Crawford v. Langmaid

• Decision Date: 23 May 1898
• Citation: 50 N.E. 606,171 Mass. 309
• Parties: CRAWFORD v. LANGMAID et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

171 Mass. 309

50 N.E. 606

CRAWFORD v. LANGMAID et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 23, 1898

COUNSEL

H.T. Richardson, for petitioner.

E.R Champlin and G.L. Wilson, for defendants.

OPINION

LATHROP J.

By two deeds, executed on the same day, Mrs. Langmaid conveyed all her property to trustees, to manage the property, and to pay her the net income semiannually during her life, and on her decease "to convey and transfer the said trust estate or the residue thereof, to such person or persons and such object or objects, and in such way and manner, as the said Dorcas A., by her last will and testament, duly admitted to probate in the probate court of said Suffolk county, shall provide and direct, or, in default of a duly-probated will to convey and transfer said trust estate to the legal heirs and representatives of said Dorcas A. in fee, and discharged of all trusts." The deed also gave the trustees power to sell and convey the real estate, or any part of it, with the consent of Mrs. Langmaid, for such price and on such terms as the trustees should deem best, and proceeded as follows "And the proceeds of any and every sale or mortgage may be retained by such trustees as part of the principal of the trust estate, or may be paid over in whole or in part to said Dorcas A., and her acceptance of such money shall fully release and discharge the trustees from all further accounting or liability therefor." The judge has found that the conveyances were not made with any actual intent to defraud either the plaintiff or any other creditors by covering up or concealing property from him or them, but were made, without any valuable consideration therefor, for the purpose of securing the property to herself and her heirs by rendering it impossible for her to sacrifice it to the importunities of a spendthrift son; that she has received from the trustees all the future income for a long time to come, and has spent it for the benefit of her son. The plaintiff does not now contend that there was any fraud on the part of Mrs. Langmaid, and the only question is whether, under the trust deeds, aside from the income, Mrs. Langmaid retained "any property, right, title, or interest, legal or equitable," which can be applied in satisfaction of the debt. In Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175, in which it was held that a person could not settle his property in trust to pay the income to himself for life, with a provision that it should not be alienated by anticipation, so as to prevent his creditors from reaching the income by a bill in equity, under Gen.St. c. 113, § 2, cl. 11, it was said by Chief Justice Morton: "It is true that a man who is not indebted may by a voluntary conveyance made in good faith transfer his property so as to put it out of the reach of future creditors. When a man transfers a trust fund of which the income is to be paid to him during his life, and the principal, at his death, to be paid or transferred to others, the principal may be beyond the reach of the future creditors." There are only two grounds upon which it can be...