Crawford v. State
| Decision Date | 10 November 1927 |
| Docket Number | 25962 |
| Citation | 216 N.W. 294,116 Neb. 125 |
| Parties | FAUNE M. CRAWFORD v. STATE OF NEBRASKA |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR to the district court for Adams county: WILLIAM A. DILWORTH JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
J. E Willits, for plaintiff in error.
O. S Spillman, Attorney General, and Lloyd Dort, contra.
Heard before, GOSS, C. J., ROSE, DEAN, DAY, GOOD THOMPSON and EBERLY, JJ.
Faune M. Crawford, hereinafter called defendant, was convicted of manslaughter in the district court for Adams county, for which he was adjudged to serve three years in the penitentiary and pay the costs of the prosecution. As plaintiff in error, defendant has brought the record of his conviction to this court for review.
It is undisputed that on the night of January 9, 1926, defendant, while driving a Ford automobile southward upon a public highway in Adams county, collided with another automobile being driven in the opposite direction by Lloyd Jackson, resulting in physical injuries to one Clarence Nelson, who was riding in defendant's car as an invited guest, from which injuries the said Clarence Nelson died. The information charged that the defendant, while driving an automobile upon a public highway in Adams county, in an unlawful, reckless, careless and negligent manner and being in a state of intoxication did cause the automobile which he was driving to collide with another automobile being lawfully driven on the highway by one Lloyd Jackson, thereby wounding and injuring one Clarence Nelson, from the effects of which the said Clarence Nelson died; that by reason of the facts aforesaid the said Faune M. Crawford unintentionally and while in the commission of said unlawful act did unlawfully and feloniously kill Clarence Nelson. To this information, defendant pleaded not guilty.
It is urged by the defendant that the court erred in overruling his motion in arrest of judgment. No attack was made by the defendant on the information by motion or otherwise until after the trial, when he filed a motion in arrest of judgment. The motion, as applied to the situation then before the court, raised only the question as to whether the facts stated in the information constituted an offense. Section 10159, Comp. St. 1922, provides that a motion in arrest of judgment raises only the questions of the jurisdiction of the court and whether the facts stated in the information constitute an offense. As we view it, there can be no question of the court's jurisdiction or that the facts constitute an offense.
It is next urged by defendant that the court erred in overruling the motion for continuance. This motion was founded upon the theory that defendant could not obtain a fair and impartial trial before the regular panel of jurors because, the day previous, he had been convicted, before a jury drawn from the regular panel, of violating the liquor laws of the state. During the argument of the motion, the court announced that the grounds alleged were not sufficient to grant a continuance, but that in the impaneling of the jury the court would sustain an objection for cause to any juror who had served upon the former case or against whom there was other ground of challenge for cause.
In the impaneling of the jury, all of the jurors who had served on the former trial were excused for cause except juror Havens. After otherwise qualifying, it was developed that he had been a juror in the former trial, but both sides passed him for cause. Defendant having declined to excuse the juror for cause, especially in view of the statement made by the court, he is not in position to now claim that he did not have a fair and impartial jury. Especially is this true since all of the jurors qualified to hear and determine the case. Where a party fails to object to a juror whose voir dire examination discloses facts for which challenge for cause would be sustained, and fails to exercise such challenge, he will not after verdict be heard to complain. Beckman v. Lincoln & N. W. R. Co., 85 Neb. 228, 122 N.W. 994; Palmer v. People, 4 Neb. 68; Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N.W. 788.
It is also urged that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction. It appears that on January 9, 1926, about 11 o'clock p. m., defendant was driving his car on the highway and collided with a car driven by Lloyd Jackson, injuring Nelson, from the effects of which he died. Several witnesses testify that as defendant was coming south his car zigzagged across the road and Jackson drove his car to the extreme right so that his right wheels were partially in the ditch, when, within 20 feet of Jackson's car defendant drove his car directly against Jackson's car, the force of the impact turning defendant's car completely around and upside down, east of the center of the road. After the accident, defendant was seen to pour some liquid out of bottles and throw the bottles over a fence. Witnesses also testify that there was a strong odor of whiskey; that he was seen to stagger; and several testified that he was under the influence of liquor. One bottle was picked up about half filled with intoxicating liquor. In addition to this, defendant, while riding back to town with the doctor, who had been summoned, told the doctor that he had been drinking. The position of the cars,...
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