Crapps v. State

Decision Date20 November 2014
Docket NumberNo. A14A1097.,A14A1097.
Citation766 S.E.2d 178,329 Ga.App. 820
PartiesCRAPPS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Pamela Tillery Britt, Grayson, for Appellant.

Richard Carter Armond, Asst. Dist. Atty., Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., for Appellee.

Opinion

BRANCH, Judge.

Alander Crapps was tried by a Gwinnett County jury and convicted of a single count of aggravated stalking.1 He now appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in failing to give a curative instruction after the victim's testimony improperly placed Crapps's character in issue. Crapps also asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no error and affirm.

On appeal from a criminal conviction, the defendant is no longer entitled to a presumption of innocence and we therefore construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga.App. 512, 514, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010). So viewed, the record shows that Crapps began a romantic relationship with Erica Pass in July 2011 and shortly thereafter the couple began living together, along with Pass's son, at Crapps's DeKalb County apartment. At some point during the couple's relationship, Crapps qualified for Social Security mental health disability benefits. Social Security would not pay the benefits directly to Crapps, however, and required that he designate another individual as his payee.2 Crapps asked Pass to serve as his payee, telling her that he knew no one else who could fill that role. Pass explained that when she received those funds each month, she gave them directly to Crapps.

On February 12, 2012, after the couple had been living together for approximately six months, Crapps awakened Pass at around 3:00 a.m. and began screaming at her. Crapps, who had just examined the contents of Pass's cell phone, was demanding to know with whom Pass had been communicating via text message. Pass attempted to calm Crapps, but when her efforts failed, she gathered her son and went to her car in an effort to leave. Crapps, however, followed Pass and stood behind her car, thwarting her attempt to get away from him. When Pass rolled down her car window slightly to talk to Crapps, he reached inside the car and pulled on the window, breaking the window out of the car. Crapps then dragged Pass out of the car through the window opening, with Pass suffering significant cuts to her back in the process. Once Pass was out of the car, Crapps punched her in the face; he then took Pass's shoes and fled the scene.

Pass called the police, who eventually located and arrested Crapps. Crapps subsequently bonded out of jail and on February 16, 2012, the DeKalb County Magistrate Court entered an order of “Special Condition of Bond” for Crapps, which required Crapps to [s]tay away, absolutely, directly or indirectly, by person and telephone, from the person, home, job, and school of Erica Pass ....” Immediately following the February incident and for some period of time following entry of the protective order, Pass continued to stay at Crapps's apartment periodically because she had no place else to sleep. On some of those occasions, Crapps was present. Approximately four to six weeks after the entry of the order, Pass was able to move into the Gwinnett County home of her aunt. Additionally, Pass obtained a job at a Waffle House in Lawrenceville.3

Following her move to Gwinnett County, Pass initiated limited contact with Crapps via text message regarding his disability benefits and the fact that Crapps needed to designate a new payee to receive those funds on his behalf. When Crapps continued to use Pass as his payee, Pass went to the local Social Security office in May 2012 and had herself removed as payee for Crapps's disability benefits. She then informed Crapps of this fact via text message.

On May 27, 2012, Pass reported to her Waffle House job at around 9:00 p.m. Approximately one hour later, Pass's co-worker, Ashley Byrd, answered the Waffle House telephone and a woman asked if Pass was there. When Pass came to the phone, however, Crapps was on the other end of the line. Crapps then threatened Pass, telling her, “I'm going to fuck you up. You want to fuck with my money? I got you. I'm going to fuck you up. We're going to see about this.” Pass immediately hung up the phone, but Crapps called back within minutes. Crapps then threatened Pass a second time, telling her: “You want to fuck with my money? You think it's a game? Yeah, I'm going to get your ass.” Crapps then began laughing, at which point Pass told him to quit calling her and hung up the phone.

Sometime later that night, Byrd noticed a man standing outside the Waffle House staring at Pass; she called Pass's attention to the man, and Pass recognized Crapps standing outside the restaurant grinning at her from approximately 20 to 25 feet away. After Crapps made eye contact with Pass, he fled the scene. Approximately two minutes later, Byrd and Pass walked into the restaurant's parking lot, where they heard air escaping from the tires on Pass's car. Upon examination, they discovered that the tires on the passenger side of Pass's car had been slashed. Pass called the police, and Crapps was subsequently arrested and indicted for aggravated stalking.

Crapps told his trial counsel that prior to the incident at the Waffle House, Pass had been calling him frequently. Thus, defense counsel decided that the strongest theory of defense was that Crapps's contact with Pass had been consensual and therefore could not be considered stalking. To support this defense, counsel subpoenaed Crapps's cell phone records for the months of February through July 2012, thinking they would show that Pass had initiated contact with Crapps despite the protective order. In response to that subpoena, Crapps's cell phone carrier provided counsel with the records for February and March 2012, but told him that no records were available for the months of April through July 2012, either because they had been purged or could otherwise not be located.4

During his cross-examination of Pass, defense counsel attempted to support the theory that Crapps's contact with Pass after the entry of the protective order was consensual. He therefore asked Pass why, after the protective order was in place, she had continued to sleep at Crapps's apartment. Pass responded, [b]ecause [Crapps] was incarcerated at the time I [obtained the protective order]. He was still in jail.” Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial on the grounds that this response improperly placed Crapps's character in issue. The court denied that motion and the trial then continued without defense counsel requesting a curative instruction as to Pass's allegedly prejudicial testimony.

At the close of the State's evidence, Crapps moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. The defense then rested without presenting any evidence. After the jury found Crapps guilty, defense counsel moved for a pre-sentencing, psychological evaluation. The trial court denied that motion but invited defense counsel to present any available information regarding Crapps's mental health issues. During the sentencing phase, defense counsel stated that Crapps suffered from bipolar disorder.

Following his conviction, Crapps moved for a new trial. After an evidentiary hearing on that motion, the trial court denied the same. This appeal followed.

1. We first address Crapps's claim as to the sufficiency of the evidence. With respect to this claim of error,

the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining that question, we consider the inferences that can be logically derived from the evidence presented at trial. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State's case, the jury's verdict will be upheld.

Castaneira v. State, 321 Ga.App. 418, 423(2), 740 S.E.2d 400 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Under Georgia law, a person commits aggravated stalking when, in violation of a protective order, he “follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.” OCGA § 16–5–91(a). For purposes of the stalking statute, “harassing and intimidating” is defined as

a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear for such person's safety or the safety of a member of his or her immediate family, by establishing a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, and which serves no legitimate purpose.

OCGA § 16–5–90(a)(1). To prove that an act was done for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the victim, therefore, the State must show that the act was part of a “pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior.” State v. Burke, 287 Ga. 377, 379, 695 S.E.2d 649 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga.App. 724, 728 –729(1), 706 S.E.2d 114 (2011). Thus, to convict Crapps of aggravated stalking, the State had to prove that Crapps contacted Pass without her consent and in violation of the protective order; that this conduct placed Pass in reasonable fear for her safety; and that the conduct at issue was part of a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior toward Pass. Louisyr, 307 Ga.App. at 728(1), 706 S.E.2d 114.

On appeal, Crapps contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he engaged in any behavior for the purpose of harassing or intimidating Pass, because the evidence showed that following the entry of the protective order, Pass continued to have consensual contact with Crapps....

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6 cases
  • McNeal v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 5, 2022
    ...this [portion of the] enumeration only under the plain error rule." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crapps v. State , 329 Ga. App. 820, 825 (2), 766 S.E.2d 178 (2014). See State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29 (2) (a), 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011) (defining the elements of plain error). However, because......
  • State v. Enich
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 5, 2016
    ...may have received special, first offender treatment in exchange for testimony favorable to the State.” Crapps v. State , 329 Ga.App. 820, 829 (3) (c), 766 S.E.2d 178 (2014).4 But this statement was dicta, because in Crapps we concluded that any attempt to impeach the witness would have been......
  • Moran v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 20, 2015
    ...evidence that Thomas was placed in reasonable fear for her safety, an essential element of stalking. See Crapps v. State, 329 Ga.App. 820, 823 –824(1), 766 S.E.2d 178 (2014). As in In the Interest of C.C., 280 Ga.App. 590, 591 –592(1), 634 S.E.2d 532 (2006), there was no evidence that Thoma......
  • Jackson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 10, 2015
    ...returned to the house that Jackson came to the victim's house for the purpose of threatening or harassing her. See Crapps v. State, 329 Ga.App. 820, 766 S.E.2d 178 (2014) ("To prove that an act was done for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the victim, ... the State must show that t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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