Crawford v. City of Bakersfield

Decision Date06 October 2016
Docket NumberCase No. 1:14-cv-01735-SAB
PartiesLESLIE LARAY CRAWFORD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND BIFURCATING TRIAL FOR PURPOSES OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES

Currently before the Court are the parties' motions in limine. Oral argument on the motions was conducted on October 6, 2016. Counsel Brian Dunn appeared telephonically for Plaintiff and counsel Micheal Marderosian personally appeared and counsel Heather Cohen appeared telephonically for Defendants at the hearing. Having considered the moving papers, the arguments made during the October 6, 2016 hearing, and the Court's file, the Court issues the following order.

I.INTRODUCTION

On August 6, 2014, Elsa Torres was filling her car with gasoline at a gas station in Bakersfield, California. (Order Denying Defendant City of Bakersfield and Defendant Aaron Stringer's Motion for Summary Judgment 3, ECF No. 40.) Michael Dozer (hereafter "Decedent") approached Ms. Torres car and took the hose from the gas pump to the vehicle causing gasoline to spill onto the ground, Ms. Torres, and himself. (Id.) Decedent used a lighter to start a fire. (Id.) Ms. Torres was able to quickly drive and park a short distance away. (Id.) Witnesses at the scene called the police to report the incident. (Id.)

Defendant Stringer was advised of the incident by dispatch and responded to the scene. (Id. at 4.) Defendant Stringer contacted witnesses who informed him that Decedent had started a fire but that Ms. Torres had not been burned. (Id.) The witnesses pointed out Decedent, who was in the area and pacing back and forth, as the individual who had started the fire. (Id. at 4-5.) As Defendant Stringer approached Decedent to speak with him, Decedent made comments, picked up a horseshoe-shaped lock, and began approaching Defendant Stringer. (Id. at 5.) The events that occurred next are disputed. Ultimately, Defendant Stringer drew his weapon and shot Decedent. (Id. at 5-6.)

Plaintiff Leslie Laray Crawford filed this action on November 6, 2014. Following denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, this action is proceeding on the first amended complaint, filed May 27, 2015, against Defendant Aaron Stringer for use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and against Defendants City of Bakersfield and Aaron Stringer on California state law claims of wrongful death. The matter is set to proceed to trial on October 18, 2016.

On September 15, 2016, the parties filed motions in limine. (ECF Nos. 45, 46.) On September 29, 2016, the parties filed oppositions to the motions in limine and Plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice. (ECF Nos. 48, 49, 50.)

On October 6, 2016, Defendants filed a motion in limine. (ECF No. 52.) Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to oppose the October 6, 2016 motion. Accordingly, the Court shall defer ruling on this matter and provide Plaintiff an opportunity to file an opposition.

II.LEGAL STANDARD

A party may use a motion in limine to exclude inadmissible or prejudicial evidence before it is actually introduced at trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). "[A] motion in limine is an important tool available to the trial judge to ensure the expeditiousand evenhanded management of the trial proceedings." Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Services, 115 F.3d 436,440 (7th Cir. 1997). A motion in limine allows the parties to resolve evidentiary disputes before trial and avoids potentially prejudicial evidence being presented in front of the jury, thereby relieving the trial judge from the formidable task of neutralizing the taint of prejudicial evidence. Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003).

Motions in limine that exclude broad categories of evidence are disfavored, and such issues are better dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises. Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975). Additionally, some evidentiary issues are not accurately and efficiently evaluated by the trial judge in a motion in limine and it is necessary to defer ruling until during trial when the trial judge can better estimate the impact of the evidence on the jury. Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440.

III.DISCUSSION

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that generally relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 402. "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence can be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.

A. Plaintiff's Motions in Limine

Plaintiff brings motions in limine to exclude evidence that no criminal charges or discipline was imposed on Defendant Stringer due to the incident, and prior bad acts of the decedent, his father, and his mother.

1. Evidence that No Criminal Charges Were Brought and No Internal Discipline Was Imposed Against Defendant Stringer

Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence that the district attorney did not file criminal charges and that no internal discipline was imposed after an internal investigation of the incident.Defendants do not oppose the motion if the Court grants Defendants' motion to exclude evidence pertaining to the circumstances resulting in Defendant Stringer's termination.

As Defendants' motion to exclude the circumstances regarding the termination of Defendant Stringer shall be granted as discussed below and upon Defendants' statement of non-opposition, the Court shall grant Plaintiff's motion to exclude evidence that no criminal charges were brought and no internal disciple was imposed against Defendant Stringer based upon the subject incident.

2. Evidence of Decedent, Michael Eugene Dozer's, and Plaintiff's Prior Bad Acts

Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence of prior bad acts of herself, the decedent, and decedent's father, Michael Eugene Dozer.

Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence applies in both criminal and civil cases. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)). "Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). "However, evidence of earlier behavior is admissible for other purposes 'such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . .' " Boyd v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Extrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that issue involves the actor's state of mind and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from conduct. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685.

The Ninth Circuit has found that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion and, unless the evidence of other crimes tends to only prove propensity, it is admissible. Boyd, 576 F.3d at 947. "The intent behind the rule is not to 'flatly prohibit the introduction of such evidence,' but to limit the purpose for which it may be introduced." Id. (quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687). Once it is established that the evidence is offered to prove one of the purposes set forth in Rule 404(b), only those conditions set forth in Rule 403 will justify the exclusion of the evidence. U.S. v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2007).

a. Decedent's Bad Acts

Plaintiff asserts that since Defendant Stringer was unaware of the prior bad acts of decedent they are not relevant in this action where the issue is whether Defendant Stringer used excessive force. Defendants argue that decedent's prior arrest in 2014 for violation of California Penal Code section 148(a)(1), resisting/obstructing a peace officer in performance of his duties, and in 2010 for violation of Penal Code section 245(a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, are relevant to show that Defendant Stringer's perception of the actions of Decedent was accurate. Defendants assert that a limiting instruction can be provided to ensure that the jury considers the evidence only for the purpose for which it is provided. Further, Defendants argue that the prior criminal charges are relevant to explain why the decedent acted in the way he did. Defendants contend that the central issue in this action is whether decedent was demonstrating resistance or refusing to follow commands at the time that Defendant Stringer was forced to discharge his weapon. Finally, Defendants argue that the evidence is relevant to refute the anticipated argument that decedent was a semi-homeless individual suffering from mental illness and provide a full profile of the decedent.

In Boyd, the court addressed prior arrests in an action similar to this in which the decedent's family was alleging unlawful use of force. Boyd, 576 F.3d at 942. The only issue to be decided by the jury was whether the officer's actions in shooting the decedent were reasonable based on his perspective at the time. Id. at 944. At trial, the decedent's family presented evidence that the decedent was leaning against the car in an attempt to get down on the ground and surrender when police shot him. Id. at 944. The officers presented evidence the decedent ignored commands to surrender and instead sat down on the dashboard of a vehicle and reached both hands inside as if attempting to grab something. Id. The appellate court held that "[i]n a case such as this, where what the officer perceived just prior to the use of force is in dispute, evidence...

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