Crawford v. State

• Decision Date: 15 November 1977
• Docket Number: Nos. 32910,32911,s. 32910
• Citation: 240 S.E.2d 824,240 Ga. 321
• Parties: Cynthia CRAWFORD v. The STATE (two cases).
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 824

240 S.E.2d 824

240 Ga. 321

Cynthia CRAWFORD v. The STATE (two cases).

Nos. 32910, 32911.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 15, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 6, 1977.

Sidney Pope Jones, Jr., Newnan, for appellant.

William F. Lee, Dist. Atty., Newnan, R. William Buzzell, II, LaGrange, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Kirby G. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

HILL, Justice.

After a jury found she was competent to be tried, the defendant was found guilty of the murder of her 16 year old cousin and was sentenced to life in prison. Newspaper articles filed in support of a motion for change of venue described this as one of the worst cases of child abuse in Coweta County. The deceased was found dead in a trailer housing 13 people, 2 adults and 11 children. Several other adults were arrested as a result of collateral investigations. The victim's body bore evidence of physical and sexual abuse.

At the trial of the special plea of insanity, a psychiatrist testified that in his opinion the defendant was not mentally competent to stand trial. A social worker who had known the defendant for over two years testified that in his opinion she would be unable to assist defense counsel. Three law enforcement officers who investigated the case and interrogated the defendant testified that in their opinion the defendant was competent.

At the trial of the special plea the psychiatrist was asked a hypothetical question by the prosecutor, over objection, which included the assumed but unproven facts that the defendant had abused the victim for a long period "as she is charged with doing" and that she "killed her cousin as she is charged with doing." The social worker was cross examined by the prosecutor, over objection, by reference to a photograph of the corpse, as to whether the scars on the body were old or fresh.

At the guilt-innocence trial at which the defendant and her mother were found guilty of murder, the state called the following witnesses: the social worker who discovered the body after the defendant called him to say she couldn't waken the victim; a newspaper photographer who took pictures of the body in the morgue; the victim's high school counselor who testified that the deceased was emotionally disturbed; the pathologist who performed the autopsy, identified the autopsy photographs and testified that death occurred at about 2 a. m. on January 7 immediately following a blow to the right forehead from a blunt instrument; and two of the law enforcement officers who investigated the crime and obtained the defendant's confession, as well as the defendant's mother's confession, that on the afternoon or evening of January 6 the defendant beat the victim with a ball bat and the mother hit the victim with her hands. The defense called no witnesses. As can be seen, the defendant's confession was the only probative evidence showing that the defendant committed the crime.

The defendant, a 16 year old female, IQ of 56, borderline mentally retarded, was arrested on a charge of cruelty to children and was taken to the police station. She was interrogated by four law enforcement officers at the station after being read her constitutional rights and waiving her right to counsel. After an hour the officers had her confession. Each of them asked questions. She didn't volunteer the information "You had to pick everything out of her." Although the defendant said she hit the deceased sometime during the afternoon or evening (several hours earlier than the pathologist fixed the time of death), the officers "didn't really try to pin her down" as to the time.

The record does not show that this juvenile was taken before the juvenile or superior court as required by Code Ann. § 24A-1402. Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298, 300-301, 232 S.E.2d 535 (1977). The record does show that the juvenile, when advised of her Miranda rights, was not advised that she could have a parent or other relative, teacher, social worker or other adult present during the questioning.

1. Unlike a plea of guilty, a confession is not conclusive in a criminal case. "All admissions shall be scanned with care and confession of guilt shall be received with great caution. a confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction." Code § 38-420.

Confessions of juveniles are scanned with more care and received with greater caution. In Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga.App. 325, 329, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969), the Court of Appeals held that although a juvenile confessed after being advised of his right to counsel, his confession was inadmissible because his mother was not advised as to her son's right to counsel.

This court, in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976), disapproved Freeman v. Wilcox, supra, to the extent that it required automatic exclusion of a juvenile's confession if a parent was not advised of the juvenile's right to counsel. Instead, this court in Riley, supra, adopted a totality of the circumstances test, saying (237 Ga. at 128, 226 S.E.2d at 926): " . . . the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances and the state has a heavy burden in showing that the juvenile did understand and waive his rights."

The court in Riley then set forth several of the factors to be considered among the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the juvenile's waiver of counsel was made knowingly and voluntarily, as follows (237 Ga. at 128, 226 S.E.2d at 926): "(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge . . . and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date."

Considering these factors, we find that in this case (1) the accused was 16; (2) the educational attainment of the accused was not shown by the state (where the burden rested) but we do know that her IQ was 56 and she was borderline mentally retarded; (3) she was arrested on a charge of cruelty to children with a warning that "there might be a murder charge involved in it"; Miranda warnings given and understood; (4) the accused was not allowed to consult, or advised that she could...