Crandall v. Crandall

Decision Date13 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. 20100402.,20100402.
Citation799 N.W.2d 388,2011 ND 136
PartiesHeidi Jo CRANDALL, Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross–Appellantv.Chad Von CRANDALL, Defendant, Appellant and Cross–Appellee.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Erica Leigh Chisholm, Wahpeton, N.D., for plaintiff, appellee and cross-appellant.Tracey Rae Lindberg, Breckenridge, MN, for defendant, appellant and cross-appellee.CROTHERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Chad Crandall appeals and Heidi Crandall cross appeals from a divorce judgment distributing the parties' marital property, awarding Chad Crandall primary residential responsibility for the parties' three minor children and ordering Chad Crandall to pay Heidi Crandall $680 per month in child support for the three children. We affirm the district court's property distribution but reverse the court's child support decision and remand for further proceedings.

I

[¶ 2] The parties were married in 1995 and have three children together. In July 2009, Heidi Crandall brought this divorce action against Chad Crandall. At the time of a September 2010 trial, Chad Crandall was 43 years old and worked for Bobcat in Gwinner, and Heidi Crandall was 37 and operated a day-care facility in Gwinner. After trial, the district court awarded Chad Crandall primary residential responsibility for the parties' three children and also ordered him to pay Heidi Crandall $680 per month in child support beginning on December 10, 2010, finding that [c]onsidering the child support guidelines for both parents and the amount of time the children will be with each parent, the Court concludes that Chad [Crandall] shall pay child support to Heidi [Crandall] in the amount of $680 per month.” The court also distributed the parties' marital property, stating that after taking “away the value of Chad [Crandall's] 401(k) he is awarded personal property of $44,244.99 and Heidi [Crandall] is awarded property of $42,701.00. The debt awarded to Heidi [Crandall] is $51,681.48 and the debt awarded to Chad [Crandall] is $46,978.98. The Court finds that this is a fair and equitable distribution.” The district court denied Chad Crandall's motion to stay his payment of child support pending appeal.

II

[¶ 3] Chad Crandall argues the district court erred in not requiring Heidi Crandall to pay him child support and by instead ordering him to pay her child support. He asserts the child support guidelines do not contemplate requiring the custodial parent to pay the noncustodial parent child support, and he contends the court failed to adequately explain its methodology for ordering him to pay Heidi Crandall child support. Heidi Crandall responds that N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–09(2)(j) allows for a deviation from the child support guidelines based on [t]he reduced ability of the obligor to pay child support due to a situation, over which the obligor has little or no control, which requires the obligor to incur a continued or fixed expense for other than subsistence needs, work expenses, or daily living expenses, and which is not otherwise described in this subsection.” She argues the court exercised its discretion in awarding her child support after making a finding the award was based on a consideration of the child support guidelines and the amount of time each parent will spend with the children.

[¶ 4] In Buchholz v. Buchholz, we described the standards of review for child support determinations:

“Child support determinations involve questions of law which are subject to the de novo standard of review, findings of fact which are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, and may, in some limited areas, be matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. A court errs as a matter of law when it fails to comply with the requirements of the Guidelines. ‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ When a district court may do something, it is generally a matter of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. A district court errs as a matter of law when it fails to make required findings or required findings are not intelligible.

“As a matter of law, the district court must clearly set forth how it arrived at the amount of income and level of support. ‘A proper finding of net income is essential to a determination of the correct amount of child support under the guidelines.’ N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–02(10) requires ‘a child support order include a statement of the obligor's net income and “how that net income was determined.”‘A mere recitation that the guidelines have been considered in arriving at the amount of a child support obligation is insufficient to show compliance with the guidelines.’ Even where the district court used ‘vague figures ... despite the fact it appears adequate evidence was admitted for the trial court to make a precise finding,’ we reverse.”

1999 ND 36, ¶¶ 11–12, 590 N.W.2d 215 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

[¶ 5] The issue here is whether our law authorizes a district court to require a parent awarded primary residential responsibility of a child to pay child support to a parent who is not awarded primary residential responsibility of the child. Under N.D.C.C. § 14–09–33, a custodial parent or parent with primary residential responsibility “means a parent with more than fifty percent of the residential responsibility” for a child and a noncustodial parent “means a parent with less than fifty percent of the residential responsibility” for a child. See also N.D.C.C. § 14–09–00.1(6) and (7) (defining “primary residential responsibility” to mean “a parent with more than fifty percent of the residential responsibility” and defining “residential responsibility” to mean “a parent's responsibility to provide a home for the child”). Parents have a mutual duty of support for their children, and a court may compel either or both parents to provide for the support of their children.” N.D.C.C. § 14–09–08. Under N.D.C.C. § 14–09–09.7(1), the Department of Human Services is authorized to “establish child support guidelines to assist courts in determining the amount a parent should be expected to contribute toward the support of the child.” The Department has promulgated child support guidelines in N.D. Admin. Code ch. 75–02–04.1.

[¶ 6] Administrative regulations are statutory derivatives and are construed using rules of statutory construction. Gofor Oil, Inc. v. State, 427 N.W.2d 104, 108 (N.D.1988). ‘Statutory interpretation is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.’ Landsiedel v. Director, North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2009 ND 196, ¶ 7, 774 N.W.2d 645 (quoting Schaaf v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2009 ND 145, ¶ 11, 771 N.W.2d 237). The objective in interpreting a statute is to determine legislative intent by first looking at the language of the statute. Amerada Hess Corp. v. State ex rel. Tax Comm'r, 2005 ND 155, ¶ 12, 704 N.W.2d 8. ‘Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined in the code or unless the drafters clearly intended otherwise. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–02. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. N.D.C.C. § 1–02 [–07]. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot “be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. § 1–02–05.’ Arnegard v. Cayko, 2010 ND 83, ¶ 10, 782 N.W.2d 54 (quoting North Dakota Dep't of Labor v. Matrix Props. Corp., 2009 ND 137, ¶ 8, 770 N.W.2d 290).

[¶ 7] The child support guidelines define a custodial parent as “a parent who acts as the primary caregiver on a regular basis for a proportion of time greater than the obligor, regardless of custody descriptions such as ‘shared’ or ‘joint’ custody given in relevant judgments.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–01(4). The calculation of a child support obligation “assume[s] that the care given to the child during temporary periods when the child resides with the obligor or the obligor's relatives do not substitute for the child support obligation.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–02(2). The general instructions for determining child support contemplate the primary caregiving parent is the obligee and is owed a duty of support. See N.D. Admin. Code §§ 75–02–04.1–01(8) and (9) (defining obligee and obligor) and 75–02–04.1–02 (general instructions for determining support amount). See also N.D.C.C. § 14–09–09.10(12) and (13) (defining obligor and obligee). The parent who is not the primary caregiver is the obligor and the person owing a duty of support. Id.

[¶ 8] The guidelines provide a schedule of child support amounts based on the obligor's net income. See N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–10. The scheduled amount “is presumed to be the correct amount of child support.” N.D. Admin. Code 75–02–04.1–09(1). The guidelines also provide criteria for determining child support for split custody situations, N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–03, for calculating a minimum duty of support where an obligor has any income, N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–04, for making adjustments for extended visitation, N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–08.1, and for rebutting the guideline amount. N.D. Admin.Code § 75–02–04.1–09.

[¶ 9] Except as provided in N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–08.2 for equal custody situations, [c]alculation of child support obligations under the guidelines ‘consider and assume that one parent acts as a primary caregiver and the other parent contributes a payment of child support to the child's care.’ Richter v. Houser, 1999 ND 147, ¶ 22, 598 N.W.2d 193 (quoting N.D. Admin. Code § 75–02–04.1–02(1)). The child support guidelines describe a procedure for calculating an offsetting child...

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