Crandall v. Sammons
| Decision Date | 31 January 1940 |
| Docket Number | 27884. |
| Citation | 7 S.E.2d 575,62 Ga.App. 1 |
| Parties | CRANDALL v. SAMMONS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied March 6, 1940.
Syllabus by the Court.
Harris Harris, Russell & Weaver, of Macon, for plaintiff in error.
Jos W. Popper and William H. Harbin, both of Macon, for defendant in error.
John R Crandall brought suit against Jack L. Sammons to recover damages for injuries sustained by him while a guest of the defendant in an automobile driven by the latter. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial on the general grounds, and by amendment added several special grounds. The exception is to the judgment overruling the motion for new trial, but only the special grounds are argued or insisted on in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error.
It is shown by the evidence that the plaintiff and three others were guests of the defendant and were returning to Macon from an airport located a short distance from the city, one guest sitting on the front seat of the automobile with the defendant driver and the others occupying the rear seat, the plaintiff being on the right-hand side. On account of the heavy line of traffic the cars were continually stopping and starting. At one point, when the line of traffic had halted, one of the guests called attention to the unusual construction of a house on the right-hand side of the road, and some conversation took place while the occupants were looking in the direction of the house and away from the line of traffic. Sammons, while so looking and paying no attention to the traffic in front of him, suddenly started his car in low gear,
and while traveling at a rate of speed estimated at from fifteen to twenty miles an hour drove violently into the rear of the car immediately in front of him. It appears that one or two seconds elapsed while the attention of the driver was diverted towards the house. Crandall was thrown to the top of the car against a panel, receiving a blow upon the head, was somewhat dazed and suffered a headache, but it did not appear that he was substantially injured, and it was only when he consulted a specialist two or three months later that it was found that he had a cataract on one eye, the sight of which was subsequently lost. The evidence was conflicting as to whether or not the loss of sight was the result of the blow he received in the car. The petition alleged that he had no way of avoiding the consequences of the alleged gross negligence of the defendant at the time and place in question, and the answer of the defendant denied such allegation.
1. Grounds 1 and 2 of the amended motion for new trial complain that the court erred in charging the jury, in effect, that the plaintiff was bound by the rule of ordinary care and diligence and was not entitled to recover if by the exercise of ordinary care he could have avoided the consequences to himself of the defendant's negligence, it being contended that under the evidence the plaintiff did not know and had no opportunity to discover that the defendant was negligent, and that the charge of the court was unauthorized and placed an illegal burden upon the plaintiff. It can not be determined from the jury's verdict whether it was returned for the reason that they found that the defendant was not grossly negligent or whether they found that he was, but also found that by the exercise of ordinary care the plaintiff might have avoided the consequences to himself of the defendant's negligence. It is well settled that except in plain and indisputable cases the question of negligence is one peculiarly for the determination of the jury, and from a careful consideration of the testimony of all the witnesses in the present case it can not be said as a matter of law that the defendant was or was not grossly negligent. The jury might reasonably have found that he was or was not.
The defendant contends that the verdict was demanded as a matter of law because the evidence showed that the defendant's attention was diverted for only one or two seconds, and that his act followed a natural instinct to yield to the suggestion of looking at the house and did not constitute a failure to use even slight diligence. It appears, however, that there was no emergency or any outcry or warning which would reasonably startle the defendant and cause him to assume that his attention was needed in another direction. The situation was one in which no excitement prevailed, and where no compelling influence operated to affect the exercise of normal judgment. The question resolves itself into a determination of whether or not his lack of attention to the roadway for the brief interval of one or two seconds was, under the circumstances shown, a failure to use even slight care for the safety of his guests. A discussion of cases heretofore before this court is deemed unprofitable, inasmuch as each depends on its own particular facts. Under the pleadings and the evidence the charge of the court was appropriate and proper. The plaintiff alleged that by the exercise of ordinary care he could not have avoided the consequences of the defendant's alleged negligence. This the defendant denied, and we do not think that the evidence demanded a finding as a matter of law that the plaintiff could not, in the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence.
There was uncontradicted evidence that the defendant was not keeping a lookout ahead of him, and that he drove his car into the rear of the one immediately in front of him while all the time looking towards the house on the right-hand side of the road. Should the plaintiff, acting as an ordinarily prudent person, have discovered this negligence and have avoided the consequences thereof? It is true that, as held in Western & A. R. Go. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, 39 S.E 306, 54 L.R.A. 802, and oft reiterated, "The duty...
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Freeman v. Martin
...part of the driver arises must act as an ordinarily prudent person would act, under the same or similar circumstances.' Crandall v. Sammons, 62 Ga.App. 1, 4, 7 S.E.2d 575. Certainly prudence would have required this plaintiff, a passenger rather than a guest, to desist from riding with one ......
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Beadles v. Bowen, 39473
...evidence offered relating to the conduct of host and guest, thereby supporting the defense of contributory negligence. Crandall v. Sammons, 62 Ga.App. 1, 7 S.E.2d 575; Hatcher v. Bray, 88 Ga.App. 344, 77 S.E.2d It is elementary that the negligence of a host driver is not imputable to the gu......
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Browning v. Kahle, 39401
...like circumstances.' See also Roberts v. King, 102 Ga.App. 518, 116 S.E.2d 885. In the Russell case, supra, as well as Crandall v. Sammons, 62 Ga.App. 1, 7 S.E.2d 575, the plaintiff actually knew of the hazard and did nothing about it. There is not one scintilla of evidence that the plainti......
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Brown v. Sims
...307, 308, 196 S.E.2d 451 (1973). Compare Hatcher v. Bray, 88 Ga.App. 344, 347-348(5), (6), 77 S.E.2d 64 (1953); Crandall v. Sammons, 62 Ga.App. 1, 2(1), 7 S.E.2d 575 (1940). 4. Appellants also enumerate as error the trial court's charge on comparative negligence, asserting that there was no......