Cranford v. Cranford

• Citation: 772 S.W.2d 48
• Parties: Scott F. CRANFORD, Petitioner/Counter-Defendant/Appellee, v. Marcella CRANFORD, Respondent/Counter-Plaintiff/Appellant. 772 S.W.2d 48
• Decision Date: 17 February 1989
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 48

772 S.W.2d 48

Scott F. CRANFORD, Petitioner/Counter-Defendant/Appellee, v. Marcella CRANFORD, Respondent/Counter-Plaintiff/Appellant.

772 S.W.2d 48

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Middle Section, at Nashville.

Feb. 17, 1989.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme

Court June 5, 1989.

Mary Frances Lyle, Nashville, for respondent/counter-plaintiff/appellant.

Joseph M. Dalton, Nashville, for petitioner/counter-defendant/appellee.

OPINION

KOCH, Judge.

This appeal concerns a spouse's continuing obligation to support a former spouse who has multiple sclerosis. Two years after the dissolution of their eighteen-year marriage, the husband filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to terminate his obligation to support his wife on the grounds that she had been given an adequate opportunity to rehabilitate herself. The trial court heard the case without a jury and substantially reduced the husband's support obligations. The wife has appealed. We find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings and in favor of the wife's request for increased support.

I.

Scott F. Cranford married Marcella Cranford in 1966, the same year he began his optometry practice in Nashville. They have no children. In 1979, Mrs. Cranford began attending the University of Tennessee's College of Veterinary Medicine in Knoxville. In early 1981, she began to experience weakness in her legs which was diagnosed as multiple sclerosis.

The parties separated in July, 1981. Mrs. Cranford continued to reside in a house the parties had purchased in Knoxville, and Dr. Cranford continued to reside in the Nashville area. Mrs. Cranford graduated from veterinary school in 1982. However, her multiple sclerosis prevented her from becoming a practicing veterinarian and from passing her national licensing examination. She supported herself by giving animal conservation lectures to school groups and other community organizations.

Dr. Cranford became involved with another woman and filed for divorce in March, 1983. Mrs. Cranford counterclaimed for divorce, and the trial court granted her a divorce in November, 1983. However, the trial court set aside the decree in January, 1984. It also ordered Dr. Cranford to pay Mrs. Cranford $1,000 per month in pendente lite support.

The trial court awarded Mrs. Cranford a bed and board divorce in October, 1984. Later, on July 19, 1985, it granted her an absolute divorce, divided the marital estate, and directed Dr. Cranford to pay Mrs. Cranford $1,300 each month for her support. Mrs. Cranford received the house in Knoxville and became solely responsible for the payment of its mortgage. In October, 1985, the trial court also ordered Dr. Cranford to obtain a $100,000 life insurance policy naming Mrs. Cranford as the beneficiary.

Dr. Cranford married his live-in girl friend in October, 1985. Mrs. Cranford had a serious multiple sclerosis attack in January, 1986 that required hospitalization. She had another attack in early 1987. Dr. Cranford divorced his second wife in July, 1987 after agreeing to pay her a substantial cash settlement.

In July, 1987, Dr. Cranford filed a petition requesting the trial court to terminate his obligation to continue to support Mrs. Cranford, insisting that his earning capacity had changed and that Mrs. Cranford had been given sufficient time to rehabilitate herself. Mrs. Cranford filed a counterclaim seeking to increase her support payments.

The trial court heard the proof in March, 1988. Dr. Cranford, who now practices in Nashville, Fairview, and Murfreesboro, stated that his business was prospering and that his income had actually increased. While conceding that Mrs. Cranford had multiple sclerosis, he insisted that, "as a matter of principle," he should not be required to support Mrs. Cranford because he had "supported her for 22 years" and because he did not think Mrs. Cranford "has any incentive to work because she's being supported."

Mrs. Cranford described how her multiple sclerosis has progressed since the divorce in 1985. She walks with a stutter step which is a characteristic of persons with multiple sclerosis, and she is now required to wear a brace on her right leg and to use a cane. She has lost control of her bladder and suffers from severe fatigue and loss of energy. Her short term memory is deteriorating, and she is experiencing numbness, tingling, and arthritis-type pain.

Mrs. Cranford also explained that her ability to earn an income has decreased during the two years after the divorce. She stated that her illness prevented her from seeking steady employment as a veterinarian and that she was unable to give more than two or three lectures a week. She testified that she earned approximately $300 per month by giving lectures and that her only other source of income, other than Dr. Cranford's support payments, was $130 per month which she receives as rent. She explained that she was unable to pay the medical bills that had accumulated since 1986, that she had been required to borrow money to make her house payments, and that collection agencies were contacting her about her debts.

The trial court found that Mrs. Cranford had multiple sclerosis but stated that it did not "think that Dr. Cranford should be saddled with an inexorable amount for the rest of his life to support Mrs. Cranston [sic] ... with whom he is no longer married." Thus, finding that Mrs. Cranford "is capable of some additional economic and monetary employment which she is not making at the moment," the trial court decreased the amount of Dr. Cranford's support obligation to $750 per month effective in April, 1988 and then to $500 per month effective in August, 1988. The trial court also declined to require Dr. Cranford to pay the medical bills Mrs. Cranford had accumulated since the divorce.

II.

Mrs. Cranford contends that the trial court erred by declining to increase the amount of maintenance and support she is receiving from Dr. Cranford. She insists that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's decision and in favor of her request for an increase in her support payments. We agree.

A.

There are no hard and fast rules for determining the extent of a person's obligation to support a former spouse. Stone v. Stone, 56 Tenn.App. 607, 615-16, 409 S.W.2d 388, 392-93 (1966); Walden v. Walden, 13 Tenn.App. 337, 344 (1930). The decision is factually driven and calls for a careful balancing of numerous factors, including those listed in Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101(d) (Supp.1988). Accordingly, appellate courts give wide latitude to a trial court's alimony and maintenance decisions.

However, spousal support decisions are subject to appellate review pursuant to Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d). Thus, in order for a support decision to be upheld, it must be based upon the proper application of the relevant legal principles and upon a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court's decision with regard to Dr. Cranford's obligation to support Mrs. Cranford is based on neither.

An award for spousal support cannot be modified unless there has been a substantial change in circumstances ¹ since the entry of the previous support decree. Seal v. Seal, 726 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986); Jones v. Jones, 659 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983). However, once a change has been shown to exist, the courts should weigh the same factors that were considered in making the original support award. Threadgill v. Threadgill, 740 S.W.2d 419, 422-23 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987).

While Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101(d) authorizes the courts to consider many factors, the real need of the spouse seeking the support is the single most important factor. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 671 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984). In addition to the need of the disadvantaged spouse, the courts most often consider the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support. Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 246-47 (Tenn.1983); Barker v. Barker, 671 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984); Aleshire v. Aleshire, 642 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tenn.Ct.App.1981).

B.

Traditionally, Tennessee, like most jurisdictions, viewed spousal support, or alimony, as a recognition of a husband's common law obligation to support his wife or as compensation for the wife's contributions to the marriage. Rush v. Rush, 33 Tenn.App. 496, 503, 232 S.W.2d 333, 336 (1949); Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101(d)(9); 2 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States Sec. 17.5, at 254-55 (2d ed. 1987). Alimony payments were intended to reduce the financial impact of the divorce on the wife. See Shackleford v. Shackleford 11 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tenn.Ct.App.1980); 2 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States Sec. 17.5, at 255 (2d ed. 1987).

In the last decade, Tennessee and many other jurisdictions have moved away from the traditional concept of alimony toward the concept of "rehabilitative support." This concept views spousal support as

a transitional tool, which provides financial support for the recipient spouse while he or she acquires job skills, education, or training which will enable him or her to become fully self-supporting, in a period typically set at not more than several years from the date of dissolution.

3 Family Law and Practice (MB) Sec. 35.02[a], at 35-4 (1988); W. Garrett, Tennessee Divorce, Alimony & Child Custody Secs. 13-1, 13-10 (2d ed. 1984). Accordingly, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101(d) states

It is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse be rehabilitated whenever possible by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance.

However, the advent of rehabilitative support did not totally displace permanent alimony. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101(d) provides that the courts may still award long-term support and maintenance until the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse where "rehabilitation is not...