Crane v. Stulz, 2219
| Decision Date | 27 December 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 2219,2219 |
| Parties | Walter CRANE, Appellant, v. Irene M. STULZ, Incompetent, and the First National Bank in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, as Guardian of the Property of Irene M. Stulz, Incompetent, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Cecil T. Farrington, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Kirk Sullivan, West Palm Beach, Sutton, James & Singer, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
Appellant Walter Crane was plaintiff and counter-defendant in a suit to quiet title to land previously conveyed to him by a client, Irene M. Stulz, whose property guardian at the time of suit was the appellee-defendant First National Bank in Fort Lauderdale. The chancellor declined to quiet the title as prayed, but on the counterclaim he directed that Walter Crane convey back the land in question and also restore to the estate of Irene M. Stulz, with interest, the sum of $16,733.75 which purportedly had been given to him by Irene M. Stulz.
On July 16th, 1957 Irene M. Stulz was adjudicated incompetent and the First National Bank in Fort Lauderdale was appointed guardian of her property. It was discovered that on September 30th, 1955 Irene M. Stulz apparently had made a gift of $16,733.75 to Walter Crane and also, on January 26th, 1956, had conveyed to him a certain lot or parcel of land located in Palm Beach County, Florida. Upon the insistence of Leo Barian of California, the brother and sole heir apparent of Irene M. Stulz, the guardian bank demanded that Walter Crane reconvey the land and restore the $16,733.75, with interest, to the estate of Irene M. Stulz.
Walter Crane responded by instituting suit to quiet title to the land in question. The guardian filed a counterclaim to set aside both the deed and the cash gift, alleging that there was a confidential attorney-client relation between the parties at the time of both transactions, that Irene Stulz was incapable of forming a donative intent and that, moreover, the gifts were the result of undue influence.
The final hearing extended over a period of five days. Numerous witnesses testified and many exhibits were offered and received in evidence. Upon consideration the chancellor, as stated, dismissed the complaint and found for the counterclaimant, requiring Walter Crane to reconvey the land and also to return $16,733.75, with interest, to the Irene Stulz estate.
Walter Crane had been handling the business and personal affairs of Irene Stulz as her attorney, friend and confidant since early in 1947. She was then about seventy years of age. She had been referred to him by a bank where she had made inquiry concerning the probate of her late husband's will. Walter Crane thereafter devoted much time and attention to his client's interests. Over a period of ten years he appears to have gone far beyond the call of professional duty to serve her. He accordingly urged in the trial court and now urges in this court that his years of faithful, uncompensated services provided a full justification for the now disputed gifts.
Walter Crane, while not denying the gratuitous character of the particular transactions here involved, delineated many services rendered by him to Irene Stulz with respect to such matters as traffic offenses, banking, insurance, taxes, mortgages, correspondence, purchase of automobiles, title searches, locating places for Irene Stulz to live and taking numerous trips with her to New Jersey, Philadelphia, Colorado, Texas, North Carolina and Ocala, Florida. He stated Irene Stulz could well afford these particular gifts, that she had made similar generous gifts to others. He pointed out that the conveyance of the land was through another attorney without his knowledge and that the $16,733.75 was derived from the proceeds of a sale of stock and was intended to provide for the education of his children, particularly the eldest who was Irene Stulz's godson.
Without detailing the testimony of the witnesses who testified with reference to the mental condition of Irene Stulz, we note that at the time of final hearing she was not aware of the identify of her friends and acquaintances and did not know her own name. It was impossible for her to testify. A psychiatrist testified that she was afflicted with a chronic brain syndrome which had gradually resulted from arteriosclerosis. In view of the involvement of confidential relations, it was not incumbent upon the counterclaimants to show that Irene Stulz was incompetent at the time the gifts were made. There was, nevertheless, substantial testimony tending to show that she was in fact disoriented and mentally unbalanced prior to her adjudication of incompetency and prior to and at the time of the gifts in question. A number of expert and lay witnesses who observed her over a period of years expressed the opinion that she was mentally incompetent at the time of the purported gifts on September 30, 1955 and January 26, 1956.
Early in their relations as attorney and client Walter Crane received payment for his services in connection with the administration of the estate of Irene Stulz' deceased husband. It also appears that during this early period Irene Stulz executed a will making Walter Crane a beneficiary to the extent of one-half of her residuary estate. This circumstance may well have been a contributory cause of the subsequent dealings of the parties in a loosely gratuitous manner rather than on a sound business basis. It does not appear that Walter Crane ever agreed to render legal and personal services without charge. He simply never billed her therefor. In his on language 'This thing just grew, snowballed.' Thus the ultimate tangled web resulted not from wilful deception but from a professionally unwise and impolitic manner of dealing.
The import of the chancellor's findings was that Walter Crane failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence, as required by law, the fairness of the particular transactions here involved. Walter Crane complains that the chancellor, while in terms recognizing his kindness and extensive services to Irene Stulz, overlooked and failed to take into account the value of such services. He insists that the gifts did not reflect unfair dealing or unprofessional conduct on his part and that the evidence affirmatively disclosed that they were voluntarily made by a competent donor and were well deserved.
In stating his points on appeal the appellant set forth his version of the case in a considerable number of divisions and headings. In essence,...
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