Crane-Jenkins v. Mikarose, LLC

• Decision Date: 07 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20150225–CA.,20150225–CA.
• Citation: 371 P.3d 49,2016 UT App 71
• Parties: Michelle CRANE–JENKINS, Appellee, v. MIKAROSE, LLC and Michaella Lawson, Appellants.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

371 P.3d 49

2016 UT App 71

Michelle CRANE–JENKINS, Appellee

v.MIKAROSE, LLC and Michaella Lawson, Appellants.

No. 20150225–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

April 7, 2016.

Andrew W. Stavros and Austin B. Egan, Draper, for Appellants.

Robert C. Avery and Nathan E. Burdsal, Orem, for Appellee.

Judge J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judge KATE A. TOOMEY and Senior Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD concurred.¹

Memorandum Decision

VOROS

, Judge:

¶ 1 Michaella Lawson and Mikarose, LLC appeal the district court's award of attorney fees to augment the default judgment affirmed in Crane–Jenkins v. Mikarose, LLC, 2015 UT App 270, 374 P.3d 1024

. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

¶ 2 The district court entered a default judgment against Mikarose, Michaella Lawson, and Brad Lawson on December 9, 2013. Id. ¶ 4. The district court awarded Michelle Crane–Jenkins attorney fees under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012)

. That statute provides that “[t]he court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff ..., allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” Id. Accordingly, the district court “awarded all costs and attorney fees associated with the collection of the [default] judgment.”

¶ 3 Brad Lawson, a non-lawyer, filed a motion to set aside or amend the default judgment as to all defendants. Crane–Jenkins, 2015 UT App 270, ¶ 4, 374 P.3d 1024

. The district court set aside the default judgment against Brad Lawson, but left in place the judgment against Michaella Lawson and Mikarose. Id. ¶ 5. Over the next ten months, the parties filed numerous motions in relation to the default judgment. The court ultimately dismissed Brad Lawson from the case, id. ¶ 5 n. 2, and rejected as untimely Michaella Lawson's and Mikarose's motions to set aside the default judgment against them, id. ¶¶ 6–7. Crane–Jenkins then filed a motion to augment the default judgment with attorney fees and costs incurred after entry of the default judgment. The court awarded Crane–Jenkins an additional $25,192.50 in attorney fees, $107 in costs, and $246.53 in interest. Michaella Lawson and Mikarose challenge that award as unreasonable.

¶ 4 “The trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and we consequently review that determination under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Griffin v. Cutler, 2014 UT App 251, ¶ 25, 339 P.3d 100

. “Under this standard, a district court's ruling will not be reversed unless it was beyond the limits of reasonability or not based on an evaluation of the evidence.” Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc., 2013 UT 21, ¶ 52, 308 P.3d 424 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 5 “ ‘An award of attorney fees must be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact.’ ” Griffin, 2014 UT App 251, ¶ 28, 339 P.3d 100

(quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992) ). In determining a reasonable fee, “as a practical matter the trial court should find answers to four questions”:

1. What legal work was actually performed?

2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?

3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services?

4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988)

. The district court “must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions.” Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). “It is important to note that with this analysis, what an attorney bills or the number of hours spent on a case is not determinative.” Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. “ ‘The amount of the damages awarded in a case does not place a necessary limit on the amount of attorney[ ] fees that can be awarded.’ ” Id. (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985) ).

¶ 6 Michaella Lawson and Mikarose contend that the district court abused its discretion when it determined the additional attorney fees were reasonably necessary. They next contend that the district court did not enter findings of fact sufficient to support the additional attorney fee award. They also contend that the court erred when it awarded attorney fees related to Brad Lawson and fees related to discovery activities. Finally, they contend that Crane–Jenkins's attorney's affidavit did not comply with rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

.

I. Reasonably Necessary Fees

¶ 7 Michaella Lawson and Mikarose contend that “the default judgment in the case at bar limits attorney's fees and costs to those that are associated with the collection of the instant judgment.” They identify attorney fees for five “activities that were unreasonable and had no relation to collecting on the default judgment.” They identify fees for another five activities which they argue “were unreasonable in relation to the work allegedly performed.”

¶ 8 As an initial matter, we must determine whether Michaella Lawson and Mikarose adequately preserved the issue for appeal. See Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 1233

. “An issue is preserved for appeal only if it was ‘presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court [had] an opportunity to rule on [it].’ ” Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ¶ 4, 330 P.3d 762 (alterations in original) (quoting 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 ). “Merely mentioning an issue does not preserve it; the issue must be specifically raised, with relevant legal authority, in a manner that alerts the court to the need to correct the error.” Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97, ¶ 38, 302 P.3d 1220. When more than one party raises an issue on appeal, “[o]ne party cannot assign as error a ruling against a different party where the appealing party reserved no exception.” Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 548 (Utah 1984). “We will not address the merits of an argument that has not been preserved absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances.” Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 28, 158 P.3d 540

.

¶ 9 Michaella Lawson preserved this issue as to her. Acting pro se, she filed an opposition to Crane–Jenkins's motion for augmented judgment. She asked the district court “to review the actions” of Crane–Jenkins's attorney in order to determine “if he pursued this case in a reasonable manner and in the best interest of his client.” She also argued that Crane–Jenkins should not be awarded attorney fees for a number of tasks that Michaella Lawson alleged were “not consistent with work reasonably necessary.”

¶ 10 Mikarose, however, stands on different footing. Mikarose did not oppose the motion for augmented judgment, join in Michaella Lawson's opposition, or otherwise object to the attorney fees. In fact, the district court noted that “[t]he only party opposing the motion to augment judgment is Michaella Lawson. Mikarose, LLC has not responded.” On appeal, Michaella Lawson and Mikarose argue that although “Mikarose filed no opposition, the issue of the reasonableness of [attorney] fees was unquestionably preserved for appellate review.” But the passive construction of that sentence masks the pivotal fact that Michaella Lawson, a non-lawyer, preserved the issue for herself, but did not and could not preserve the issue for Mikarose. See Godesky, 690 P.2d at 548

. Because Mikarose did not preserve the issue, we will not consider the issue as it applies to Mikarose “absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances.” See

Duke, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 28, 158 P.3d 540.

¶ 11 Michaella Lawson and Mikarose argue that “[e]ven if this Court concludes that Mikarose did not properly preserve its right to challenge fees on appeal, trial courts must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the evidentiary submissions.” (Citing Griffin v. Cutler, 2014 UT App 251, ¶ 28, 339 P.3d 100

.) Mikarose does not, however, argue that the district court in this case failed to do so. Further, we conclude that the district court did “make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees.” See

Griffin, 2014 UT App 251, ¶ 28, 339 P.3d 100 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 12 “The trial court ‘must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions.’ ” Id. (quoting Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998)

). “Factors such as those outlined in Dixie State Bank ‘should inform the court's meaningful appraisal.’ ” Id. (quoting Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 ). Here, although the district court's findings are somewhat sparse, the court considered the Dixie State Bank factors, including “[h]ow much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter.” See

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) ; see also

Griffin, 2014 UT App 251, ¶¶ 30–31, 339 P.3d 100. In its ruling, the district court found that the legal work completed by Crane–Jenkins's attorney “was, in part, reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter.” The court determined that “it [was] reasonable” for Crane–Jenkins to “defend[ ] the judgment [she] had already obtained” and therefore “the fees [were] reasonable because they were incurred in responding to the motions initiated” by Michaella Lawson. Furthermore, the court excluded certain fees it determined were not appropriate in collecting or defending the default judgment. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the attorney fees as a whole were reasonably necessary to collect on the default judgment.

¶ 13 Michaella Lawson and...