Craver v. House

• Decision Date: 14 June 1909
• Parties: CRAVER v. HOUSE.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

120 S.W. 686

138 Mo. App. 251

CRAVER v. HOUSE.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

June 14, 1909.

1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 102)—AUTHORITY OF AGENT—CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT— EMPLOYMENT OF SUBAGENT.

Where the owner fixed the price and the terms on which he was willing to sell property, and merely authorized his agent to sell on those terms if any one wished to purchase, the agent was not authorized to employ a broker to sell the property on commission.

2. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 123)—EVIDENCE.

In an action for commissions for selling property, which plaintiff claimed he was authorized to sell by defendant's agent, facts held to show that defendant did not authorize any one to procure a purchaser, but merely authorized his agent to sell upon certain terms, if any one wanted to purchase.

3. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 166)—RATIFICATION —KNOWLEDGE—CONTRACTS.

A principal does not ratify the unauthorized act of an agent by accepting the benefits, if he did not have knowledge thereof in time to repudiate the entire transaction without material injury to him, so that one who authorized his agent to sell property did not, by conveying pursuant to the contract made by the agent, ratify the agent's unauthorized act in authorizing plaintiff to procure a purchaser, even if he read the contract before conveying, which showed plaintiff's connection with the sale, as he was then bound by the contract to convey.

4. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 169)—RATIFICATION.

Where defendant did not authorize his agent to employ another to procure a purchaser for property, but merely authorized him to sell it on certain terms, that defendant, after his agent had employed plaintiff to find a purchaser, and had contracted to sell to the purchaser procured, offered to pay a part of the amount claimed by plaintiff as commissions did not, of itself, show ratification by defendant of his agent's unauthorized act in employing plaintiff, being only an offer to settle a disputed claim.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; H. L. McCune, Judge.

Action by Charles C. Craver against E. L. House. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Cyrus Crane and Hardin B. Manard, for appellant. Henry L. Jost, for respondent.

BROADDUS, P. J.

This is a suit by a real estate agent to recover commission for the sale of defendant's property in Kansas City. The parties do not differ materially about the facts. As set out in the briefs, they are as follows: In September, 1906, the defendant, House, owned certain real estate in said city. His son, F. E. House, was an attorney, and engaged in the practice of the law. The plaintiff was a real estate broker, and had in his employ a Mr. J. H. Hollister. Hollister learned that defendant's property was for sale, and found upon inquiry at his place of business that he was out of the city. He was directed to apply to the son, F. E. House. He saw Mr. F. E. House, and offered to furnish a purchaser for the property if it could be purchased for $3,500; terms cash $100, the balance in deferred $30 monthly payments, commission to be paid out of the installments as paid by the purchaser. The son telegraphed to his father for instructions, which in a short time resulted in defendant directing him "to go ahead and sell at that price." Neither plaintiff nor Hollister ever saw either of these telegrams. After receiving the instructions to sell, the son informed Hollister that "the sale could be made" at the price named. Hollister then showed the property to a Mr. Beeson, and induced him to sign a contract for the purchase, the purchaser at the time depositing with plaintiff the sum of $100. The son then gave Hollister directions about getting the abstract of the property. In due time, defendant executed a deed conveying the property to the purchaser, who executed the notes for the deferred payments, which were made payable at the son's house. The execution of the deed was acknowledged by defendant before the son, as notary public, in Kansas City On October 10th, when the papers between defendant and the purchaser had been exchanged, plaintiff drew his check to the order of defendant for the $100, the deposit in his hands as agent of the seller, which was turned over to the son, who indorsed defendant's name thereon, cashed it, and accounted for the proceeds, since which time all of Beeson's dealings in reference to the business have been with the son. At the foot of the contract for the sale of the property is a memorandum fixing the amount of commission and the manner of its payment, which contract was signed by the son. He testified that he did not understand that he was making any agreement as to commission, and that he never attempted to do so, except as to show it should be paid. The parties do not agree in every particular as to what was agreed as to the amount of the commission. The son contended that it was agreed that plaintiff was to have $150, which Hollister denies. The regular commission in such cases was $162.50. The suit was instituted in a justice's court. In the circuit court, plaintiff was allowed, without objection on the part of defendant, to elect to treat the statement as declaring on a cause of action for services rendered. A jury was waived, and the cause was tried before the court...