Crawford v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 06 April 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 61309,61309 |
| Citation | 158 Ga.App. 187,279 S.E.2d 486 |
| Parties | CRAWFORD v. CRAWFORD et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
David F. Kell, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.
John C. Tyler, Atlanta, for appellees.
This is a garnishment proceeding for the collection of child support. Two documents were stipulated into evidence in the trial court, the same being the final judgment and divorce decree with an agreement executed by both parties settling all questions as to alimony and child support and a document designated final order of modification which was also consented to by all parties.
The garnishment was filed. The garnishee answered and paid $1,200 into court. The defendant then filed a traverse to the garnishment contending he is not indebted to plaintiff in any amount and he does not owe the amount claimed by the plaintiff and demanding that the garnishment be dismissed. The traverse was set down for a hearing. The trial court set forth in its order overruling and denying the traverse the above facts with reference to the divorce decree. The order incorporated only parts of the written agreement involving the two minor children and also the petition to modify and the agreement entered as a consent decree with reference thereto. In its final order the court construed the language contained in the consent decree as a matter of law. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court has erroneously construed the language contained in the consent decree. Held:
The defendant in garnishment was the defendant in the divorce and alimony and child support proceedings. The dispute here is whether or not the consent decree required an additional $50 per month child support per child when each child reached the age of 12 years only upon the remarriage of the plaintiff at which time (remarriage) there would be an increase of $250 per month for the support and maintenance of each of the said minor children, or simply when each child becomes 12 years of age, notwithstanding remarriage, an additional $50 per month would be "in addition to amount the child shall at that time be entitled to receive." The trial court simply construed the document as a matter of law to mean that the additional sum of $50 per month per child should have been "upon their reaching the age of 12 years," relying upon language in the document as follows: "The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff an additional $50.00 per month for each child, which sum shall be in addition to the amount the child shall at that time be entitled to receive as hereinabove provided." (Emphasis supplied.)
If the language of the document was clear and unambiguous, then the trial court was correct in its construction as to its meaning as a matter of law. However, all agreements ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bowman v. WALNUT MTN. PROP. OWNERS ASSOC.
...to its terms. OCGA § 13-2-3; Budd Land Co. v. K & R Realty Co., 159 Ga.App. 448, 449(2), 283 S.E.2d 665 (1981); Crawford v. Crawford, 158 Ga.App. 187, 188, 279 S.E.2d 486 (1981). Therefore, where there has been a substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of the covenant permittin......
-
Foshee v. Harris
...rule of construction is to ascertain the parties' intent. McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 144 S.E.2d 741 (1965); Crawford v. Crawford, 158 Ga.App. 187, 279 S.E.2d 486 (1981). In the construction of a contract "[w]ords generally bear their usual and common signification ..." OCGA § 13-2-2(2)......
-
Jones v. Quigley
...made available to them, since this would have the effect of nullifying the contingent nature of the contract. See Crawford v. Crawford, 158 Ga.App. 187, 188, 279 S.E.2d 486; Kirkland v. Kirkland, 209 Ga. 526(1), 74 S.E.2d Having decided that the contract of sale and obligations of the defen......
-
Travel Agency Group, Inc. v. Henderson Mill Travel, Inc.
...[Cit.] The cardinal rule in construing contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties. [Cits.]" Crawford v. Crawford, 158 Ga.App. 187, 188, 279 S.E.2d 486 (1981). Accord Olympic Constr. v. Drywall Interiors, 180 Ga.App. 142 (1), 348 S.E.2d 688 (1986); Heyman v. Fin. Properties Devel......