Crawford v. Masters
| Decision Date | 27 August 1914 |
| Docket Number | 8925. |
| Citation | 82 S.E. 793,98 S.C. 458 |
| Parties | CRAWFORD v. MASTERS. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Anderson County; Geo. E Prince, Judge.
Action by Lula P. Crawford against John W. Masters. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
A. H Dagnall, of Anderson, for appellant.
Quattlebaum & Cochran, of Anderson, for respondent.
In 1889, H. K. Crawford conveyed a tract of land to his daughter, Lula P. Crawford, habendum "unto the said Miss Lula P. Crawford and to her bodily heirs and assigns forever and to no others." In 1906, the Legislature enacted (Civ. Code 1912, § 3562) that:
"Any illegitimate child or children, whose mother shall die intestate, possessed of any real or personal property shall be, so far as said property is concerned, an heir or heirs at law as to such property, notwithstanding any law or usage to the contrary."
In 1899, Lula P. Crawford gave birth to an illegitimate child, Lucile Crawford, who is still living. In 1914, plaintiff contracted with defendant to sell him the land and make him good title thereto in fee simple. Defendant refused to accept her title and comply with his contract, on the ground that she could not make a good title, and this action was brought to determine whether, under the statute above quoted, the birth of an illegitimate child enabled her to make a feesimple title to the land.
Plaintiff's title is a fee conditional. At common law, the tenant in fee conditional may, on the birth of lawful issue, convey the land in fee simple. Postell v. Jones, Harp. 92; Wright v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. 441; Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545; Archer v. Ellison, 28 S.C. 238, 5 S.E. 713; Miller v. Graham, 47 S.C. 294, 25 S.E. 165; Timber Co. v. Holden, 90 S.C. 474, 73 S.E. 869; Holley v. Still, 91 S.C. 487, 74 S.E. 1065. If the statute makes plaintiff's child her heir, so that the child would take the land under the deed on the death of her mother, the condition of the deed has been performed, and plaintiff can make a fee-simple title to the land. By its terms the statute makes an illegitimate whose mother shall die intestate, possessed of any property, an heir at law as to such property. As to this property, the mother is bound to die intestate, for it is not subject to devise. Postell v. Jones, Harp. 92; Wright v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. 441. Therefore, if plaintiff should die now, Lucile would take as her heir under the statute. That being so, the title tendered to defendant is good. The statute was intended to ameliorate the rigorous policy of the common law with respect to the rights of bastards, which, in modern times, has been thought to visit the sins of the fathers too harshly upon their innocent offspring. It is therefore remedial in its nature, and should be construed liberally.
There is no force in the contention that this construction makes the statute retroactive. Nor is it obnoxious to any settled principle of law, in that it gives an effect to the deed of H. K. Crawford different from that which it would have had if the statute had not been enacted. While it is true that the laws existing at the time and place of making contracts enter into and form part of them, so that it will be presumed that the parties contracted with reference to them, it is also true that contracts are made in contemplation of the fact that the policy of the state relative to any matter is subject to change, and that parties to contracts have no vested right in an existing policy.
The principle is illustrated and the point decided in the case of Deas v Horry, 2 Hill, Eq. 244. There, a fee conditional was created by devise prior to the act abolishing the right of primogeniture. A reverter occurred, for failure of issue, after the passage of the act. It was nevertheless held that the reversion went, not to the eldest son of testator, as would have been the case under the law existing at the date of the...
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