Crampton v. 54-A Dist. Judge

• Decision Date: 01 May 1975
• Docket Number: Nos. 13--16,s. 13--16
• Citation: 245 N.W.2d 28,397 Mich. 489
• Parties: Clyde B. CRAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 54-A DISTRICT JUDGE, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Royce Daniel HUDGINS et al., Defendants-Appellees. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 28

245 N.W.2d 28

397 Mich. 489

Clyde B. CRAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 54-A DISTRICT JUDGE, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Royce Daniel HUDGINS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 13--16, May Term, 1975.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 27, 1976.

Church, Wyble, Kritselis & Tesseris by Thomas H. Hay, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant Crampton.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Raymond L. Scodeller, Pros. Atty., Ingham County, Lawrence J. Emery, Asst. Pros. Atty., Ingham County, Lansing, for 54--A District Judge.

State Appellate Defender Office by Dennis H. Benson, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for People of State of Mich.; Larry Baron, Research Atty.

George C. Parzen, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Hudgins; Alvin C. Sallen, Detroit, of counsel.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

In People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 255, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973) this Court, following the lead of other jurisdictions, ¹ adopted the 'same transaction' test as the proper standard to be applied in examining a claim of double jeopardy. ² We adopted this test because it 'provides the only meaningful approach to the constitutional protection against being placed twice in jeopardy', Supra, 390 Mich. 257--258 212 N.W.2d 227.

The cases now before this Court require us to examine the parameters of the same transaction test. This is by no means an easy task. ³ As Justice Brennan admitted in calling for the adoption of the same transaction test, 'the phrase 'same transaction' is not self-defining.' Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454, fn. 8, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1199, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). However, the task can be accomplished in such a way that the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant will be protected without reaching anomalous or absurd results.

In this opinion we will explore the purposes behind the adoption of the same transaction test, examine how other jurisdictions have developed the concept of the same transaction, set forth criteria for determining whether crimes arise out of the same transaction and apply that standard to the facts of the four cases before us.

I--PURPOSE BEHIND ADOPTION OF SAME TRANSACTION TEST

In seeking to establish the proper parameters of the same transaction test we must be mindful of the purposes behind adopting the rule. We expressed the view in White that the use of the same transaction test would promote both 'the best interests of justice and sound judicial administration.' 390 Mich. 258, 212 N.W.2d 228. Indeed, economical and expeditious administration of justice will result from use of this test, but as we emphasized in White, 'our primary objective in adopting the same transaction test is to ensure that a criminal defendant receives meaningful protection under the double jeopardy clause.' 390 Mich. 258, fn. 6, 212 N.W.2d 227. ⁴ We observed:

'A far more basic reason for adopting the same transaction test is to prevent harassment of a defendant. The joining of all charges arising out of the same criminal episode at one trial '* * * will enable a defendant to consider the matter closed and save the costs of redundant litigation.' It will also help '* * * to equalize the adversary capabilities of grossly unequal litigants' and prevent prosecutorial sentence shopping. 'In doing so, it recognizes that the prohibition of double jeopardy is for the defendant's protection.' 41 Mich.App. 370, 378, 200 N.W.2d 326, 330 (1972).' 390 Mich. 258--259, 212 N.W.2d 228.

It is the protection of the defendant from the possibility of prosecutorial harassment which was foremost in our minds when we adopted the same transaction test ⁵ and this is the principle which must be kept in mind as we give substance to the phrase, the same transaction.

I--SAME TRANSACTION--INTENT

CRIMES--WHITE APPLIES

White dealt with a series of offenses all of which involved crimes where criminal intent was an element of the crime. In White, this Court said:

'(T)here can be no doubt that the three crimes committed by defendant were all part of a single criminal transaction. The Crimes were committed in a continuous time sequence and display a single intent and goal--sexual intercourse with complainant.' ⁶ (Emphasis added.) 390 Mich. 245, 259, 212 N.W.2d 222, 228.

This was the criterion that case established:

'a continuous time sequence and display (of) a single intent and goal.'

This criterion provides a generally workable test to apply in most instances to determine whether a single transaction exists vis-a-vis double jeopardy if all the activities involve crimes where Criminal intent is an element. We accept that as the criterion which must be applied in all cases where only Intent crimes are in question.

III--SAME TRANSACTION: NO INTENT CRIMES

Where a series of offenses involve either no intent crimes or intent and no intent crimes, the criterion in White does not provide a wholly workable test. The cases with which this opinion deals involve such fact situations. Our task therefore is to formulate an appropriate criterion to test them in the spirit of White.

The American Law Institute Model Penal Code seeks to prevent successive prosecutions where offenses are part of the same criminal episode. Section 1.07(2) provides in pertinent part:

'A defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.'

In Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing the Model Penal Code with approval, held that:

'The Double Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a 'single criminal episode." (Footnote omitted.)

The White quotation used above in Part I makes use of the term 'criminal episode' as follows:

'The joining of all charges arising out of the same criminal episode at one trial '. . . will enable a defendant to consider the matter closed and save the costs of redundant litigation." 290 Mich. 259, 212 N.W.2d 228.

Utilization of this term therefore will comport with language already employed in White.

Both Hawaii and New York have an approach to the problem at hand that suggests another useful criterion. In State v. Ahuna, 52 Haw. 321, 474 P.2d 704, 707 (1970), the Supreme Court of Hawaii held:

'We think that a satisfactory approach to the problem is set forth in § 111 of the proposed Hawaii Penal Code 1970. Under the approach, a former prosecution, although it has been for a violation of a different statutory provision, will bar a subsequent prosecution if the subsequent prosecution is for an offense based on the same conduct, unless the offense 'requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil."

A New York criminal statute likewise provides that subsequent prosecutions will not be barred where 'the offenses * * * (contain) an element which is not an element of the other, and the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.' N.Y. Crim.Pro.L. § 40.20(2)(b). ⁷

A common criterion in both these jurisdictions is that the same transaction rule applied where the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, not 'a substantially different harm or evil' (Hawaii), or 'very different kinds of harm or evil.' (New York)

Drawing upon these sources certain criteria for determining whether crimes arise out of the same transaction can be set forth.

1) Where criminal intent is required in the offenses involved, the criterion set forth in White applies: 'continuous time sequence and display (of) a single intent and goal.' ⁸

2) Where one or more of the offenses does not involve criminal intent, the criterion is whether the offenses are part of the same criminal episode, and whether the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, not a substantially different, or a very different kind of, harm or evil. ⁹

The above criteria do not purport to be all inclusive. Criteria could no doubt be fashioned to encompass a greater number of fact situations and perhaps offer more guidance and thereby promote to a greater degree the efficient administration of justice. However, we believe that the criteria set forth today are as broad as appropriate until we are called upon to consider further illustrative cases.

IV--APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD

The task remains to determine whether the individual offenses involved in each of the four cases before us arise out of the same transaction. Each of the four cases include either traffic or liquor law violations. Such offenses do not require criminal intent as an element and consequently, Part (1) of the standard dealing with the singleness of the criminal intent or goal is inapplicable. The relevant portion of the standard for the cases before us is Part (2).

A. CRAMPTON

On May 13, 1972, Clyde Crampton was arrested in Lansing and charged with driving under the influence of liquor, M.C.L.A. § 257.625; M.S.A. § 9.2325. The complaint alleging that charge was filed in 54--A District Court on May 16, 1972. Subsequently, on June 28, a separate complaint charging Crampton with failure to display a valid registration on demand, M.C.L.A. § 257.223; M.S.A. § 9.1923, was also filed in the district court. It is clear that this second complaint was also based on the May 13 arrest.

Faced with the two complaints, Mr. Crampton entered a guilty plea to the failure to display registration charge on October 25, 1972. On November 6, Crampton moved to quash the driving under the influence of liquor charge by arguing that the same...