Crawford v. City University of New York

• Decision Date: 06 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. M-34258,M-34258
• Citation: 131 Misc.2d 1013,502 N.Y.S.2d 916
• Parties: , 32 Ed. Law Rep. 1045 In the Matter of Crystal CRAWFORD v. CITY UNIVERSITY of New York. Motion
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 916

502 N.Y.S.2d 916

131 Misc.2d 1013, 32 Ed. Law Rep. 1045

In the Matter of Crystal CRAWFORD v. CITY UNIVERSITY of New York.

Motion No. M-34258

Court of Claims of New York.

May 6, 1986.

Zuller & Bondy, for claimant; Michael Eric Zuller, Thomas Bondy and Sara Youner, New York City, of counsel.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., for defendant; William P. Kleen, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel.

GERARD M. WEISBERG, Judge.

Inter alia, this motion raises a novel issue with respect to a change in language when the Legislature enacted the current provisions of Court of Claims Act § 10(6), thereby renumbering and rewording its predecessor. (L.1976, ch. 280, eff. Sept. 1, 1976.)

Claimant, Crystal Crawford, seeks to file a late claim. The incident giving rise to the cause of action occurred on April 8, 1985 when, at approximately 1:30 P.M., claimant slipped on a stairway located in one of the buildings of Hunter College, a facility of the defendant, City University of New York (CUNY). The location of the occurrence was the staircase connecting the third and second floors of the "Hunter North" building. The alleged cause was the presence of an area of "debris, grease and filth."

The following day, Ms. Crawford reported the event to the Administration Office at Hunter, as well as to a guidance counselor, Jo-Ann Morgan. This is uncontested by the defendant. Subsequently, on April 26, claimant, while attending school, experienced intense pain in her knees and sought aid at Hunter's medical office. This is confirmed by a letter dated January 9, 1986 from Margot Voegelin, the director of that office.

Defendant opposes this motion primarily on the ground that the Attorney-General, who defends claims against CUNY in this Court, never received actual notice of the claim. In support, reference to the 1976 amendment to the Court of Claims Act is made. Prior to that change, former Court of Claims Act § 10(5), which governed late claim applications, required in part "that the state or its appropriate department had, prior to the expiration of the time limited for the filing of the notice of intention, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim" (emphasis added.) Currently, the Court at its discretion is only required to consider, along with five other factors, "whether the state had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim." (Court of Claims Act § 10[6].) This provision is made applicable to claims against CUNY by Education Law § 6224(4).

Defendant argues that the 1976 revision was intended to "withdraw an existing right." In particular, the amendment meant that "notice to the appropriate department would no longer suffice for the purpose of determining whether the State had notice ..." (Defendant's affirmation in opposition, para. 7.) However, an examination of the bill jacket to the amendment reveals that rather than restrict relief, the Legislature intended to liberalize the provisions pertaining to the filing of late claims. (See Governor's Memorandum, McKinney's 1976 Session Laws of NY, p. 2435; see also Kelly v. State of New York, 57 A.D.2d 320, 327, 395 N.Y.S.2d 311, affd. 45 N.Y.2d 973, 412 N.Y.S.2d 891, 385 N.E.2d 628.) A comparison of the former and current law also discloses that the manner that the State may receive notice of a claim for purposes of this motion was broadened, not narrowed, by that amendment. Specifically, "actual knowledge" by the State is no longer necessary. Defendant's bald conclusion that the deletion of the phrase "its appropriate department" indicates an intent to require that the Attorney-General be informed of the incident underlying the motion is not substantiated by the legislative history. (See Woodley v. State of New York, 88 Misc.2d 889, 891, 390 N.Y.S.2d 561.)

Moreover, case law does not support the defendant's position that notice of "possible litigation" is required to be given to the Attorney-General. (Defendant's affirmation in opposition, para. 11.) We have recently held that this contention is inappropriate to a motion for permission to file a late claim. (See Avila v. State of New York, 131 Misc.2d 449, 500 N.Y.S.2d 626.) If we were to conclude otherwise, precious little would be left of the potential for relief that Court of Claims Act § 10(6) was intended to afford.

The prompt actions by the claimant the day after the mishap and the information furnished Hunter's medical office on April 26 show that appropriate supervisory officials had notice of the occurrence at the latest 18 days after the event. (See Carmen v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 965, 373 N.Y.S.2d 698.) This put CUNY in a better position to explore the circumstances surrounding the incident than if the claim had been timely filed on the 90th day. (See Veader v. State of New York, Ct of Claims, Mar. 12, 1986, Silverman, J.) Indeed, after receiving information about a dangerous condition on one of its stairways, it would seem that Hunter had the obligation as well as the opportunity to investigate.

Given the prompt notice CUNY received, we hold that it will not be substantially prejudiced by the granting of this motion. (See Matter of Newson v. City of New York, 87 A.D.2d 630, 448 N.Y.S.2d 224.) Although the condition...