Cravens v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1920
• Parties: CRAVENS v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

222 S.W. 930

188 Ky. 579

CRAVENS v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 18, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Nelson County.

Action by T. W. Cravens against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Ernest N. Fulton and Osso W. Stanley, both of Bardstown, for appellant.

Benj. D. Warfield, of Louisville, and Jno. S. Kelley and Jno. A Fulton, both of Bardstown, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

The sole question involved on this appeal is whether a husband's right of action to recover damages for the loss of services of his wife and his loss of consortium is barred by the one-year statute of limitation prescribed in section 2516 of the Kentucky Statutes, or whether the five-year limitation prescribed by section 2515 applies. The injury to the wife resulting in the loss of her services and the loss of her consortium to the husband, to recover for which this suit was brought, was sustained by her, as alleged, on December 20, 1917, and was the result of the negligence of the defendant and appellee, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, while the wife was a passenger on one of its trains. She sustained the loss of a leg and was otherwise injured and her husband sought by his petition to recover the sum of $15,000 as damages for the loss of her services and of her society resulting from such injuries.

Among the paragraphs contained in the answer was one pleading the one-year statute of limitations, the suit having been filed more than one year after the infliction of the injuries to the wife. A demurrer filed to that plea was overruled, and plaintiff declining to reply thereto, his petition was dismissed, and he appeals. Another paragraph of the answer relied on a settlement made with the plaintiff husband and his wife, whereby they were paid the sum of $8,750 in full satisfaction of their respective damages growing out of the injuries complained of. A reply was filed to that paragraph but there was no adjudication of the issues raised thereon, and we will make no further reference to it.

Section 2516 of the Statutes says:

"An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of his wife, child, ward, apprentice, or servant, or for injuries to person, cattle, or stock, by railroads, or by any company or corporation; an action for a malicious prosecution, conspiracy, arrest, seduction, criminal conversation, or breach of promise of marriage; an action for libel or slander; an action for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned on civil process, shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued, and not thereafter."

It is the contention of counsel for plaintiff that while the cause of action for the wife growing out of the personal injuries she sustained would be barred by that section after the expiration of one year, it does not necessarily follow, as argued, that the cause of action in favor of the husband to recover for the loss of her services and of her society would be so barred; it being an independent and separate cause of action, and that it is more properly "an action for the injury to the rights of plaintiff, not arising on contract," which, by the provisions of section 2515 of the Statutes, is not barred until the expiration of five years after the cause of action accrued. In support of this contention the cases of Menefee v. Alexander, 107 Ky. 279, 53 S.W. 653, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 980, and Irwin v. Smith, 150 Ky. 147, 150 S.W. 22, with some others announcing an analogous principle, are relied on.

The Menefee Case was a malpractice suit, and the only question decided was that the negligence sued for grew out of the violation of...