Crary v. Coffin
| Decision Date | 03 July 1928 |
| Docket Number | 21211. |
| Citation | 268 P. 881,148 Wash. 287 |
| Parties | CRARY v. COFFIN. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Austin E. Griffiths, Judge.
Action by F. W. Crary against Florence A. Coffin, as executrix of the estate of E. A. Coffin, deceased. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Since perfection of the appeal the executrix died, and Clara A. Piper, as administratrix with the will annexed of the estate of E. A. Coffin, was substituted as party defendant. Affirmed.
McBurney & O'Brien and F. W. Crary, all of Seattle, for appellant.
E. M Farmer, of Seattle, for respondent.
Plaintiff instituted an action against Florence A. Coffin, as executrix of the estate of E. A. Coffin, deceased, to recover the sum of $3,917.10, alleged to be the balance due for legal services performed for E. A. Coffin. The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and upon entry of judgment in conformity therewith this appeal was taken. Since the perfection of the appeal, the executrix died, and there has been substituted as party defendant the administratrix with the will annexed, of the estate of E. A Coffin to wit, Clara A. Piper.
It is urged that the court erred in failing to grant judgment for the appellant notwithstanding the verdict. Remembering that the rule is that the trial court can grant such a judgment only when there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference from evidence to support the verdict, let us turn to the issuable facts. Lydon v. Exchange National Bank, 134 Wash. 188, 235 P. 27.
Appellant sued for legal services running over a long period of time. The services were not disputed to any extent as far as the evidence was concerned; the main issue being whether the services were worth the amount claimed. The total services were alleged to be worth $6,243.45, and it was admitted that deceased had paid a total of $2,326.65. It was respondent's contention that the amount already received by appellant was the reasonable value of the services rendered. There was evidence on behalf of appellant that the services were worth as much or more than the amount sued for. Contradicting this was the testimony offered by respondent that the services were worth no more than the amount received. This made a square-cut issuable fact for the jury to determine. Where the evidence presents such an issue, there can be no question but what the rule referred to prohibits the court from entering its judgment in opposition to the verdict.
Appellant however, seeks to avoid the effect of the rule by insisting that the evidence offered by respondent concerning the value of the services was so impeached and actuated by self-interest that the trial court should have ruled it out of the case, and held that there was no evidence contrary to the appellant's on the value of the services. The evidence which appellant claims to be of no value was given by the attorney for respondent, who, during the trial, and while acting as attorney for respondent, became a witness, and testified concerning the value of the services rendered by appellant. The point is made apparently that the testimony of an attorney under such circumstances is so colored by self-interest as to be valueless. But we know of no such rule of law, nor has any been called to our attention. It may well be that such a condition should be carefully considered by the jury in...
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