Crane v. Commissioner of Dept. of Employment and Training

• Decision Date: 23 March 1993
• Parties: Richard CRANE v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 476

609 N.E.2d 476

414 Mass. 658

Richard CRANE v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Essex.

Argued Jan. 7, 1993.

Decided March 23, 1993.

Richard Crane, pro se.

Beverly I. Ward, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and GREANEY, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

Richard Crane, the plaintiff, appeals from the decision of the Lawrence District Court upholding the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Employment and Training (department) denying Crane unemployment benefits. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm.

The facts as found by the department's review examiner include the following. Richard Crane has been receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits since 1979. Crane was a client of the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission prior to his employment at a department store. Crane is currently enrolled in an accounting program at Northeastern University as part of a vocational rehabilitation program.

Regulations governing social security disability payments permit an individual to engage in full-time employment and still receive full SSI benefits for a nine-month "trial work period." After the nine-month trial work period, SSI benefits cease if the claimant continues full-time employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592 (1992). Some of Crane's employment prior to his job at the department store counted toward his trial work period calculation. Notwithstanding the "trial work period" restrictions, Social Security policy allows a claimant to work part-time and earn up to $300 a month while retaining full disability benefits.

Crane gained employment as a full-time sales associate at the department store (employer) in June, 1989. Crane did not discuss his SSI benefits nor any restrictions on his ability to work full-time with his employer.

In October, 1989, Crane's trial work period was about to end. Crane informed his employer that it would not be in his financial interest to continue working full time as doing so would terminate his SSI benefits. Crane gauged that his net earnings from his full-time position would be less than his SSI benefits alone. Crane concluded that the most profitable course would be to continue his employment on a part-time basis, which would enable him to continue receiving full SSI benefits while continuing his vocational training and supplementing his SSI benefits with income from his employment. After Crane apprised his employer of his circumstances, he was allowed to work part-time through December, 1989, with the understanding that in December his employment situation would be evaluated again.

In January, 1990, the employer informed Crane that he would have to return to full-time status in order to continue his employment. Crane decided to leave his job in order to keep his SSI benefits. ¹ Crane filed a claim for unemployment compensation, which the department's local office service representative denied on a finding of voluntary separation without good cause attributable to the employer.

Pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 42 (1990 ed.), we review the findings and decision of the department's board of review (board) in accordance with the standard of review set out in G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7) (1990 ed.), the State Administrative Procedure Act (Act). ²

General Laws c. 151A, § 25(e) (1990 ed.), provides, in relevant part, that no unemployment benefits shall be paid to an individual "[f]or the period of unemployment next ensuing and until the individual has had at least four weeks of work and in each of said weeks has earned an amount equivalent to or in excess of his weekly benefit amount after he has left his work (1) voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent.... An individual shall not be disqualified from receiving benefits under the provisions of this subsection, if such individual establishes to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary." Although "the statute expressly provides that the law should be liberally construed to establish its purpose, which is 'to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and his family,' " Reep v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Employment & Training, 412 Mass. 845, 847, 593 N.E.2d 1297 (1992), Crane bears the burden of proving either that he left his employment for good cause attributable to the employing unit, or that his reason for leaving was of an urgent, compelling, and necessitous nature that would render his departure involuntary. Sohler v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 785, 388 N.E.2d 299 (1979). The nature of the circumstances of each individual case, and the degree of compulsion that such circumstances exert on a claimant, must be objectively evaluated. See Reep v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Employment & Training, supra at 848, 593 N.E.2d 1297.

There was ample evidence to support the conclusion that Crane was capable of continuing his employment on a full-time basis. Crane did not leave his employment because he "was required by his employer to perform work that was 'clearly antithetical to that for which [he] was initially employed,' " Guarino v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 89, 93, 469 N.E.2d 802 (1984), quoting Sohler v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., supra at 789, 388 N.E.2d 299. The board determined that Crane chose to leave his employment not because of a medical...