Crane v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 10 February 1916 |
| Docket Number | Civil 1432 |
| Citation | 17 Ariz. 476,154 P. 1036 |
| Parties | H. J. CRANE, Appellant, v. T. L. FRANKLIN, Appellee |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Yavapai. Frank O. Smith, Judge.
On rehearing, former opinion reversed, and judgment for plaintiff affirmed. For former opinion, see 16 Ariz. 501, 147 P. 718.
Messrs Anderson & Lamson, for Appellant.
Messrs Norris & Mitchell, for Appellee.
The appellee instituted suit against the appellant for the reasonable value of his services as laborer as farm-hand upon the ranch of the defendant for the period of 13 months, which he fixes at $100 a month; also for the reasonable value of certain seed, horse feed, and farm supplies furnished the defendant, valued at $102, making an aggregate for services and supplies of $1,402.
The defendant-appellant filed a general demurrer and a general denial, and answered in bar of the action that the defendant verbally leased his ranch to the plaintiff for a term of one year or a season, by the terms of which lease plaintiff agreed to occupy and cultivate the premises in a good and farmer-like manner and to raise alfalfa, corn and hogs, and agreed to furnish all necessary seed, except alfalfa seed that the plaintiff agreed to sow in alfalfa 30 acres, to prune the orchard on said ranch and care for the same; that the defendant agreed to furnish the tools then on the ranch and the necessary number of horses and alfalfa seed; the crops raised to be equally divided between the plaintiff and defendant on the ranch, and that said crops were divided according to that agreement, plaintiff receiving one-half thereof in full settlement of all labor and services performed by him and all supplies furnished by him. Then follows the allegation of full performance on the part of the defendant and the failure of performance on the part of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff replied, denying the allegations in the answer concerning the lease and alleging that the plaintiff and defendant on or about the fifth day of December, 1912, entered into a verbal agreement, by the terms of which defendant agreed to give the plaintiff a lease for a period of 5 years upon defendant's ranch, and set forth his understanding of the terms of the proposed lease; that he went upon the ranch of the defendant pursuant to said understanding and labored thereon from the said fifth day of December, 1912, until the fifth day of January, 1914; that no written lease was ever entered into between the plaintiff and defendant.
The defendant moved the court to strike that part of the plaintiff's reply pertaining to the agreement for lease, on the ground of departure from the original cause of action. The demurrer to the complaint and the motion to strike were both overruled. Upon the issues thus formed the case was tried to a jury, and the verdict of the jury was in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $540, upon which judgment was entered.
It is too evident to need argument that the plaintiff presented in his complaint a good cause of action in quantum meruit for services and labor and quantum valebant for supplies furnished. Therefore the general demurrer was properly overruled. Neither do we think that error was committed by the court in refusing to strike the plaintiff's reply, on the grounds of departure. We adhere to the statement of law on that point as contained in our former opinion reported in 16 Ariz. 501-505, 147 P. 718. The reply showed upon its face that there was merely an agreement for a lease for 5 years, and at most the reply would amount to no more than an explanation of the reason why the plaintiff entered into the possession of the defendant's ranch and occupied it and labored thereon for 13 months. We do not think any reply was necessary; at most it was but a technical error in pleading, and did not in any way prejudice the rights of the defendant, and could not be cause for reversal under our Constitution. Article 6, section 22.
The real milk in the cocoanut is as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the form of action that he has adopted and upon the facts as disclosed by the pleadings and evidence.
The evidence is undisputed that in December, 1912, there was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant a verbal agreement, in which the defendant agreed to lease his ranch to the plaintiff for a term of 5 years, and that in pursuance of such verbal agreement the plaintiff moved upon the premises and began the work of clearing and improving the ground preparatory to planting crops. The dispute between the parties was as to the terms and conditions of the proposed lease. It very early developed that their understandings as to what the lease should contain widely differed, and, although they frequently tried to come to an agreement, each submitting to the other a form or forms of lease, these negotiations continuing during most of the year of 1913, it all ended in a failure to agree. Defendant notified the plaintiff in writing to vacate the ranch at the expiration of the year, and thereafter instituted suit against the plaintiff for the possession thereof, whereupon plaintiff left the place.
From these undisputed facts it will be seen that the minds of the parties never did come together or meet. Even if it be determined that their understanding was mutual when they first talked of the 5-year lease, it not being reduced to writing, would be void as in violation of the statute of frauds. For that reason the plaintiff could not enforce specific performance, neither could he sue for damages for breach of contract. The defendant, however, in his answer characterizes the relation established between him and the plaintiff, under the facts related, as that of landlord and tenant, and pleads a tenancy for one year in recognition of the law which permits a verbal lease of realty for a period not exceeding one year. If there was a lease between them for one year, it arises by force of law, and not by any contract.
Our understanding of the law is that if a verbal lease for a longer period than one year is agreed upon, in which the rental value is determined, the terms, agreements and covenants fully understood, and possession is taken thereunder, and rent paid or services rendered instead, by the lessee, although the lease may be void as a whole under the statute of frauds, the law, in order to protect the rights of the parties, will convert it into a lease from year to year. Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, 9th ed., sec. 56. And "during the time which the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Trollope v. Koerner
...original mutual oral agreement as to the terms of the lease does not, of course, overcome the Statute. See, e.g., Crane v. Franklin, 17 Ariz. 476, 479, 154 P. 1036, 1037 (1916), modifying a prior decision in the same case reported at 16 Ariz. 501, 147 P. 718 Plaintiffs strenuously urge two ......
-
Edwards v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
... ... v ... Lowder, 11 Okl. 61, 65 P. 926; Rogers v. Brown, ... 15 Okl. 524, 86 P. 443; Miller v. Camp, 45 Or. 192, ... 77 P. 83; Crane v. Franklin, 17 Ariz. 476, 154 P ... 1036; Sims v. Farson, 220 N.Y. 710, 116 N.E. 1075; ... Holbrook v. Quinlan, 84 Vt. 411, 80 A. 339. For ... ...
-
Edwards v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co
...Co. v. Lowder, 11 Okl. 61, 65 P. 926; Rogers v. Brown, 15 Okl. 524, 86 P. 443; Miller v. Camp, 45 Or. 192. 77 P. 83; Crane v. Franklin, 17 Ariz. 476, 154 P. 1036; Sims v. Farson, 220 N. Y. 710, 116 N. E. 1075; Holbrook v. Quinlan, 84 Vt. 411, 80 A. 339. For other cases see Dec. Dig. Pleadin......
-
Evans v. Mason
...v. Wassman, supra; Manford v. Coats, 6 Cal.App.2d 743, 45 P.2d 395; Burr v. Floyd, 137 Cal.App. 692, 31 P.2d 402. cf. Crane v. Franklin, 17 Ariz. 476, 154 P. 1036. In an action of this character the vital elements which the plaintiff must prove in order to establish a prima facie case are t......