Crawford v. State
Decision Date | 11 January 1972 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 170 |
Citation | 264 So.2d 554,48 Ala.App. 325 |
Parties | Ervin Lee CRAWFORD v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Kenneth D. Wallis, Birmingham, for appellant.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and Herbert H. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Murder in the first degree: death by electrocution.
This is a companion case to Brown v. State, 48 Ala.Cr.App., 304, 264 So.2d 529. 1 Part I of the opinion of the majority of this Court on original deliverance (January 26, 1971) in Brown contains the essential facts. However, Crawford, unlike Brown, took the stand as a witness in his own behalf.
The defense established without dispute that the victim, Harris, was killed by a bullet from Brown's gun. Crawford admitted shooting at Harris. Hence, if convinced to the required degree, the jury from the evidence could have inferred that Crawford's participation helped 'pin down' Harris so that Brown's killing him was thereby facilitated. Code 1940, T. 14, § 14.
On testimony taken on the motion for new trial, one of Crawford's petty jurors testified that he knew that (1) Brown previously had been given a death verdict, and (2) Crawford and Brown were both accused of killing Harris. However, this juror testified that before Crawford's trial he had no knowledge of the facts of the killing. The trial judge overruled the motion for new trial. On the record before us we perceive no error.
Apparently, the defendant while in court was handcuffed for an unspecified period of time. In brief his counsel asserts, '* * * upon the beginning of closing arguments and after all testimony was in, the Appellant was allowed to be present in the courtroom and in the view of the jury shackled by handcuffs (R. p. 407).' Ground 14 of the motion for new trial claimed error because the jury was 'allowed to view the defendant (thus) * * * and the removal of the handcuffs * * *.'
The record shows the following:
'Go ahead and do that at this time.
'We make these various motions in the record, and somebody reading the record might not know what happened.
'Let the record show that when we came out after the last recess the handcuffs had been inadvertently left on the defendant, who was seated at the counsel table, with approximately twelve feet of table between him and the jury box, and his hands were in his lap, where he was seated.
'All right, we will see you at 1:30.'
In Clark v. State, 280 Ala. 493, 195 So.2d 786, Merrill, J., noted the Alabama authorities on restraining prisoners. See also Ala. Digest, Criminal Law, headnote 637.
In Starr v. State, 209 Ga. 258, 71 S.E.2d 654, the opinion pointed out the record failed to disclose how long the defendant remained manacled or that any jurors had observed that he was manacled. The court concluded that, at most, there was a technical breach of the rule against handcuffs and the record was without proof of prejudicial effect. The trial judge's denial of mistrial was held to have been within sound judicial discretion.
Likewise on the record before us the ruling below is sustainable because of lack of proof that any juror saw the defendant handcuffed. Hence, no prejudice influencing the verdict was established.
The taking of testimony had ended and the defendant was represented by two lawyers to argue in summation to the jury. Hence, we cannot see that this brief restraint would have had any appreciable tendency to confuse or embarrass the defendant in the exercises of his mental faculties so as to assist his lawyers.
We find no error in this ruling. 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 240.
The spectre of Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387, is brought across our horizon. The motion for new trial was heard August 14, 1970. Coleman, supra, was decided June 22, 1970. But the instant trial was April 6 through 9, 1970, well before Coleman, supra.
We excerpt from the hearing on the motion for new trial:
'THE COURT: I want to say this for the record and see if this is fair to say:
'As I understand, there is one ground which you, by amendment, added to your motion for a new trial, and that had to do with ground number 20, which was added by amendment to the motion, to the effect that the defendant was not represented by counsel in the preliminary hearing.
'Now, as I understand, the Court did ask you if this ground of your motion was based on the right to cross examine and to discover, and that phase of it, as distinguished from some witness who may have been available at that time but who later may have become unavailable, and I believe you said the situation as to the witness did not occur, but that you based it on the other phases, that is, the advantages that may have been gained through and discovered through cross examination at that time.
'Is that correct?
'I thought I would clear that up, rather than to have them send it back for me to do that when I could do it easily right now.
Seemingly the trial judge had in mind the 'harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt' test mentioned in Coleman, supra, which is derived from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. His conclusion, therefore, is a finding of harmlessness to that degree.
Whether or not his ruling was 'conceding arguendo' that there was a preliminary hearing without the defendant's having counsel, we cannot but surmise.
The State argues that under Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248; Coleman v. Alabama, supra, should apply only to preliminary hearings After June 22, 1970. This, of course, would exempt Crawford's case from the operation of the rule. We, however, pretermit such an oracular divination.
In view of the lack of any record proof that there was a preliminary hearing we find no error in the trial judge's ruling. A preliminary hearing does not always occur, Braden v. State, 45 Ala.App. 186, 227 So.2d 816, because a grant jury can be in session when a crime is committed.
McGautha v. California and Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, dispose of the appellant's death penalty arguments. Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 So.2d 631, and Swain v. State, 285 Ala. 292, 231 So.2d 737, expound recent views of our Supreme Court that the death penalty per se is not cruel and unusual punishment.
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Daniels v. State
...no proof was offered in support of the motions for new trial or mistrial. Therefore, they were properly overruled. Crawford v. State, 48 Ala.App. 325, 264 So.2d 554, cert. denied, 288 Ala. 686, 264 So.2d 559 (1972); Walters v. State, 30 Ala.App. 547, 9 So.2d 32 (1942); Hart v. State, 28 Ala......
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Crawford v. State
...the record under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346. Crawford's former case on appeal may be found in 48 Ala.App. 325, 264 So.2d 554. Technically, we should issue the writ, have the record brought up and pass upon it to ascertain what every one knows, to wit: tha......
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Crawford v. State, 6 Div. 956
...Petition of Ervin Lee Crawford for certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision in Crawford v. State, 264 So.2d 554. The State of Alabama has filed a motion to strike the petition on grounds that the petition 'manifestly and totally fails to com......