Cranor v. School Dist. No. 2

• Decision Date: 26 June 1899
• Parties: CRANOR v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2, OF TOWNSHIP NO. 62, OF RANGE NO. 32, IN GENTRY COUNTY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

52 S.W. 232

151 Mo. 119

CRANOR v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2, OF TOWNSHIP NO. 62, OF RANGE NO. 32, IN GENTRY COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 26, 1899.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — SHORTENING TIME — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — COSTS.

1. A statute shortening the time within which an action may be brought on an existing obligation, where the time within which it might have been brought under the pre-existing statute had not run, but which, by the new statute, is barred at the time of its passage, and which does not provide a reasonable time after its passage within which an action may be commenced, is unconstitutional as to such causes of action, as violating the obligation of contracts.

2. In an action on a judgment the plaintiff is entitled to recover for costs in the original action, though they were not paid by him, or assigned to him, under Rev. St. § 2920, which provides that the party prevailing is entitled to recover his costs against the other party, and section 2946, which provides that in all cases where costs shall be awarded execution shall be issued therefor unless otherwise ordered by the party in whose favor such costs shall be awarded.

Appeal from circuit court, Gentry county; C. A. Anthony, Judge.

Action on a judgment brought by John D. Cranor against school district No. 2, of township No. 62, of range No. 32, in Gentry county, Mo. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff defendant appealed to the Kansas City court of appeals, where the judgment was affirmed. Because of a seeming conflict of the opinions in this case with that in Meyer v. Mehrhoff, 19 Mo. App. 682, the cause was transferred to this court, where it was affirmed, and Meyer v. Mehrhoff disapproved.

McCullough & Perry, for appellant. Sallee & Goodman and Patton & Shoemaker, for respondent.

BURGESS, J.

This cause, appealed to the Kansas city court of appeals, has been transferred to the supreme court because of a seeming conflict of the opinion rendered in the case by the court of appeals with Meyer v. Mehrhoff, 19 Mo. App. 682. On the 20th day of March, 1882, the plaintiff recovered in the circuit court of Gentry county a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $180 debt and $400 costs. No part of this judgment seems to have been paid, and on the 13th day of January, 1896, this suit was instituted by plaintiff against defendant in the same court upon that judgment. The answer admits that defendant is a body politic and corporate. It then denies all other allegations in the petition, and pleads the 10-year statute of limitations and payment in bar of the action. There was judgment for plaintiff for debt and interest $331.20, and $300 for costs; being the total of $631.20. Defendant appeals.

When the original judgment was rendered, the statutory period in which all actions upon judgments of courts of record were barred was 20 years. Rev. St. 1879, § 3251; Rev. St. 1889, § 6796. But before this suit was begun that section of the statute was repealed, and another enacted in lieu thereof, by which it is provided that: "Every judgment, order and decree of any court of record of the United States, of this or any other state or territory, shall be presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the day of the rendition of such judgment, or order, or decree, or in case a payment has been made thereon, and duly entered upon, the record thereof, after the expiration of ten years from the day of the last payment so made; and after the expiration of ten years from the day of the rendition, or from the day of the last payment, no execution, order or process shall issue thereon, and neither shall any suit be brought thereon to collect the amount of the same as a debt." Laws 1895, p. 221. The first question with which we are confronted is whether or not the action was barred by this statute at the time of the commencement of this suit. At any time before the statute of limitations has become a bar to an action the legislature may shorten or cut down the length of time required by statute to become a bar thereto, provided a reasonable length of time is given the party in whose favor the cause of action exists in which to bring his suit. Callaway Co. v. Nolley, 31 Mo. 393; Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514, 2 Sup. Ct. 854; In re Ackerman, 33 Minn. 54, 21 N. W. 852; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; O'Brien v. Gaslin, 20 Neb. 347, 30 N. W. 274; Ryhiner v. Frank, 105 Ill. 326. But in the act of 1895 no time is given after its passage in which suits upon judgments of courts of record theretofore rendered may be brought, and, if it applies to such judgment, it is, as to them, unconstitutional and void, in that it cuts short the plaintiff's right to sue, thereby depriving him of a vested right. In the case of Stephens v. Bank, 43 Mo. 385, it is said: "Limitation acts are based on the idea that the party has had an opportunity to try his rights in the courts. A statute which should bar the existing rights of claimants without affording that opportunity after the time when the statute shall take effect would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights, and destroy the force of contracts. It is essential, therefore, to their validity, that they allow a reasonable time after they are passed for the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action," — citing Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423; Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 141, Fed. Cas. No. 13,156; Blackford v. Peltier, 1 Blackf. 36; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 336 (Gil. 237); Berry v. Ransdall, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 292. "Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But, if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or on the contract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the constitution." Smith, Const. Const. 388. The same author also says: "Although ordinary statutes of limitation to actions are not within this clause, yet, if such a statute should be passed which did not allow a reasonable time after the passing thereof for the commencement of suits on existing causes of action, such an act would be unconstitutional." Id. 407. It was so held in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 207, and Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 290. We are not, however, inclined to hold that this statute has any reference to causes of action which existed at the time it took effect, and which are mentioned therein for these reasons. If so, then it is retrospective in its operation, and a law will always be deemed prospective when vested rights may be affected thereby if otherwise construed, "unless the legislature has so explicitly expressed its intention to make the act retrospective that there is no place for a reasonable doubt on the subject." Black, Const. Law, par. 198, p. 544; Bartlett v. Ball, 142 Mo. 28, 43 S. W. 783; Leete v. Bank, 115 Mo. 184, 21 S. W. 788, and cases cited; Id., 141 Mo. 574, 42 S. W. 927; Shields v. Johnson Co., 144 Mo. 76, ...