Crane v. Voorhis

• Decision Date: 23 October 1931
• Citation: 257 N.Y. 298,178 N.E. 169
• Parties: CRANE v. VOORHIS et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

257 N.Y. 298

178 N.E. 169

CRANE

v.VOORHIS et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 23, 1931.

Proceedings by James C. Crane for peremptory order of mandamus to be directed to John R. Voorhis and others. From an order of the Appellate Division (234 App. Div. 715, 253 N. Y. S. 62) reversing as a matter of law, and not in the exercise of discretion, a peremptory mandamus order, plaintiff appeals.

Order of Appellate Division reversed, and that of Special Term affirmed.

LEHMAN, O'BRIEN, and HUBBS, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second department.

Frederick W. Clifford, of St. George, James E. Finegan, of New York City, and Carl D. Isaacs, of St. George, for appellant.

Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (William E. C. Mayer, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

CRANE, J.

The board of elections has prepared a ballot for use in the voting machines for the county of Richmond in the coming election, which carries a full line of nominees for the Democratic and Republican parties; almost a complete line for the Socialist party; and a separate line or horizontal row for the Independent party designated by the emblem of a ‘Bell’ and the words ‘Independent Judiciary.’ The candidates of this Independent Judiciary body were nominated by petition for the office of Surrogate, justice of the City Court, and district attorney. No nominations were made by this party for the other offices to be filled.

The name Frank S. Gannon, Jr., appears in this Independent row or line as nominee for surrogate and Carl D. Isaacs as nominee for justice of the City Court. The space for the district attorney in this row or line is left blank. One James C. Crane was nominated by this Independent Judiciary body for district attorney, but his name does not appear in the place where a voter would naturally look for it, in the row of the Independent Judiciary nominations, but it does appear in the line or row of the Republican nominees with the two emblems, the ‘Eagle,’ the emblem of the Republican party, and the ‘Bell,’ the emblem of the Independent Judiciary nominees. Although Crane has received the nomination of the Republican party, and has also been nominated by petition by the Independent Judiciary nominators, his name appears but once upon the ballot, and that in the Republican line or row with these two emblems, the Eagle and the Bell. The reason why his name does not appear in the line with the other nominees of the Independent Judiciary nominators is that the Election Law (Consol. Laws, c. 17), § 249, as amended by chapter 270 of the Laws of 1931, enacted as follows: ‘When a person has been nominated for an office by one political party and has also been nominated for that office by one or more independent bodies, unless said independent body or bodies shall have nominated candidates for more than fifty per cent. of the offices to be filled, his name shall appear only in the row or column containing generally the names of candidates for other offices nominated by such party, and the name and emblem of such party and of each of such independent bodies shall appear in connection with his name.’

The petitioner, Crane, attacks this law as unconstitutional on the ground that it is unreasonable and unfair to the voter, and an arbitrary direction by the Legislature for the formation of the ballot.

We held in Matter of Callaghan v. Voorhis, 252 N. Y. 14, 168 N. E. 447, 448, that, where an independent body had made nominations for some of the offices to be filled at the coming election, and there was a line provided for these nominations, the name of Mr. Justice Callaghan, who had been nominated for the Supreme Court by that body, should appear in its line as well as in that of the Republican party which had also nominated him. In that opinion we did refer to the fact that this body of independent nominators had made up a fairly full and complete ticket. This, however, was an incident and not a rule for the case. What would constitute a sufficient number of nominations to require an independent line or row, and how many nominations should appear in that row to entitle all the nominees of that party or of those nominators to a place in the line, we did not undertake to state. We simply stated the facts as they were.

The underlying principle regarding the franchise and the inviolable rights of an elector under the state Constitution was stated in these words: ‘The whole purpose of the Election Law and of the Constitution under which it is enacted is that, within reasonable bounds and regulations, all voters shall, so far as the law provides, have equal, easy, and unrestricted opportunities to declare their choice for each office. Section 249 of the Election Law is constitutional except in those instances when to apply it would be unfair and prejudicial to a particular class of voters.’

What would be unreasonable and unfair to the voter is a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is a judicial question and not a matter for arbitrary legislation. Shall we say, for instance, that an independent party which shall make nominations for 40 or 45 per cent. of the offices to be filled shall be deprived of a nominee for one of these offices because another party has also nominated him, whereas, if it had made nominations for 51 per cent. of the offices, the name of that candidate would be placed in the row of the independent party nominations as well as in another p...