Crawford v. The State Of Ga.

• Citation: 12 Ga. 142
• Decision Date: 31 August 1852
• Docket Number: No. 26.,26.
• Parties: James Crawford, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

12 Ga. 142

James Crawford, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.

No. 26.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

AUGUST TERM, 1852.

Indictment for murder, in Bibb Superior Court. Tried before Judge Powers. May Term, 1852.

At the May Term, 1852, of Bibb Superior Court, James Crawford was put on trial for the killing of Evan Moore.

It appeared from the evidence, that the killing for which the defendant was indicted, occurred about night-fall on the 23d December, 1851, at a grocery in the city of Macon. There was no positive evidence, going to show that the defendant was the person who struck the blow, from which the physician testified that the deceased came to his death.

John Fennill, was sworn by the State, and on his cross-examination testified, " that just after dinner, the evening Moor was killed, Levi G. Bright, Daniel J. King and deceased, had a quarrel at witness's grocery, at the wagon yard, about a dollar; witness told them to hush it up, and they did so." At this point, the Solicitor General stopped the witness, and moved the Court to rule out the testimony, on the ground that the same was irrelevant.

The Court sustained the motion, and defendant excepted.

Charity Moore was sworn by the State, and when her crossexamination was concluded, counsel for defendant proposed to have her testimony (taken down on the cross-examination,) read over to her for correction and approval; which, the Court refused, remarking at the same time, in the presence of the Jury, " never mind reading over the testimony taken down on cross-examination, it does not amount to much any way."

To which ruling and remarks by the Court, defendant excepted.

After the State had closed its evidence, and defendant had announced that he would introduce none, and before the argument had commenced, " the witness Fennill came back into Court, and stated to the Court, that he wished to correct his tes-timony; at the same time, stating to the Court and in his hearing only, in what the corrections consisted. The Solicitor General moved the Court to have the correction made. Defendant objected. The Court refused the motion, but at the same time stated, in the presance and hearing of the Jury, the correction proposed to be made—which was, "that when witness Fennill asked deceased who hurt him, and deceased replied that he knew who did it, and would have satisfaction; witness then asked deceased if it was some one that went off with the wagon, and deceased replied it was."

To which announcement by the Court of said proposed correction, defendant excepted.

Among other things, the Court charged the Jury, " that if they believed from the evidence, that prisoner struck the fatal blow that killed the deceased, then the law imposed on him the obligation to show that he was justified in so doing, and makes the killing murder; and it is on the prisoner to produce evidence of justification, and to reduce the crime to manslaughter or justifiable homicide, if he could by proof." " That it was for them to decide whether there was any evidence showing that prisoner was justified in giving the blow—was it lawful to give it? had any assault been made on him? did he stand in reasonable fear of his life? For without the act was lawful in some way, the result could not be this kind of manslaughter. The issue was a plain one, and did prisoner strike the blow that caused the death of the deceased, and if so, was he justified in so doing?"

The Court charged the Jury, that if they had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the deceased, they must give him the benefit of that doubt, and acquit the prisoner; but that this must not be a doubt founded on mere fancy or caprice, but a reasonable doubt, such as a sensible, honest-minded man would reasonably entertain from the evidence. Doubts were not intended by law for the Jury to acquit prisoners; that is, the unfounded and imaginary doubt as before alluded to.

To which charges, counsel for defendant excepted, and upon these several exceptions, have assigned error.

Lamar & Lochrane, Poe and Hill, for plaintiff in error.

Sol. Gen. DeGraffenreid, for the State.

By the Court.—Warner, J. delivering the opinion.

The first ground of error assigned in this case is, the rejection of that portion of the testimony of John Fennill, drawn out by the cross-examination, in which he stated, that "just after dinner the evening Moore was killed, Levi G. Bright, Daniel J. King and deceased had a quarrel at witness' grocery, at the wagon yard, about a dollar; witness told them to hush it up, and they did so." In view of the facts of this case, we think this evidence was competent to show that there had been cause of quarrel between the deceased and other persons, on the evening of the same day the deceased was killed; the more especially as it appears that the deceased and prisoner were on friendly terms but a short time before he received the fatal blow, and it being somewhat doubtful from the evidence who struck that blow, that it was a circumstance, of which the Jury were entitled to consider, in favor of the defendant.

The second ground of error is, the refusal of the Court to have the cross-examination of Charity Moor, which had been taken down in writing under the Statute, read over in her hearing for her correction or approval, at the request of prisoner's counsel; the Court remarking at the same time, in the presence and hearing of the Jury, " never mind reading over the testimony taken down on cross-examination, it does not amount to much any way."It was the right of either party to have the testimony of the witness read over in her hearing, in order that she might correct or approve it, as it was taken down in writing; the more particularly if either party entertained any doubt that it had been incorrectly taken down, or not taken down at all. The testimony of the witnesses' is as it is taken down in writing at the time of the examination, usually constitutes the criterion when counsel differ as to what has or has not been proved, and therefore, it is always important that it should be correctly taken down, inthe sense which the witnesses delivered it, and not in a different sense.

This object can best be accomplished by reading it over to the witness before he or she leaves the stand, when all the facts are fresh in the recollection of the counsel, the Court and the witness, so...