Crankshaw v. Schweizer Mfg. Co.

Decision Date24 January 1907
Docket Number33.
PartiesCRANKSHAW v. SCHWEIZER MFG. CO.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court.

The verdict was warranted by the evidence. Where the error assigned is that the verdict was without evidence to support it, and there is any evidence to support it, the verdict should not be interfered with, unless there is further complaint that (a) some ruling of the court improperly withheld evidence from the jury, or (b) illegally permitted the jury to consider evidence which should not have been submitted to them, or (c) that the court's instructions when applied to the evidence, were erroneous, inapplicable or misleading.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, § 3935.]

In this case the proper issue was submitted to the jury, there was conflict in the evidence, and the verdict as to the issues of fact was fully authorized.

In order to entitle the defendant, in an action arising ex contractu, to the opening and conclusion of the argument, the defendant must, before the introduction of any evidence admit facts authorizing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed in the petition, without imposing upon the plaintiff necessity for proof of any kind. The admissions of the defendant in this case did not concede a prima facie case.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 50.]

Compliance with the warranties in this case was essential to a recovery, and to allege a breach of this material part of the plaintiff's contract destroys the admission of plaintiff's prima facie case.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 50.]

There was no error in admitting the testimony of which complaint is made in the second ground. The witness had the right to express an opinion, after having stated the facts from which he deduced it, and also to give his opinion as an expert, as appears from the evidence.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 2343, 2349.]

The court did not err in refusing to allow the questions set forth in the third and fourth grounds. The questions asked referred to the operation of jewelry cases in Field's store, and had no relation to the similarity in appearance between the jewelry cases involved and the Field cases.

There was no error in rejecting testimony as to the alleged statements as set forth in grounds 5 and 6, nor in rejecting the letters referred to in the seventh ground.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 898, 2030, 2035.]

The question and answer of which complaint is made in the eighth ground are objectionable for irrelevancy, but neither could have been harmful to the defendant.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, § 4153.]

There was no error in excluding the testimony quoted in the ninth ground; it not appearing from the evidence that that person whose declarations were sought to be proved was an agent of the defendant, authorized to speak, as to these things, in his behalf.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 887-892.]

The court properly excluded the questions referred to in the tenth ground; the evidence not showing that the alleged declarant was an agent of the defendant, authorized to bind the defendant by his statements. And there was no error in rejecting the letter written by the defendant after the arrival of the jewelry cases. If the letter was admissible on the theory of notice, its exclusion did no harm in this case, because it was conceded that the defendant always claimed that there were certain defects in the cases he bought.

The charge of the court gave the defendant the benefit of every contention which he was legally entitled to have considered by the jury. It could, perhaps, have been more full and specific with relation to some matters therein presented; but the defendant cannot complain that an abstract principle of law pertinent to the issue was not given in charge, when the court in the charge made clear the specific application of the principle by enumerating all defenses set up by him, and stated to the jury that they should find for the defendant on any of them which was proved to their satisfaction.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 582.]

That the plaintiff knew the purpose for which the articles purchased by the defendant were to be used was immaterial in this case. "If an order be given to a manufacturer or dealer for a specific article of a known and recognized kind and description, and if the defined and described thing be actually supplied, there is no implied warranty that it will answer the purpose for which it is intended to be used. The only implied warranty or condition of the contract is that it will conform to the description and be of good workmanship and material."

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 43, Sales, §§ 772-776.]

Error from City Court of Atlanta; Calhoun, Judge.

Action by the Schweizer Manufacturing Company against one Crankshaw. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

The suit was for a balance alleged to be due upon a contract for installing certain wall showcases in the defendant's storehouse. The defense, as stated in the plea, was "that it was made a stipulation and warranty, attached to and growing out of said contract, that the said cases were to work perfectly smooth and without friction; that said cases were to be so made and installed as to support bric-a-brac, clocks, and heavy articles of sale of various natures; that the doors were to be arranged hung with bicycle chains, weights, and pulleys, weights to slide in pockets in back of the case, work to be finished in best style and workmanship to match sample of store-finish work furnished by defendant, and the said cases to be installed without injury or damage to or disfigurement of defendant's cases; *** that the said wall cases were not installed in the manner stipulated in said contract; that said cases did not work smoothly and free from friction; that great injury and disfigurement were done to the defendant's cases in the installment of said cases; that some of the sashes of said cases warp from side to side and stick; that the side and top rails of said sashes were rubbed in many places; that the doors were not arranged to slide up, hung with bicycle chains, weights, and pulleys, weights to slide in pockets in back of the cases, but, on the contrary, were hung with ordinary trunk rollers, and in such manner as with great difficulty to be moved up and down; that the shelves were so heavy and brackets so light as to be incapable of supporting articles of any weight or breakable articles of any character with safety; that the sashes were warped and ill-fitted to the cases, and various and other defects exist in said cases and in the installment thereof; *** that great expense and trouble has been occasioned by virtue of the necessity of calling, at inconvenient times, defendant's employés from their ordinary and regular pursuits to assist in moving the sashes in said cases up and down, great inconvenience caused customers in inspecting and examining articles exhibited in said cases, and great loss sustained in the inability of the defendant to display in said cases his heavy articles and many delicate articles of breakable character, because the cases were and are so illy constructed and installed as to be incapable of supporting articles of weight or articles easily broken"; and that by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the contract, "and to carry out the stipulations thereof and the warranties connected therewith, defendant has been injured and damaged in the sum of $1,000, besides the sum of $720.41 alleged by [the plaintiff] to be due on said contract." Under the evidence and the charge, the jury found for the plaintiff the amount sued for. The defendant excepted to the overruling of his motion for a new trial. For the grounds of the motion and the other material facts, see the opinion.

Payne, Jones & Jones, for plaintiff in error.

Rosser & Brandon, for defendant in error.

RUSSELL J.

1, 2. The plaintiff in error assigns the refusal of a new trial upon his motion and amendments thereto, to be the error which should be corrected. The first three grounds of the motion are in the stereotyped form commonly called the "general grounds," and sometimes known as a "skeleton motion"; but they call for a complete review and weighing of the evidence as it appears in the record, which in this case is by no means brief. We have taken the pains to travel deliberately more than once through the very voluminous record in this case and to examine its contents most critically. We have been enlightened on some of the principles of natural philosophy as applied to cabinetmaking, and have become conversant with some phases of the jewelry business. This court, however, being restricted to the correction of errors of law and in equity, the only legitimate purpose of our journey through the evidence embodied in the record is the discovery of errors of law, and especially to determine, so far as the three original grounds of the motion are concerned, whether the refusal of a new trial is an error of law, because the verdict is without evidence to support it. In considering the three general grounds alone, it may be stated as a general rule that, if the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, it should not be interfered with, unless (a) some ruling of the court improperly withheld from the consideration of the jury evidence which they should have had, and which might have contributed to a different result; or (b)...

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