Crawford's Adm'r v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1907
• Citation: 124 Ky. 733,99 S.W. 963
• Parties: CRAWFORD'S ADM'R v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

99 S.W. 963

124 Ky. 733

CRAWFORD'S ADM'R v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 26, 1907

Appeal from Circuit Court, Nelson County.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Alexander Crawford's administrator against the Travelers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

John S Kelley, for appellant.

John A Fulton, for appellee.

NUNN J.

The judgment appealed from was rendered by the Nelson circuit court in an action instituted by the appellant against the appellee to recover $5,000 on an accident insurance policy issued to Dr. Alexander Crawford, appellant's intestate. On the trial, after the introduction of testimony by both parties, the court gave the jury a peremptory instruction to find for defendant, and of this ruling the appellant now complains.

The policy was sold to Dr. Crawford by the agent of appellee on September 23, 1904, which insured him against accidental death for a term of 24 hours. Within that time he was killed by reason of a collision of two trains, on one of which he was riding. In its answer appellee relied solely upon the following clause in the policy, to wit: "This ticket and the insurance thereunder, shall be wholly void as to persons under 18 and over 65 years of age." It is alleged that Dr. Crawford was over the age of 65 years at the time he purchased the ticket or policy, that he failed to disclose that fact, and for this reason appellee was not bound to pay the policy. The appellant, in reply admitted that Dr. Crawford was over the age of 65 years at the time; but alleged that the agent of appellee who sold him the ticket knew that fact, and that his intestate did not know that the ticket or policy contained such a clause. The appellee, by rejoinder, controverted the affirmative matter in the reply, and for the first time questioned the authority of the agent of appellee on selling the ticket to waive any provision of it. It is not necessary to consider the effect of this plea in rejoinder; for, as we understand the briefs of counsel, the question of the limited powers of the agent who sold the ticket is abandoned. But, if not, the principle is so well settled that such an agent, while acting in the apparent scope of his authority, will bind his principal as firmly as could its general officer while acting in that capacity. His knowledge, therefore, respecting any material fact which affects the risk is imputed to the company, and it is estopped from setting it up in defense unless the party dealing with the agent knew of his limited power, and that he was exceeding the power conferred upon him by his principal. See May on Insurance,§ 143; Ph nix Insurance Co. of Brooklyn v. Phillips, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 123; German Insurance Co. v. Hart, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 346; Ph nix Insurance Co. v. Spiers & Thomas, 87 Ky. 285, 8 S.W. 453; London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Co. v. Gerteisen, 51 S.W. 617, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 471; Teutonic Insurance Co. v. Howell, 54 S.W. 852, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1245. J. Tyler Davis was the agent of appellee in the district which included Nelson county. He left these tickets or policies in the hands of B. J. Hubbard prepared to be delivered to purchasers; Hubbard only having to insert the date and the name of the purchaser of the ticket. The facts of this case are similar to the facts of the London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Co. v. Gerteisen, supra. In that case the court said: "It is also well settled that knowledge of the agent who represents the company in the transaction is the knowledge of the company. It is insisted, however, that Rudd alone was appellant's agent, that Haws had no authority from it, and that it is not chargeable with facts known to Haws, unless communicated to Rudd. This is the decisive question in the case. According to the testimony, Haws was in effect the partner of Rudd in effecting this insurance. The rule that a delegated authority cannot be delegated has some limitations....