenheen vs. Boston & Providence R. R., 11 Cush. R., 70.)

Upon question of delivery, see also American Express Co. vs. Fletcher, 6 American Law Register, N. S., 21; Redfield's American Railway Cases, p. 72, and 74; 5 Barn. and Ald., 53; 3 Brod. and Bing., 177; 5 T. S., 389; Gibson vs. Culver, 17 Wend., 305; 6 Wharton, 505; Adams Express Co. vs. Darnell, 31 Ind., 20; Young vs. Smith, 3 Dara, 92; Hall vs. B. & W. R. R., 14 Allen, 439; The Santee, 2 Ben., 519; The Thames, 10 Wallace, 98, and 7 Bl. C. C., 226.)

If the goods are delivered contrary to the instructions of the consignor, whether written or verbal, the common carrier is liable. (16 Mich., 463; Redfield's Am. R. Cas. 77.)

III. Taking into consideration, that the defendant only contracted to convey the goods as far as St. Louis; that the freight was only paid to St. Louis, and that the St. Louis and Vicksburg Packet Company is the only consignee at St. Louis mentioned in the bill of lading, we are bound to conclude that the St. Louis and Vicksburg Packet Company was the consignee; and hence that a failure to deliver the goods to them, or to store them or hold them and notify the consignor, makes the defendant liable as for a conversion. (C. & N. W. R. R. vs. Merrill, 48 Ill. 425.)Daniel Dillon, for Respondents.

The ultimate destination of the goods being known, and also the means of transportation which the shipper meant to employ, what was the duty of respondent, when, on arrival of the goods at St. Louis, it ascertained that the intermediate consignee to whom it was directed to deliver the goods at that point did not exist?

In Steamboat Keystone vs. Moies, (28 Mo., 245;) the court says the carrier's duty in such a case, “is to regard himself as the agent of the owners, and as such, invested with authority to take such steps as will advance the owners' interest and purposes, consistently with a reasonable security himself for his freight and charges.” Regarding the respondent as the agent of the owner of the goods, when they arrived in St. Louis, with authority as such agent to take such steps as would advance the owners' interest and purposes, was it not justified in forwarding the goods to their point of destination, by usual and customary means of shipping such goods to that point? Respondents contend that it was not only justified in so doing, but that, under the circumstances, its duty to do so was so plain that to have pursued any other course would have rendered it liable.

The shippers and owners had manifested to respondents their purpose of having the goods forwarded from St. Louis to Vicksburg, by means of river transportation; this it did by shipping the goods in care of St. Louis & Vicksburg Packet Company, at St. Louis. This, together with the admission that respondent shipped the goods on a first class steamboat, on which it was usual and customary to ship such goods from St. Louis to Vicksburg, shows that the respondent did what a man of ordinary prudence acting as agent for the owners, would do under the circumstances. And this court has said in the case of the Steamboat Keystone vs. Moies, (28 Mo., p. 246,) that if he pursues such a course, “he is protected by the law, whatever may be the result.”

Respondents contend that the case comes clearly within the principle of the case just referred to, and that, applying the rule laid down in that case to the admitted facts of the case at bar, it fully sustains the action of the court below.

ADAMS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action on a contract of affreightment brought by the plaintiffs, residing at Vicksburg, Mississippi, against the defendant, as a common carrier, for damages for failing to deliver goods at St. Louis, according to the terms of a bill of lading by which they were shipped from the city of New York.

The ultimate destination of the goods was Vicksburg, the residence and place of business of the plaintiffs, who were merchants. By the terms of the bill of lading the defendant was only to carry the goods to St. Louis, Missouri. The goods were marked “Cramer, Hume & McCown, Vicksburg, Miss., care St. Louis & Vicksburg Packet Co., St. Louis, Mo.”

The receipts given by the defendant to the shippers in New York as the goods were being delivered, were to the same effect, and in the following form: “New York, October 2nd, 1869. Shipped on board the M. D. via. St. Louis & Vicksburg Packet Co., for Cramer, Hume & McCown, Vicksburg, Miss.”

The defendant is a common carrier, its line being from New York to St. Louis. The goods were received by defendant, as above, at New York, on the 2nd day of October, 1869, and in due time were safely conveyed to St. Louis. For the purpose of the trial, the plaintiffs admitted “that at the time the goods in question arrived in St. Louis, there was no company, or person or persons in existence in St. Louis, having an office or place of business in St. Louis, named or known as the Vicksburg Packet Company; and that the W. R. Arthur at that time was a first class steamer, in which it was usual and customary to ship goods of this...