Crawford v. Dammann
| Decision Date | 02 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. A05A2101.,No. A05A2114.,A05A2101.,A05A2114. |
| Citation | 277 Ga. App. 442,626 S.E.2d 632 |
| Parties | CRAWFORD et al. v. DAMMANN et al. Dammann et al. v. Crawford et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Brian R. Dempsey, Lovejoy, for Appellant.
Derek W. Johanson, Weissman Nowack Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Raymond K. Williams, for Appellee.
Appellants/cross-appellees are Starfirst Homes, Inc. ("Starfirst"), and its owner and president, David Crawford, each of whom own property and build homes in the Turtle Cove subdivision in Jasper County. Appellees/cross-appellants are members of the board of directors (the "Board") of the Turtle Cove Property Owners Association, Inc. (the "Association"), a nonprofit corporation responsible for managing and maintaining the subdivision, including its closed-end water supply system and all common property in the subdivision. To carry out its responsibilities, the Board levied certain assessments and charges upon the property owners in the subdivision. The charges included a $3,000 building deposit obtained from owners initiating new construction; $100 administrative processing fee for building permits; a ready to serve ("RTS") fee of $70 per residential lot per year for the availability of water service; and a water meter fee of $1,350 for each water meter installed by the Board for each newly developed lot and lots to be developed or built upon.
On March 3, 2003, Crawford sued appellees for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages, requesting the trial court: (1) to determine whether the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions ("Covenants") authorized the Board to assess and levy the various fees upon him; (2) to issue injunctive relief in the form of a restraining order, temporary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from assessing and levying fees upon him or any of his property; (3) to issue both a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from denying water service or refusing to supply water or a water meter at actual cost to any of the lots or properties owned by Crawford; and (4) to issue both a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from interfering with or otherwise impeding the development and occupancy of any of the lots or property owned by Crawford. Appellees filed a timely answer to Crawford's complaint.
The case was set for a hearing on the petition for injunctive relief on May 27, 2003, but on May 12, 2003, Starfirst filed a motion to intervene as a party plaintiff on the grounds that it was Starfirst, not Crawford, who owned many of the lots that were subject to the assessments. At the injunctive relief hearing, a consent order was entered and the case was continued.1 Upon Crawford and Starfirst's compliance with the terms of the consent order, the trial court granted Starfirst's motion to intervene.
On August 6, 2003, Starfirst filed its verified petition for declaratory judgment, which was identical to the averments and prayers for relief in Crawford's complaint. Within 30 days of the date of service of Starfirst's complaint, appellees filed a "first amended answer and defenses." This document listed Crawford as a plaintiff and did not designate Starfirst as a plaintiff.
A second hearing on the claim for injunctive relief was set and again continued based on another consent order reached by the parties. In the second consent order, the Board agreed to suspend collection of the $3,000 building deposit fee during pendency of the litigation in exchange for Crawford and Starfirst agreeing to release the RTS fees from the court registry, agreeing to pay the $100 building permit processing fee, and agreeing to pay the $1,350 water meter installation fee. The parties also agreed to extend the discovery period; and for nine months following the filing of Starfirst's complaint, all parties participated in extensive discovery.
On May 4, 2004, nine months after Starfirst intervened, Starfirst filed its motion for default judgment as well as an amended complaint, which prayed for the recovery of "water usage or consumption fees." Starfirst and Crawford also filed motions for summary judgment. Appellees responded and also filed a motion to open default, an answer to Starfirst's complaint, and a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the parties' motions for summary judgment, denied the motion to open default, and entered default judgment against appellees in favor of Starfirst. The court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting appellees from charging Starfirst for the RTS fee, the water meter fee, and the building deposit and permit processing fee. Further, the court found that Starfirst was entitled to a refund of all fees paid to the Board, reserving the issue of Starfirst's damages, costs, and attorney fees for trial.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on all of Crawford's claims and on Starfirst's damages. Following the trial, the court entered final judgment in favor of appellees. The court found that the Association was authorized by the Covenants to assess and collect the disputed fees in amounts determined by the Board; that the Association did not abuse its discretion in assessing and collecting those fees from Crawford; that Starfirst did not sustain any damage from the assessment and collection of the fees; and that Crawford and Starfirst received a tangible benefit from the RTS fee and water meter fee by the provision of a private, closed-end water supply system. The court ruled that Starfirst failed to sustain its burden of proving damages and awarded no damages, costs, or attorney fees on the default judgment. In Case No. A05A2101, Crawford appeals the judgment in favor of appellees and Starfirst appeals the judgment awarding no damages. Although we find that the court erred in ruling that the Covenants authorized appellees to collect the building deposit and permit processing fee, we affirm the judgment because appellants failed to prove damages. In Case No. A05A2114, the Board and the Association cross-appeal the default judgment granted to Starfirst. We reverse so much of the default judgment that permanently enjoins appellees from charging Starfirst for the RTS fee, the water meter fee, and the water usage fee, but affirm the remainder of the judgment.
1. Crawford and Starfirst ("appellants") argue that the trial court erred in determining that the Association did not abuse its discretion in assessing and collecting the fees at issue. Appellants contend that the Board does not have the inherent authority to create mandatory assessments and that the assessments it levied are illegal because the Covenants do not expressly permit them.
"Restrictive covenants on real estate run with the title to the land and are specialized contracts that inure to the benefit of all property owners affected."2 "The construction, interpretation and legal effect of [such] a contract . . . is an issue of law" to which the appellate court applies the plain legal error standard of review.3 Accordingly, we determine de novo whether the trial court correctly ruled that all of the fees at issue were permitted by the Covenants. However, the "any evidence" standard of review applies to nonjury trials of disputed material facts.4 "In the absence of legal error, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to interfere with a judgment supported by some evidence."5 Therefore, if we determine the fees are permitted by the Covenants, the court's rulings that the Association did not abuse its discretion in assessing and collecting those fees from Crawford will be upheld if there is any evidence to support them.
(a) We first address the propriety of the judgment as to the RTS fee, the water meter fee, and water usage fees. Paragraph 8.05 of the Covenants, which is entitled "Special Assessments for Services," states:
The Board may provide for . . . the installation and maintenance of water-supply and sewage-disposal systems, the maintenance of water quality in the bodies of water within and adjacent to the Properties. . . , the protective maintenance of Lots, and similar services. The Board may assess the owners for these services, on the basis of benefits received, and add the charges therefor to the dues.
This provision plainly authorizes the Board to assess fees that are necessary for the maintenance of the Turtle Cove water system. Appellants argue that this provision is invalid because it contains no effective date. Specifically, Paragraph 8.05 states that "no special assessment for services shall commence prior to (date)." "[A] contract should be construed by examining the agreement in its entirety, and not merely by examining isolated clauses and provisions thereof."6 The Covenants were recorded on July 29, 1971. According to Paragraphs 8.03 and 8.04, property owners were required to begin paying dues in 1972, and dues could not be increased for the years 1972, 1973, and 1974. It logically follows that special assessments could not be levied prior to 1975. Parol evidence was introduced to show that the effective date of the provision was July 1, 1975. The absence of the date did not render Paragraph 8.05 ineffective.
Appellants next argue that there is no evidence that the owners were assessed for water services "on the basis of benefits received," as contemplated under Paragraph 8.05. We disagree. Testimony indicated that the RTS fee is utilized for maintaining the water system so that when an owner moves in, the water lines are ready to be hooked up. Gregory Marsh Johnson, who has resided in Turtle Cove since 1987 and manages its water department, testified that approximately 860 of the 1700 lots in the subdivision are metered for water service. According to Johnson, the developer installed a 300,000 gallon elevated tank and twenty-seven miles of water lines; the subdivision originally had two wells and now...
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...court misapplies a rule of evidence, not when it merely allows or refuses to allow questionable evidence. See also Crawford v. Dammann , 626 S.E.2d 632, 277 Ga.App. 442 (2006); Williams v. Black Rock Yacht Club, Inc., 877 A.2d 849, 90 Conn.App. 27 (2005); Floyd v. Floyd , 615 S.E.2d 465, 36......
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Overview
...misapplies a rule of evidence, not when it merely allows or refuses to allow questionable evidence. 6 See also Crawford v. Dammann , 626 S.E.2d 632, 277 Ga.App. 442 (2006); Williams v. Black Rock Yacht Club, Inc., 877 A.2d 849, 90 Conn.App. 27 (2005); Floyd v. Floyd , 615 S.E.2d 465, 365 S.......
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Overview
...court misapplies a rule of evidence, not when it merely allows or refuses to allow questionable evidence. See also Crawford v. Dammann , 626 S.E.2d 632, 277 Ga.App. 442 (2006); Williams v. Black Rock Yacht Club, Inc., 877 A.2d 849, 90 Conn.App. 27 (2005); Floyd v. Floyd , 615 S.E.2d 465, 36......