Crawford v. Boyd
| Decision Date | 03 April 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 17104,17104 |
| Citation | 453 S.W.2d 232 |
| Parties | W. L. CRAWFORD, III, et al., Appellants, v. Henry L. BOYD, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Coleman, Whitten & Philips, and Earl L. Coleman, Denton, for appellants.
Gerald E. Stockard, Denton, for appellee.
The plaintiffs, A. H. Stepken, William L. Crawford III, and Hal I. Padgett sued the defendant, Henry L. Boyd, for damages and injunctive relief.
The defendant, Boyd, and one Mabry Courtney, had jointly owned a tract of land in Denton County near Lake Dallas, and in 1961 they platted such land and dedicated it as an addition which they named Rocky Shore, a subdivision in Denton County, Texas.
The instrument by which the addition was dedicated contained some restrictions. Those that are material here will be set out below.
'2. No shacks or tents shall be permitted on this property * * *. Trailer homes are permitted on lots approved for trailers, being 33 through 54, both inclusive, and trailers may not be older than 1955 models.
* * *'
At the time this suit was filed each of the plaintiffs was the owner of a lot in Rocky Shore Addition and each had built a substantial residence on his lot and this was their reason for being interested in seeing that applicable restrictions in the addition were enforced.
Restrictive covenants such as the one involved here forbidding the placing of trailer homes on lots in residential areas are designed to exclude an influx of travel trailers occupied by transients on the theory that their presence in the neighborhood would depreciate the value of the area for substantial permanent homes.
Plaintiffs' contention in this case is that defendant, Boyd, has moved onto Lots 56, 57, 58 and 59, which lots he still owns, a trailer home or trailer house, and that such conduct was in violation of the restrictions above set out that control the type of structure that can be placed on such lots.
The plaintiffs, in addition to damages, sought a mandatory injunction ordering defendant to remove the structure complained of from the lots in question and also sought a permanent injunction enjoining defendant from violating any of the restrictions in the future.
The case was tried without a jury and judgment was rendered for defendant denying all of the relief sought by plaintiffs.
No findings of fact or conclusions of law were filed by the trial court and the record does not show that any were requested. The record does not in any way indicate the reason why the trial judge rendered the judgment that was rendered in the case. There are no fact findings in the judgment itself.
It is settled in Texas that in a nonjury trial where findings of fact and conclusions of law are not requested and none are filed, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Seaman v. Seaman, 425 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Sup., 1968). For a large number of cases on this see 4 Tex.Digest, Appeal & Error, Key 846 (2, 5).
In such a case the trial court's judgment implies that all necessary fact findings were made by that court in support of the judgment. In determining whether there is any evidence to support the judgment and the implied findings of fact incident thereto the appellate court can consider only that evidence that is most favorable to the issue and must disregard entirely that which is opposed to it. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950).
There was testimony offered during the trial to the following effect: before August, 1967, defendant had a house in which he and his family lived that was located on lots 89 and 90 of Rocky Shore Addition; this house burned and thereafter in August, 1967, defendant went to a mobile home manufacturing company in Fort Worth and contracted with them to build him a building to his specifications, same being 12 feet wide by 64 feet long; he had this structure built as a building intending to have it moved onto his lots and to live in it as his home; it was built at the factory and moved by that company onto Lots 56 and 57 of Rocky Shore Addition, which lots defendant owns; before buying the building he built a concrete foundation on his lots which consisted of 4 slabs of reinforced concrete about 12 feet long with one to go under each end of his building and the other 2 slabs located toward the center of the structure; he also built a large septic tank to be used in connection with the structure before buying his building; when he bought this building he did not order any axles or wheels to go with it; and did not get any; the mobile home company brought the building out to his lots with a special truck that had a fifth wheel; they pulled it there with a tractor and when they brought it out they had axles and wheels under it; when they got the building onto defendant's property they set it on the concrete foundation and took their wheels and axles out from under the building and took them back with them; after getting this building located onto his lots, defendant built a 12 foot by 16 foot building or room onto the back side of such building and this was fastened onto the building that he bought with nuts and bolts; this addition is wooden framed with aluminum siding, the same as the other one is; this addition was added within one month after he purchased the building from the mobile home company; the two structures were so fastened together at time of trial that they constitute one structure; he has also poured a 12 foot by 20 foot foundation or slab in front of the structure on which he intends to erect a rumpus room with a fireplace as soon as he can get the money to do it with; he has lived in that area since 1960; his present intentions are for him and his family to live in this building on these same lots from now on as their home; he intends now that he will never move the building; the buildings are so constructed that now it would not be possible to move any part of them without damaging the whole thing materially; his intention when he first started his project was to build him a permanent home on the lots in question; the buildings are...
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