Cranford v. McNiece

Decision Date13 February 1969
Citation450 P.2d 529,252 Or. 446
PartiesRandy CRANFORD, a minor, by Roy O. Young, his guardian ad litem, Appellant, v. Martha McNIECE, Defendant, Duane L. Sampson, Respondent. Roy O. YOUNG, Administrator of the Estate of Janice Cranford, Deceased, Appellant, v. Martha McNIECE, Defendant, Duane L. Sampson, Respondent. Artus A. CRANFORD, Appellant, v. Martha McNIECE, Defendant, Duane L. Sampson, Respondent.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

Randolph Slocum, Roseburg, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was D. R. Dimick, Roseburg.

Eldon F. Caley, Roseburg, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Long, Neuner, Dole & Caley, Roseburg.

Before PERRY, C.J., and McALLISTER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN, DENECKE and HOLMAN, JJ.

DENECKE, Justice.

The issue in these three consolidated cases is whether documents entitled 'Covenant Not to Sue' bar plaintiffs from maintaining actions against Sampson. The trial court held that these documents did bar plaintiffs, and they appeal.

Two of the plaintiffs were injured and Janice Cranford was killed in an automobile collision between cars driven by one McNiece and Sampson. An action was commenced naming both McNiece and Sampson as defendants. During the first part of 1966 the plaintiffs entered orders of involuntary nonsuit as to the defendant McNiece. Subsequently, each plaintiff executed a document evidencing a settlement with McNiece. The documents are all legally similar. The one executed by the plaintiff Roy Young, administrator, is as follows:

'COVENANT NOT TO SUE

'KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned ROY YOUNG, the duly appointed, qualified and acting Administrator of the Estate of JANICE CRANFORD, deceased, having been appointed as such on the 21st day of August, 1964, by the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Douglas, in proceedings bearing Registry No. 8198, and thereafter having qualified as such, for and in consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($5,750.00), to me in hand paid by MARTHA McNIECE, the receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged, for and on behalf of said estate, do hereby now and forever covenant and agree, for myself and my successors, and for and on behalf of said estate, not to sue the said Martha McNiece, and to refrain forever from instituting, pressing, collecting or in any way aiding or proceeding upon any and all claims, judgments, demands, causes of action, suits and proceedings of any kind, either at law or in equity, which the said estate ever had, now has, or may have, against the aforementioned Martha McNiece, her heirs and assigns and all other persons, firms and corporations whatever in interest with her, or any of them, arising out of a certain accident which occurred on or about August 25, 1962, at or near Myrtle Creek, Oregon, and in which the said Janice Cranford was killed.

'It is expressly understood and agreed that the consideration aforesaid has been received by the undersigned as such Administrator, acting on behalf of said estate, in full payment for this covenant not to sue, notwithstanding any injury or damages sustained in said accident, whether known or unknown, foreseen and/or unforeseen.

'This covenant is made by the undersigned with full knowledge of the situation, with the approval of the aforesaid Court and under advice of his counsel, and without any representation of any kind being made by the parties making payment for this covenant, or any of their representatives. The undersigned represents and guarantees that all claims, liens of charges against the consideration for this covenant have been completely satisfied, and agrees to hold the parties making payment for this covenant and all those in interest with them, harmless against any and all further loss, cost, expense, liens, claims, actions and suits in the premises.

'Nothing herein contained shall be construed as an admission of any legal liability in the premises, it being understood that this is a compromise of all claims, past, present or future, against the parties making payment for this covenant, and all those in interest with them in the premises.

'Included herein, but without limitation thereto, are all claims asserted in that certain case in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Douglas, bearing registry No. 28262, which said case may now be dismissed upon application of any attorney of record therein.

'DATED this 5th day of April, 1966.

APPROVED:

/s/ D. R. Dimick

Attorney for Administrator

/s/ Roy O. Young

Administrator of the Estate of Janice Cranford, deceased.'

The other documents are, as noted, similar, with each plaintiff inserting his name in the document he executed. The name of defendant Sampson does not appear in any of the documents.

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed amended complaints alleging payments by McNiece and seeking judgments only against Sampson. Sampson filed amended answers setting forth the above-quoted document and alleging that the plaintiffs were thereby barred from maintaining the actions against Sampson. Plaintiffs filed motions to strike and demurred to such defense and Sampson in turn filed motions to dismiss on the ground that Sampson had been released. The trial court overruled the plaintiffs' demurrers, granted the motion to dismiss and entered judgments of dismissal.

The original rule was that a release of one tortfeasor releases all others. The evolution of this rule is an excellent example of the history of a rule of law based on sterile and questionable logic, rather than reality. After an initial adherence to this rigid rule, courts continued to announce their adherence to the rule but created new legal concepts to achieve more just results. Finally, many courts expressly rejected the original rule and applied the usual law of contracts.

The original rule and the reasoning used in formulating it were recognized in Stires v. Sherwood, 75 Or. 108, 112, 145 P. 645, 647 (1915):

'* * * The well-established rule of law is that the absolute discharge of one joint tort-feasor from liability on account of the alleged tort is a release of all the others. The reason of the precept is that the plaintiff has but one cause of action and can reap but one satisfaction.'

We took cognizance in that case that there were numerous decisions from other jurisdictions which seemingly adhered to the original rule but which developed distinguishing concepts to reach results in conformance with the intention of the parties.

In Keadle v. Padden, 143 Or. 350, 361--366, 20 P.2d 403, 22 P.2d 892 (1933), this court applied one of these distinctions or exceptions to the original rule and held that the joint tortfeasor was not released. In that case an injured employee, the plaintiff, on July 1, 1930, signed a document which appeared to be a release of his employer, Varney Air Lines, from any liability for injuries to plaintiff. The defendant Padden, who was being sued for malpractice in the treatment of plaintiff for the injury he received while working for Varney, claimed that this release also released him. Plaintiff was permitted to introduce into evidence another document executed by him on April 1, 1931, purporting to show 'the real understanding between him (plaintiff) and the Varney Air Lines.' 143 Or. at 363, 22 P.2d 892. This later document did not use the word 'release' but stated that plaintiff 'does hereby covenant and agree * * * that said Floyd Keadle (plaintiff) will not commence, bring or maintain any action at law * * * against said Varney' for his injuries. 143 Or. at 364, 22 P.2d 892. The document also specifically excepted the defendant Padden from plaintiff's promise not to sue Varney.

We held: '(T)he settlement made by the plaintiff and his employer is nothing more than a covenant not to sue and would not operate as a release...

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15 cases
  • Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • July 15, 1999
    ...release. The rule that we announce today is the same rule applied by this court to releases in tort. See, e.g., Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Or. 446, 452-53, 450 P.2d 529 (1969) (stating rule), citing Hicklin v. Anders, 201 Or. 128, 135-36, 253 P.2d 897 (1953). The decision of the Court of Appe......
  • Savelich Logging Co. v. Preston Mill Co.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • May 17, 1973
    ...necessarily releases all the others. Instead, such a release will be given the effect intended by the parties. Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Or. 446, 452, 450 P.2d 529 (1969); Hicklin v. Anders, supra, 201 Or. at 135, 253 P.2d 897, 269 P.2d 521. There is not the slightest evidence in this case t......
  • Sterling Sav. Bank v. Emerald Dev. Co.
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • October 15, 2014
    ...excellent example of the history of a rule of law based on sterile and questionable logic, rather than reality.” Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Or. 446, 450, 450 P.2d 529 (1969).Notwithstanding those distinctions, the remaining coguarantors argue that it is appropriate to import the concept in Ja......
  • Stanfield v. Laccoarce
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • December 27, 1978
    ...between Roy Laccoarce and the plaintiff. We find both these arguments to be plainly inconsistent with our decision in Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Or. 446, 450 P.2d 529 (1969), where we held that a release of one tortfeasor operates as a release of others only if the parties to the release inte......
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