Crane v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 11 March 1890
• Citation: 118 N.Y. 648,23 N.E. 991
• Parties: CRANE v. McDONALD et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

118 N.Y. 648

23 N.E. 991

CRANE

v.McDONALD et al.¹

Court of Appeals of New York,

Second Division.

March 11, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fourth department.

When this action of interpleader was commenced, as the trial judge found, the plaintiff held in his hands the sum of $808, then due from him upon a contract that he had entered into with one Jennie L. Graves. At the same time the defendant Martha McDonald, who is the mother of said Jennie L. Graves, claimed said sum as the assignee of the latter's interest in said contract, and had brought an action against the plaintiff to recover the same. The defendant George E. Goodrich, as administrator, etc., of Milo Goodrich, deceased, also claimed said sum on the ground that he had an attorney's lien thereon, and had obtained an attachment pursuant to which the sheriff of Cortland county had levied upon the claim in question, and had forbidden the plaintiff to pay said money to Mrs. McDonald, or to any one except himself. The plaintiff was ready to pay it into court to abide the event of any action between the defendants, and was willing to pay it to either upon being indemnified, and had so notified them, but both had refused to indemnify him. He could not without hazard pay the same to either, and he was not in collusion with either, but in good faith desired that they should settle the matter between themselves. Before this action was commenced he paid the amount involved into court, pursuant to an order made at special term, to abide its decision as to who was entitled thereto. The trial judge, after finding, in substance, these, among other, facts, found, as a conclusion of law, that this was a proper case for an interpleader, and for an injunction perpetually restraining Mrs. McDonald from the further prosecution of the action brought by her against the plaintiff. Each defendant served an answer claiming the entire fund, but the defendant McDonald alone appealed from the judgment of the special term.

W. B. French and Matthew Hale, for appellant.

A. P. Smith, for respondent.

VANN, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

The material allegations in a bill of interpleader, according to an early decision by the court of errors, are: (1) That two or more persons have preferred a claim against the complainant; (2) that they claim the same thing, (3) that the complainant has no beneficial interest in the thing claimed; and (4) that he cannot determine, without hazard to himself, to which of the defendants the thing belongs. Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cow. 691, 703. It was also held in that case that the complainant should annex to his bill an affidavit that there is no collusion between him and any of the parties, and that he should bring the money or thing claimed into court, so that he could not be benefited by the delay of payment which might result from the filing of his bill. This method of procedure still prevails. Dorn v. Fox, 61 N. Y. 268. The plaintiff insists that he has conformed to the practice thus laid down in every particular, while the appellant contends that the complaint is not sufficiently specific with reference to the claims of the defendants, and that no privity is shown between them in relation to their respective demands. The complaint describes the claim of the defendant McDonald more fully than that of the defendant Goodrich, because the former had sued him, and had thus furnished him with a definite description. While the claim of the latter was not clearly nor fully described, enough was set forth to show that it was not a mere pretext, but that it apparently rested upon a reasonable and substantial foundation. If the appellant desired that it should be made more definite and certain, his remedy was by motion, under section 546, Code Civil Proc. Neftel v. Lightstone, 77 N. Y. 96. Upon the trial, according to the old chancery practice, as it appeared by the answers of the defendants that each claimed the fund in dispute, no other evidence of that fact was required to entitle the plaintiff to a decree. Balchen v. Crawford, 1 Sandf. Ch. 380. In this case, however, the point was not left to be determined by the pleadings, but evidence was introduced upon the subject, and it appeared that at least a fair doubt existed as to the rights of the conflicting claimants. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to decide, at his peril, either close questions of fact or nice questions of law, but it was sufficient if there was a reasonable doubt as to which claimant the debt belonged. When a person, without collusion, is subjected to a double demand to pay an acknowledged debt, it is the object of a bill of interpleader to relieve him of the risk of deciding who is entitled to the money. If the doubt rests upon a question of fact that is at all serious, it is obvious that the debtor cannot safely decide it for himself, because it might be decided the other way upon an actual trial; while if it rests upon a question of law, as was said in Dorn v. Fox, 61 N. Y. 264, ‘so long as a principle is still under discussion * * * it would seem fair to hold that there was sufficient doubt and hazard to justify the protection which is afforded by the beneficent action of interpleader.’ Although the claim of Mr Goodrich has since been held untenable by this court, (Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 N. Y. 157, 19 N. E. Rep. 649,) it does not follow that no doubt existed when this action was commenced, because the supreme court, both at special and general term, held that it was valid, and attempted to enforce it. This conflict in the decisions of the courts shows that the adverse claims of the defendants involved a difficult and doubtful question, and is a conclusive answer to the contention of the appellant that the plaintiff did not need the aid of an action of this character. Was it possible for him to safely decide a point so intricate as to...